From Copenhagen to Cancun - Driving-Forces in the International Climate Regime

Table of content

1. Introduction

2. Scientific and economic consequences of anthropogenic climate change
2.1. The natural and anthropogenic greenhouse effect
2.1.1. The IPCC and its 4th Assessment Report
2.1.2. The Stern Review and the economics of climate change

3. The regime theory
3.1. Three schools of thought within the theory of international regimes
3.1.1. The interest-based approach
3.1.1.1. Two-level games
3.1.2. The power-based approach
3.1.3. The knowledge-based approach
3.2. Application of the three approaches to the issue are of climate change

4. The issue area of climate change
4.1. The current climate regime
4.1.1. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
4.1.2. The Kyoto Protocol
4.1.2.1. The exit of the United States
4.1.2.2. Basic weaknesses of the Kyoto Protocol
4.1.3. The Bali Action Plan
4.2. Prorities of the main actors
4.2.1. The United States of America
4.2.1.1. Obama’s new climate policy
4.2.2. China
4.2.2.1. China’s plead for consumption-based inventories
4.3. International negotiations for a post-2012 agreement in Copenhagen and Cancun

5. Analysis of the driving-forces in the climate regime
5.1. The effectiveness and robustness of the climate regime
5.2. Analysis of the driving-forces with regard to the effectiveness of the international climate regime
5.2.1. Analysis of the current climate regime
5.2.2. Analysis of the negotiations for a post-2012 climate regime
5.2.3. Outlook regarding the regime’s potential future driving-forces
5.2.3.1. A shift in Obama’s political priority setting
5.2.3.2. Developments at the state and local level in the US
5.2.3.2.1. The ballot on Propostion 23 in California..82
5.3. Conclusion

References

Table of figures

Figure 1: Development of global annual average temperature and CO2-concentrations

Figure 2: Examples of impacts associated with global average temperature change

Figure 3: Example of a payoff matrix in the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Figure 4: Example of a payoff matriv in the Battle of the Sexes

Figure 5: Classification of a country’s support for international environmental regulations

Figure 6: Types of domestic political interest

Figure 7: Targets of the Kyoto Protocol and actual reductions

Figure 8: Coal producing states in the US

Figure 9: Cross-party voting on the ACES in the House of Representatives

Figure 10: Total energy consumption in China, by type (2008)

Figure 11: China’s exports and CO2-emissions since 2002

Figure 12: C02-emissions from China’s net exports in 2004 in comparison with total emissions from China and other countries

Figure 13: Renewable & alternative portfolio standards in the US

Figure 14: Regional cap and trade programs in the US

Figure 15: Total global investments in clean energy in $ bn from 2004 to 2010

Appendixes

Appendix 1: World carbon dioxide emissions by region

Appendix 2: National reduction targets in the Non-ETS-Sector in the EU

Appendix 3: Global carbon dioxide emissions from coal use in million metric tons, by region from 2005 to 2035

Appendix 4: Global carbon dioxide emissions in million metric tons, by region from 2005 to 2035

Appendix 5: Energy-related carbon dioxide emissions in metric tons per person, by region and country from 2005 to 2035

Appendix 6: China’s coal deposits and major railway infrastructure

Appendix 7: Copenhagen Accord emission mitigation goals of selected countries

Appendix 8: New constructions of coal-fired power plants in Germany

Appendix 9: World nuclear enery consumption, by region from 2005 to 2035

Appendix 10: Transcript - Interview: Nicholas Stern

Appendix 11: Transcript - Interview: Hermann Ott .120

Appendix 12: Transcript - Interview: Steve Kretzmann

1. Introduction

For more than two decades, scientific and political communities have debated whether and how to act on climate change. This discussion moved on. Today science is very clear about the magnitude of the risks imposed by unmanaged climate change:

“What we are doing is redifining where people could live and if we do that as a world than hundreds of million of people will move. Probably billions will move. We are talking about gambling the planet, we are talking about a radical change of the way in which human beings could live and where they could live and, indeed, how many of them.”^[1]

With regard to these risks the application of the precautionary principle telling us “to better be safe than sorry” appears to be imperative and makes traditional cost-benefit analysis become obsolete. Thus combating global warming has become one of the most important issues facing the world in the 21st century.

As nobody would be immune from the transformation the planet faces, avoiding this gamble should, in theory, be in the interest of all nations. Unfortunately, a common response in the scale necessary is hard to organize. While the industrialized countries fear the costs of the transformation from a high-carbon to a low-carbon economy, it is the poorest people who are facing a double unequity as they 1. will be hit earliest and hardest by the adverse impacts of climate change, and 2. are least responsible for the stock of current concentrations in the atmosphere.^[2] This inequity consequently leads to a great sense of injustice in developing countries being asked cut emission, while knowing, that the developed world got rich on high-carbon growth. Without any doubt the outcome of this is a historical responsibility of industrialized countries to take over leadership in reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases. However, bearing in mind that by 2050, approximately eight out of nine billion people in the world will be living in developing nations, it is impossible to get down to emission levels needed without at the same time covering the developing world as well.^[3]

Against this background international climate protection is a sociopolitical, economical, and ethical challenge, concerning all nations, which have to understand that they are a community based on the principle of mutual solidarity. The international climate regime is regarded as the main platform to further cooperation between nations in order to succesfully combat global warming. Ever since the first world climate conference in 1979 the international community of states pursues the goal of stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions in the medium-term, before finally reducing them in the long-term. In the end of 2009 and 2010, the 15th and 16th Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) aimed at achieving the final breakthrough with regard to framing new long-term mitigation commitments necessary in the scale needed to assure that global warming will not exceed 2° C above preindustrial levels; the line of demarcation from which on climate change is supposedly irreversible.

Going from this initial situation this thesis will try to determine the driving-forces of the climate regime and research if the regime theory is a capable tool to explain them. In the following chapter it will be started by highlighting the scientific and economic consequences of anthropogenic climate change to amplify, why there is such an urgent need to fight global warming. Thereafter part three is going to deal with the regime theory. After presenting its interest-based, power-based, and knowledge-based school, these different approaches will, in a second step, be applied to the issue area of climate change. Basing on this analysis it is possible to hypothesize on how actors are supposed to behave within the regime. Due to the fact, that this thesis has a limited volume it will be focused on the three actors, which are regarded as not only most important for the regime’s success but also possess the biggest influence within the international community, namely the United States, China, and the European Union. Thereby it will be strongly concentrated on the role of the United States. Understanding this role within the international climate regime is considered as absolutely central since the absolute emissions of the US surpass - with the exception of China - those of any other country and its per capita emissions are also amongst the highest in the world. As a result the US although containing just around one-twentieth of the world’s population produce almost one-fifth of the world’s total emissions of greenhouse gases. Being the world’s largest economy the US moreover not only has considerable financial resources which could be directed to environmental problems abroad, but also a technological capability with huge mitigation potentials. Consequently there is a great chance that a possible decision of the US to take a leading role on addressing climate change would set an example that other countries would follow. On the other hand the rest of the world, and here especially developing countries, such as China or India, very likely will not agree to needed actions either, if the US chooses to reject such a leader-role. Therefore it is often spoken of a ‘moral duty’ of the US to take the lead in the response towards global warming^[4], a duty which is amplified by the fact that the US alone is historically responsible for almost 30% of the total concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.^[5] While the EU has recognized its responsibility for anthropogenic climate change and implemented, as the first region worldwide, a comprehensive and demanding programme to fight the greenhouse effect, China’s participation and cooperation in the climate change regime is particularly important for two reasons. First, China’s impact on climate change is forecasted to be enormous: China’s large population, rapid economic growth and heavy reliance on fossil fuels collectively imply large increases in CO2 emissions and thereby a disproportionate influence on climate change.

The fourth part is divided in three sections. Since in isolation from its historical and institutional antecedents the global climate regime and the challenges it currently faces, cannot be properly understood, the first section will take a closer look at the current regime, which is founded on the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on climate change and supplemented by its 1997 Kyoto-Protocol. In this context special attention will be given to the exit of the US from the Kyoto process as the slow progress in the international climate negotiations from that point on was mainly triggered by the reluctance of the US to endorse the Kyoto approach.^[6] The second section focuses on the main priorities of the actors within climate negotiations, which are in turn highly affected by their energy political situation. The negotiations in Copenhagen and to a minor extent in Cancun will from this basis offer valuable clues to the question to which extent the actors have been able to convert their interests within the regime. In the final part it will be possible to draw a conclusion regarding the driving-forces of the regime and how they affect its effectiveness and robustness. After giving a compressed outlook on potential future driving-forces an assumption will be issued whether the hypotheses developed in the third part can be coroborated as valid.

2. Scientific and economical consequences of anthropogenic climate change

2.1. The natural and anthropogenic greenhouse effect

The greenhouse effect is a vital process, which is responsible for the heat on the earth’s surface. Analogical to the metaphoric naming the greenhouse gases^[7] in the atmosphere are the ones who take over the function as glas, that means while water vapour (H20), carbon dioxide (CO2) and other trace gases indeed let the short-waved solar radiation pass, the long-waved infrared radiation is after being absorbed by the earth given away to the universe again. During this process the greenhouse gases absorb a part of the infrared radiation and in turn radiate them back to the earth’s surface. This leads to a doubled radiation consisting of insolation and additional heat radiation. In the equlibrium of heat emissions of the earth and incoming solar radiation the surface temperature stays constant. If the concrentation of greenhouse gases now increases the equilibrium will be disordered. As a consequence the earth’ surface heats up as long until its through the higher temperature increased heat emissions meet the solar radiation. In the natural greenhouse effect the equilibrium regulates itself, so that in contrast to the universe an increased temperature at the earth’s surface exists, which makes life on earth possible.^[8] Humans interfere in this natural process by for instance consuming fossil fuels, like coal, oil and gas or intensive agriculture. Forest clearance and other land-use changes are also releasing carbon stored in trees and other vegetation, while reducing the amount of CO2 that is naturally absorbed by such carbon sinks. Consequently the concentration of greenhouse gases and here especially the share of carbon dioxide increases. Alone between 1970 and 2004 overall global greenhouse gas emissions increased by 70%, due to human activity whereby global carbon dioxide emissions increased by even 80%.^[9]

By these means human influence aggravates the greenhouse effect, what leads to global warming in the long-run, because additionally trapped heat exceeds the earth’s intake capacity. Thus we speak of anthropogenic^[10] climate change. Since the beginning of industrialisation the emission of greenhouse gases continuously increases. The current concentration of CO2 only in the atmosphere, adding up to 387 ppm, exceeds the concentration numbers prior to the industrial revolution, which ranged between 170 and 280 ppm for at least 800.000 years by around 30%. As a consequence temperatures today are already 0.8° C above preindustrial levels.^[11]

illustration not visible in this excerpt

Figure 1: Development of global annual average temperature and CO2-concentrations^[12]

However, today’s emissions have a delayed impact in the atmosphere, so that the consequences do not occur immediatedly but several decades later. Unmanaged climate change would raise the concentration of greenhouse gases from 430 ppm CO2-equivalent^[13] today to around 750 ppm towards the end of the century and as a result there would be a chance of 50%, that the global average temperature would exceed the preindustrial level by more than than 5° C; a level that has not occured on earth for more than 30 million years.^[14] Within a very short period of time the public and political awareness of the climate change problem dramatically increased. This is not at least a result of the combined impact of the Stern Review (2007), the Fourth Assesment Report of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2007), Al Gore’s Oscar-awarded documentary “An inconvenient truth” (2006), and the activities of innumberable NGOs, business councils and citizen groups. There is no longer a serious dispute regarding the reality and widespread implications of anthropogenic climate change, so that the basic question shifted from whether man-made climate change exists to what there is to do about it.

In the following part the scientific foundation, on which the political incentives to reduce global emissions of greenhouse gases are based on, will be presented. Out of numerous studies regarding the research on human induced climate change, it will hereby be concentrated on the results of the IPCC and the Stern Review. According to the International Council for Science the IPCC 4th Assessment Report represents “the most comprehensive international scientific assessment ever conducted” reflecting “the current collective knowledge on the climate system, its evolution to date, and its anticipated future development.”^[15] The reason for including the findings of an economical research group is, that by presenting the issues of climate change in economic rather than scientific terms, the Stern Review changed the conditions of the whole climate change debate. While the effects of global warming previously have been discussed primarily in qualitative terms, Stern argued that these effects would also correspond to large losses in economic welfare. Therefore, the Review had a substantial impact on the public debate over policy responses towards global warming.^[16]

2.1.1. The IPCC and its 4th Assessment Report

While the awareness of possible effects of fossil fuel cosumption on the climate can be dated back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it lasted till the early 1980s that scientific concern was aroused by research results pointing to the potential severity of climate change. First attempts to organize scientific coopertion on this issue were produced through the establishment of the IPCC^[17] in 1988.^[18] This establishment was a clear, if implicit, precursor to the launch of a political process on climate change^[19] and since their inception the IPCC and the regime on climate change have been closely entwined.^[20]

The IPCC itself is not a traditional research grouping. It is an independent intergovernmental body charged with the responsibility of assembling and publishing peer-reviewed findings of scientists engaged in climate research to provide an objective analysis, which is needed for policy-makers in order to reach well informed decisions.^[21] To carry out its role of providing support to the climate change regime the IPCC is organised into three Working Groups.^[22] Since 1990 the IPCC has released four large scaled and highly complex^[23] Assessments Reports, which include separate reports from each of the three working groups as well as a Synthesis Report. In 2007 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was awarded - jointly with Al Gore - with the Nobel Peace Prize for its

“...efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract such change.”^[24]

Although the reputation of the IPCC was affected by the so-called ‘Climategate’-affair^[25], the results of its 4th and latest Assessment Report released in 2007 still provide a robust foundation for the international climate policy.^[26]

The results show, that there is unequivocal evidence that the climate system is warming, and this is affecting both average air and ocean temperatures, thus causing widespread snow and ice melts and the rise of average sea levels.^[27] Drivers of this climate change are recording to the IPCC the global atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, which have increased markedly as a result of human activities since pre-industrial times^[28] leading with very high confidence to a global average net effect of a warming, with a radiative forcing of plus 1.6 W/m2.^[29] The IPCC came to the conclusion, that therefore with a certainty of more than 90% most of the increase in global average temperature is man-made. With current climate change mitigation policies and related sustainable development practices, global greenhouse gas emissions will continue to grow causing further global warming in a best estimate range for different scenarios between 1.8° C and 4.0° C degrees and a likely range for those scenarios between 1.1° C and 6.4° C until the end of the 21st century, what will very likely induce even larger changes compared to those observed in the 20th century.^[30]

illustration not visible in this excerpt

Figure 2: Examples of impacts associated with global average temperature change^[31]

Besides the impacts already mentioned in Figure 2, the IPCC is also concerned with the risks of extreme weather events like droughts, heat waves and floods which are projected to increase and will have adverse impacts on humans.^[32]

Although adaptation can reduce short and long term vulnerability, unmitigated climate change would in the long term likely exceed the capacity of natural, managed and human systems to adapt. A response to climate change consequently has to be carried out by a combination of adaptation and mitigation efforts to reduce its rate and magnitude.^[33] In order to stabilise heat-trapping greenhouse gas concentrations in a range between 445 and 490 ppm CO2-equivalent at the end of the century, what would imply a global warming of in the range of plus 2.0° C to plus 2.4° C above preindustrial levels^[34], emissions would need to peak in the year 2015 and be reduced by 50 to 85% in 2050 compared to the emissions in 2000.^[35] The IPCC predicts the costs of a reduction of greenhouse gases to achieve a stabilisation in the range of 445 and 535 ppm CO2-equivalent as less than 0.12% in annual GDP growth rates. This would signify a loss of less than 3% of GDP till 2030 and a loss of less than 5,5% of global GDP till 2050. Mitigation policies could moreover be associated with a range of so called co-benefits that could minimise this loss of GDP.^[36]

In a statement at the opening ceremony at the 16th Conference of Parties in Cancun the Chair of the IPCC Rajendra Pachauri, reminded the participants, that delayed mitigation actions and as a result delayed emission reductions would significantly constrain the opportunities to achieve lower stabilisation levels. As a result the risk of more severe impacts of climate change would increase. These impacts will be most severe for some of the poorest regions and communities in the world, which have hardly contributed to the cumulative emissions of greenhouse gases in the past.^[37] Pachauri concluded his statement by saying, that the available scientific knowledge in the field of climate change justifies strong action to deal with the growing challenges it evokes.^[38]

2.1.2. The Stern Review and the economics of climate change

Undoubtedly the release of the Stern Review^[39] has been a huge international event.^[40] Although not working under a mandate of the United Nations it has acquired almost as much authority as a report of the IPCC.^[41] Its analysis has catalyzed a fundamental rethinking of the economic case for action on climate change, by changing the priorily largely negative presumption economists held about the need for strong action on climate change to a positive one.^[42]

Basically Stern came to the conclusion, that climate change is a serious global threat, which demands an urgent global response. Through the comparison of the overall costs and risks of losing at least 5%^[43] of global GDP if no actions against the effects of climate change are undertaken and the costs of action to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, which can be limited to around 1% of global GDP each year^[44], Stern points out that the overall benefits of strong and early political measures to reduce greenhouse emissions farly outweigh the economic costs of non acting.^[45]

Stern also names concrete numbers for greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere that have to be reached in order to substantially reduce the risks of the worst impacts of climate change, namely a stabilisation in the range between 450 and 550 ppm CO2-equivalent. Regarding that the current level is at around 430 ppm and that this level is rising by more than 2 ppm each year emissions would be required to be at least 25% below the current levels by 2050 to meet this target range. In order to ultimately stabilize annual emissions they would have to be reduced by more than 80% below current levels. Every delay as Stern concludes will not only be extremely dangerous but also very costly.^[46] Even if developed countries will take responsibility for about 60 to 80% of absolute cuts Stern therefore sees the urgent need that developing countries take significant actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions too, with the additional specification that developing countries should not be required to bear the full costs for their actions.^[47] Following his frequently quoted statement regarding climate change being “the greatest market failure the world has ever seen”^[48], Stern directly names three elements of policies, which are required for an effective global response:

- the pricing of carbon,
- policies supporting innovation and the development of low-carbon technologies and
- actions to remove barriers to energy efficiency that go along with the education of individuals regarding personal possibilities to respond to climate change.^[49]

As climate change is a global problem and Stern consequently states that the response to it must be international and imbedded in a shared vision of long-term goals as well as agreements on frameworks for action.^[50]

After the release of the Stern Review it elicited not only a great amount of support including of a number of Nobel Prize laureates in economics like Mirrlees, Solow, Stiglitz, and Sen also harsh criticism from economists that have been involved in climate change studies for several years, like Nordhaus, Dasgupta, Tol and Yohe.^[51] While most aspects of the Stern Review, like most significantly the costs for stabilizing global atmospheric concentration in the range of 500 to 550 ppm of 1% of the global GDP^[52], have raised little controversities, critics concentrated on the problem of discounting and the way in which future costs and benefits are converted to present values.^[53]

The problem of discounting the consequences of global warming basically centres on the question of how long humans should be concerned with the long-term effects of their generations’ actions and the consequences of these actions on the health of the planet, due to the fact that the benefits of today’s mitigation activities will only be realized by future generations.^[54] Heal thus descripes the discount rate as “the rate of intergenerational dicrimination.”^[55] Stern chose a very low rate of pure time preference of 0.1%^[56] as a result of applying the standard utilitarian view that all people count equally and thus there is no moral justification for treating people more favourably, because they were born earlier.^[57] This implementation of ethical parameters was attacked by his critics to be peculiar, biased, and potentially misleading.^[58] The difference in employed discount rates is at the same time the main reason, why the estimated costs of inaction of at least 5 and up to 20% of the global GDP are much higher in the Stern Review compared to several other studies and consequently lead to different policy conclusions. It has even been claimed “that the Stern Review had cooked the economic book in order to sketch a catastrophic picture of the climate issue.”^[59]

Despite these difficulties there is no well-developed alternative to the analytical methods of the expected utility theory.^[60] Retrospective one main factor why since the early 90s actions against global warming have been limited and emissions have continued to grow, was the misapplication of cost-benefit-analysis and the underestimation of the magnitude of the risks of global warming. Van den Bergh for example drastically describes cost–benefit analysis of climate policy as a “failure”^[61], since it is not possible to assess the costs of climate damage with any acceptable degree of certainty.^[62] It became obvious that the problem of avoiding dangerous climate change requires a shift from a single to an interdisciplinary focus.^[63] The Stern Review transferred the mainstream of economic thinking from the cost-benefit-analysis to a new approach of risk analysis, which not only applys the precautionary principle^[64] but also acknowledges the insights and analysis from other disciplines.^[65] This new uncertainty analysis, which also has been accepted by governments and the public as mainstream, suggests that most conventional studies underestimated the risks of global warming.^[66] Therefore, the overwhelming majority of economists call for strong action on global warming.^[67] Exemplary for this stands Kenneth J. Arrow, who stated that “Stern’s fundamental conclusion is justified: we are much better of reducing CO2 emissions substantially than risking the consequences of failing to act”.^[68]

3. The regime theory

The regime theory originated in the late seventies initially in the United States. It searched for answers to challenges in a time when especially crude oil induced shocks in industrial countries have plastically shown the practical consequences of the grown interdependency of economies. So the American study of regimes first and foremost concentrated on the field of the international political economy and was trying to ensure a better understanding of international cooperation. At the same time another phenomenom occured, namely the significant increase in the numbers of international governmental and non-governmental organisations, while the dominance of the United States in the world politics declined.^[69] This was a surprising development as, according to the at this time predominant approach of neorealism^[70], international institutions like GATT or the IMF were supposed to become ineffective as a result of the US loosing its status as a global hegemon.^[71]

To primarily get a better understanding of what international regimes actually are it is useful to study them as social institutions.^[72] By means of separating international regimes from international organisations, which are likewise social institutions, two of their main criteria - besides fulfilling the criteria of durability^[73] - become especially apparent:^[74]

1. in contrast to international organisations, which often have an effect across problems, international regimes always refer to a specific problem area of international politics, like the protection of the ozon layer, trade liberalisations or the problem of climate change,
2. while international organisations can act as cooperative actors, international regimes lack this attribute.

In the following it will be concentrated on the interest-based, power-based and knowledge based approach to explain the emergence and characteristics of international regimes. The main focus of attention will be put on the work of Robert Keohane, who produced the most elaborate and also most widely discussed neoliberal approach. While Keohane’s formulation had such a strong influence that it has been widely equated with ‘regime theory’ as such^[75], the neoliberal school of thought, whose overriding emphasis has been on showing the role of international regimes in helping states to realize common interests, has come to represent the mainstream approach analyzing international regimes.^[76] Keohane’s theory will be complement by Putnams theory of the two-level-games to factor in domestic influences on the interests of states in international negotiations. Thereafter not only the main criticisms of the neorealist school regarding the neoliberal theory will be pointed out, but also the cognitivist perspective will be shown. Hereby it will concentrate on the branch of weak cognitivism that regards the demand for regimes in international relations as depending on the actors’ perception of international problems, which in turn are - e.g. in the case of environmental problems - heavily influenced by the information provided by scientists and so called epistemic communities. The cognitive perspective distinguishes itself from the other two approaches since it is the only one, which does not have a rational but sociological meta-theoretical orientation and is another useful complementation of Keohane’s regime theory. While none of the present approaches denies regimes any impact, the degree of institutionalism varies considerably, what not least has something to do with the behavioural models on which neoliberals, realists and cognitivists base their analyses.^[77]

3.1. Three schools of thought within the theory of international regime

3.1.1. The interest-based ap proach

The interest-based theory attributes international institutions a significant role in international politics and therefore dealt critically with the approach of neorealism, which during the first quarter century after WWII has been predominant in the international relations.^[78] Neoliberal and realist theories of international regimes though share their commitment to rationalism, which assumes that states, which act in anarchic structures^[79] are the most important actors in international politics. By following selfishly defined interests to maximize own profits they behave as rational egoists^[80] for whom altruistism never is a motivating force. Compliance to international rules and norms is according to rationalists not a result of a moral obligaion but of a situation where own short-term gains fail to outweigh own losses in the long-run.^[81] In contrast to neorealism the interest-based approach consequently stresses, that stable international cooperation is possible even beyond hegemonic power structures, when cooperation is due to increasing interdependent relations beyond national borders in the common interest of all involved states.^[82] Since the actions of a player in a field are driven by its interests and every player behaves as a utility maximizer problematic acting interdependencies might emerge, in which a better collective result can solely be reached through cooperation.

A need for cooperation is typical for the utilization of global collective goods^[83], which once provided can be used by everyone not only by its providers but also by free-riders, namely states not contributing to make the good available.^[84] This is a situation, entitled by Garrett Hardin as the “tragedy of the commons”, that entails two major problems. 1. unless it happens to produce significant side-effects^[85] in the form of private goods an individual actor, contemplating whether to contribute to the collective good or not, most likely won’t find a unilateral effort that will pay off, and 2. concerning the collective good itself, the smaller the actor the more its own benefit-cost ratio for unilateral efforts will negatively deviate from that of the world.^[86] Although in this constellation players have a common interest in securing the common good, cooperation seems very unlikely since each player will regard it as irrational.^[87]

The classical game theoretical approach of the Prisoner’s Dilemma^[88] is well suited to show how optimal individual and collective behaviour might drift apart, leading to sub-optimal collective results.

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Figure 3: Example of a payoff matrix in the Prisoner’s Dilemma^[89]

At this stage international regimes come into play, which states are, according to Young’s contractarian idea, motivated to create “when they discover that proceeding individualistically leads to joint losses or to an inability to reap joint gains.”^[90] The assumption that international cooperation is facilitated by regimes is the most general statement of contractualism. Keohane points out that this facilitation does not necessarily happen by changing the actors’ interests respectively values but by regimes being employed as an instrument to shape the behavior of its members in predictable ways. This predictabilty is of utmost importance since the actors’ strategic choices of actions in international politics are also heavily influenced by the expected behavior of the other actors.^[91] This being considered the central problem leading to the need for regimes is that, according to the rational-choice perspective in game theoretical approaches, states initially fear being double-crossed. Therefore the optimal strategy in a ‘one shot’ game is to defect rather than to cooperate. Axelrod however has demonstrated that in an iterated game the best strategy for states is to play ‘tit for tat’^[92] since it not only leads to a growth in trust and mutual confidence but also significantly reduces the risks of cooperation - expressed in the fear of being double crossed - since there is always a possibility of reversing the decision to cooperate.^[93]

By ensuring that bargaining games are constantly repeated, regimes, which are according to Krasners’s standard definition “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”^[94] guarantee, that cooperation without central enforcement can be induced and maintained through a reciprocal strategy.^[95] This ‘shadow of the future’-effect^[96] is amplified by another feature of international regimes, namely the fact that regimes usually not only apply their principles, norms, and rules to a single but to a plurality of cases. Thus by producing issue linkages they are embedded in a larger and more encompassing international framework.^[97]

The more functional features of regimes predominantly deal with their ability to decrease the transaction costs^[98] connected to international cooperation. Choosing a defection strategy within international regimes has e.g. large reputional effects. The disregard of regime regulations might lead to the situation that the particular state looses credibility. Such a loss might in turn lead to high political costs since its ability to reach agreements with other states is affected.^[99] Furthermore international regimes decrease for instance the transaction costs by offering a negotiation framework, in which not only the negotiation procedures are specified, but also the partners as well as the basic targets of these negotiations. As a result expensive and time consuming pre-negotiations do not have to be conducted. Transaction costs are finally reduced by means of supplying control mechanisms since those mechanisms further the chances that states actually comply to the cooperation agreements; this in turn creates a higher level of confidence.^[100] Finally regimes contribute to increasing the transparency regarding the behaviour of its members. Since transparency makes norm offences visible in the first place^[101], it is the basic requirement for regimes to unfold their described positive effects on cooperation.^[102]

3.1.1.1. Two-level games

One very important refinement of the interest-based approach is the approach of two-level games by Putnam. This approach builds up on the consensus, that theories in the area of international politics should not only take interstate but also domestic factors into consideration since it is assumed that home and foreign policies are typically interwoven.^[103] According to this assumption national governments, although representing their countries in international negotiations, are not entirely free to formulate policy positions since national governments in democratic states ultimately depend on legislative majorities or in some cases public referenda to ratify international agreements. Statesmen are forced to bargain between two ‘tables’ representing domestic politics on the one and international negotiations on the other hand, so that they, regarding the choice of diplomatic strategies and tactics, “are constrained both by what other states will accept and by what domestic constituencies will ratify.”^[104]

Consequently the probability with which agreements regarding international cooperation will be ratified at home has to be factored in the international negotiations, and therefore governmental positions are likely to be influenced by the most important domestic pressure groups, such as the parliament, domestic agencies, key interest groups, or even the leader’s own political advisers.^[105] Through the emphasis of these influences of domestic preferences the two-level metaphor provides a more complex version of international negotiations.^[106] Thereby domestic preferences can affect the creation and the reach of regimes positively and negatively. Either so-called ‘leaders’ possess a pronounced interest in international cooperation in a particular issue area or ‘veto’ positions oppose this kind of cooperation.^[107]

In conclusion this leads to a situation where “domestic groups pursue their interest by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies” at the national level while national governments “seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments” at the international level.^[108] Here the constitutive idea of two-level games becomes obvious, namely that the domestic and the international level are mutually dependent on each other. The challenges of this kind of ‘double-edged diplomacy’ might lead to a predicament, in which statesmen are confronted with strategic opportunities and dilemmas.^[109] The latter emerge out of a situation, where the statesmen are forced to balance international and domestic concerns. The difficulty of this task lies in the fact that rational moves for a player at one board “may be impolitic for that same player at the other board.”^[110] Putnam however additionally stresses the opportunities for clever players to spot moves at one board, that will trigger realignments on the other board, so that they as a result are enabled to achieve objectives, which seemed to be unreachable.^[111]

3.1.2. The power-based approach

Realist theories^[112] argue that the international scociety is based on anarchic structures and is dominated by states who strive for maximal power and security.^[113] Perhaps the main critique of realist - here especially Grieco - towards neoliberal theories of cooperation is that they have failed to grasp the full meaning of the concept of anarchy, which is central to the realist thinking of international politics.^[114]

In the realist context anarchy first and foremost means that each state depends for its safety and its survival on its own capabilities as there is no central institution possessing the ability to guarantee it. This perception of the international system describes the international system as ‘one of self-help’. Due to the fact that the capabilities of states heavily depend on the capabilities controlled by other states, not absolute but relative power counts. Thus decisions of states are not exclusively determined by the expectations regarding own pay-offs, but also by the expectation of how well their partners will do.^[115] Being this kind of ‘defensive positionalists’ a situation might occur where states forgo sizeable absolute gains when their relative capabilities are expected to decrease as a result of even higher gains for their partners.^[116] Consequently realists reckon international cooperation of states, aimed at the realization of mutual gains, as elusive as “a structurally induced intolerance for relative losses circumscribes their ability to work together.”^[117]

In contrast to interest-based approaches power-based approaches thus set value on the effects of possible cooperation on the relative position of power in the international system and thus concentrate on the distributional effects of games.^[118] In this spirit Krasner argued that the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which is employed in interest-based approaches of the regime theory, is not suited to capture such distributional effects^[119] and proposes a coordination game named ‘Battle of the Sexes’^[120] to explain what happens in international politics.^[121]

illustration not visible in this excerpt

Figure 4: Example of a payoff matrix for the Battle of the Sexes^[122]

The main implication of international cooperation in terms of ‘battle’ is that the fear of being cheated is no longer the main obstacle hindering efforts to realize mutual gains since choosing a defection strategy would imply a loss of utility.^[123] However, the reason for ‘battle’ leading to a social situation no less problematic than Prisoner’s Dilemma lies in the fact that the inherent distributional effects also have implications for the distribution of power. A surplus of power can in turn be used to define the relevant actors - actors with less power are in international relations often not even invited to the table -, to influence the rules of the game, and to dictate the payoff matrix.^[124]

Thus a regime, applied to further cooperation between states, has according to neorealism the task of ensuring an equitable distribution of gains, so that the “pre-cooperation balances of capabilities” are maintained. Taking into consideration, that such a desired distribution of gains does usually not result automatically states employ so called side-payments or other similar concessions to compensate otherwise disadvantaged partners for relative losses.^[125]

One well known and classic example of a power-based approach of international regimes is the theory of hegemonic stability.^[126] Here the existence of effective international institutions is linked to a unipolar distribution of power in a given issue area.^[127] Although the prospects of cooperation were still seen pessimistically, it was acknowledged that given the existence of an actor with a preeminence of power and the willingness of this so called hegemon to use its power resources, international cooperation is prinicipally possible.^[128] The hegemon might act benevolently or malvolently. In the first case he would provide the global collective good, while the other states are basically free-riding. In the latter case, which is also called the ‘coercive leadership model’ the hegemon produces the global collective good, but by means of its superior power forces the other states to contribute as well.^[129] The theory predicts that the degree of international cooperation is proportional to the dominance of the hegemon. Conseqently the robustness of regimes is assumed to be low since once a unipolar power structure in international politics dissolves, the regime itself is expected to become ineffective.

3.1.3. The knowledge-based approach

Given the fact that interest-based and power-based approaches explaining international regimes are rationalist theories, they assume exogenously predetermined strategies and preferences of actors. Therefore behaviour, in form of cooperation or non-cooperation, is clearly identifiable and difficulties to communicate are almost non-existing. Knowledge-based approaches target to fill these upstream assumptions with regards to content.^[130] Doing so the variable knowledge, which is seen as inseparably linked to the interests of actors, stands in the center of cognitive analysis. Examining how actors receive, process, interpret, and adapt to new information about their environment and each other^[131] they try to find out more about the process that produces the interests of states.^[132]

As already mentioned in 3.1.1. Oberthür describes the rationality of actors as bounded since they do not possess complete information. Therefore adequate knowledge is a ‘sine qua non’ for a rational calculation of interests.^[133] Falling back on this assumption weak cognitivism^[134] advances the view that states need knowledge and expertise to meet the challenges of rational political decisions. Governments and other actors therefore depend on epistemic communities^[135] defined as

“...a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authorative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area.”^[136]

[...]

^[1] Transcript - Interview Stern.

^[2] The World Resources Institut estmiated that the share of the total greenhouse emission from the developed world between 1850 and 2002 mounts up to 76%.

Cf. http://pdf.wri.org/navigating_numbers_chapter6.pdf (Accessed: 30.03.2011). See also Appendix 1.

^[3] Cf. Transcript - Interview Stern.

^[4] Cf. http://www.stwr.org/climate-change-environment/us-has-a-moral-duty-to-lead-in-climate-fix.html (Accessed: 30.03.2010).

^[5] Cf. http://pdf.wri.org/navigating_numbers_chapter6.pdf (Accessed: 30.03.2011).

^[6] Cf. Skodvin/ Andresen, An agenda for change in U.S. climate policies? Presidential ambitions and congressional power, p. 264.

^[7] Reckoned as the most important greenhouse gases are carbon dioxid (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), partial halogenated fluorocarbon (H-FCKW), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) and perfluorinated hydrocarbons (FKW / PFC). Carbon dioxide emissions alone account for approximately 77% of the total emissions of greenhouse gases.

^[8] Cf. Bauer, Der Treibhauseffekt. Eine ökonomische Analyse, p. 6.

^[9] Cf. IPCC, Synthesis Report, p.36. Especially in the sectors of power supply and transportation the increases of greenhouse gas emissions by 145 respectively 120% have been significant. Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/move/70/index_de.htm (Accessed: 30.03.2011).

^[10] anthropogenic = caused by humans

^[11] Cf. World Development Report 2010, Development and Climate Change, pp. 70-72.

^[12] World Development Report 2010, Development and Climate Change, p. 73.

^[13] Since CO2 is the most important greenhouse gas in terms of volume, it is sometimes used as a standard of measurement when assessing emissions. CO2 equivalent is the amount of CO2 emission that would be involved to produce the same output as all the greenhouse gases combined.

^[14] Cf. Stern, Der globale Deal, p. 41.

^[15] Cf. http://www.icsu.org/publications/icsu-position-statements/controversy-ipcc/ (Accessed: 30.03.2011).

^[16] Cf. Quiggin, Stern and his critics on discounting and climate change: an editorial essay, p. 195.

^[17] The IPCC, also known under the name World Climate Council, is a scientific intergovernmental body that arose from a shared initiative of two organizations of the United, namely the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). The IPCC deals with the assessment of scientific findings regarding the current state of climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic consequences. The panel is tasked with reviewing the most recent scientific, technical and socioeconomic information that are relevant for the understanding of the risks of antropogenic climate change. Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/move/70/index_de.htm (Accessed: 30.03.2011).

^[18] Luterbacher/ Sprinz, Problems of Global Environmental Cooperation, p. 4.

^[19] The ozone regime, where intergovernmental, independent scientific research served as a forerunner to the negotiations leading to the Vienna Convention has been the role model for this approach. Subsequently the UN General Assembly endorsed the establishment of the IPCC. Cf. Yamin/ Depledge, The international climate change regime : a guide to rules, institutions and procedures, p. 466.

^[20] Cf. Yamin/ Depledge, The international climate change regime : a guide to rules, institutions and procedures, p. 466.

^[21] Cf. Yamin/ Depledge, The international climate change regime : a guide to rules, institutions and procedures, p. 466.

^[22] Working Group I: The science of climate change, Working Group 2: Impacts, vulnerability and adaptation, Working Group 3: Mitigation options.

^[23] The 4th Assessment Report involved the work of approximately 3750 experts including lead authors, contributing authors and expert reviewers. It referred to approximately 18,000 items of published literature and dealt with about 90,000 comments, being provided by reviewers from governments and the scientific community. Cf. http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/media/application/pdf/101129_cop16_oc_rpac.pdf (Accessed: 30.03.2011).

^[24] http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/( Accessed: 30.03.2011).

^[25] The publishing of stolen e-mails prior to the 15th COP in Kopenhagen has been the catalyst of the debate on the IPCC. The British climatologist Phil Jones and other prominent authors were confronted with the accusation of holding back data from publically financed research. In addition to the media picking up frictions, like incorrect statements regarding the rain forests in the Amazon, the IPCC came under criticism for presenting the state of research in a biased way, by systematically ignoring variational scientific findings to create a “climate of fear” in order to implement a normatively motivated environmental policy and to secure own benefices. Top-class committees, which were implemented in the US and in the UK to clear up the different scandals, however, confirmed the scientific findings of the IPCC and absolved Jones of the charges of data-manipulation. Judged by a no-nonsense approach the mistakes cannot be ascribed to politically motivated fraud, but to the sloppy realisation of existing practices of the IPCC. Cf. Beck, Vertrauen geschmolzen?: Zur Glaubwürdigkeit der Klimaforschung, pp. 16-20.

^[26] Cf. Beck, Vertrauen geschmolzen?: Zur Glaubwürdigkeit der Klimaforschung, p. 20.

^[27] Cf. IPCC, Synthesis Report, p. 30.

^[28] Alone between 1970 and 2004 there has been an increase of 70% in the emissions of greenhouse gases due to human activities. Cf. IPCC, Synthesis Report, p. 36.

^[29] In climate science, radiative forcing is loosely defined as the change in net irradiance at the atmospheric boundary between the troposphere and the stratosphere. Net irradiance, which is measured in Watts per square climate system. An increase of plus 1.6 is very likely to have been unprecedent in more than 10.000 years. Cf. IPCC, Synthesis Report, pp. 36-37.

^[30] Cf. IPCC, Synthesis Report, pp. 39-45.

^[31] IPCC, Synthesis Report, p. 51.

^[32] Cf. IPCC, Synthesis Report, p. 65.

^[33] Cf. IPCC, Synthesis Report, pp. 65-66.

^[34] At this level some impacts of climate change would already be unavoidable and global sea-level rise would be in a range between 0.4 – 1.4 meters on account of thermal expansion alone. Cf. IPCC, Synthesis Report, p. 67.

^[35] Cf. IPCC, Synthesis Report, pp. 66-67.

^[36] These co-benefits include e.g. lower levels of air pollution and associated health benefits, higher levels of energy security, higher levels of employment and higher levels of agricultural production. Cf. IPCC, Synthesis Report, pp. 67-69. The IPCC further strongly pleads for international cooperation since it not only offers many options to reduce the global emissions of greenhouse gases, but is also seen as a tool to reduce the global costs for achieving given levels of mitigation and to improve environmental effectiveness. Cf. IPCC, Synthesis Report, p. 62.

^[37] Cf. http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/media/application/pdf/101129_cop16_oc_rpac.pdf (Accessed: 30.03.2011). The IPCC pointed out that there are sharp differences across regions regarding the distribution of impacts and vulnerabilities of climate change since there is increased evidence, that low-latitude and less-developed areas, e. g. in the Arctic, Africa, small islands and Asian and African megadeltas, generally face greater risks. Cf. IPCC, Synthesis Report, p. 65.

^[38] Cf. http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/media/application/pdf/101129_cop16_oc_rpac.pdf (Accessed: 30.03.2011).

^[39] In 2005 Gordon Brown announced that he had asked Sir Nicholas Stern, a former chief economist an Senior Vice-President of the World Bank, to lead a major review on the economics of climate change in order to develop a better understanding of the nature of the economic challenges and how they can be met, not only in the UK but globally as well. The Review was prepared by a team of economists at Her Majesty's Treasury, which is the United Kingdom government department. It is amongst others responsible for developing and executing the British government's economic policy. From now on the Stern Review, will be referred to just as Stern. Cf. Godard, Time discounting and long-run issues: the controversy raised by the Stern Review of the economics of climate change, p.3.

^[40] Cf. Godard, Time discounting and long-run issues: the controversy raised by the Stern Review of the economics of climate change, p. 1.

^[41] Cf. Hulme, Why we disagree about climate change: understanding controversy, inaction and opportunity, p. 126.

^[42] Cf. Heal, The economics of climate change: a post-stern perspective, pp. 295-296.

^[43] If a wider range of risks and impacts of climate change is taken into account possible damages could rise up to loosing 20% of global GDP per year or more. Cf. Stern, The economics of climate change: the Stern review, p. xv.

^[44] In June 2008, Stern said that because of evidence that climate change was happening faster than predicted, due to the planet’s oceans and forests soaking up less carbon dioxide than expected, emissions need to be reduced even more sharply to keep them at a level below 500 ppm. As a result the costs of these reductions would double to about 2% of GDP instead of the 1% in the original report. Cf. Jowit/ Wintour, Cost of tackling global climate change has doubled, warns Stern, The Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/jun/26/climatechange.scienceofclimatechange (Accessed: 30.03.2011).

^[45] Cf. Stern, The economics of climate change: the Stern review, p. xv.

^[46] Cf. Stern, The economics of climate change: the Stern review, p. xvi.

^[47] Cf. Stern, The economics of climate change: the Stern review, p. xvii.

^[48] Stern, The economics of climate change: the Stern review, p. xviii.

^[49] Cf. Stern, The economics of climate change: the Stern review, p. xviii.

^[50] Stern acknowledges the role of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol to provide the necessary foundation for international co-operation and names the emission trading, technological cooperation, actions to reduce deforestation and adaption as key elements, which have to be included in future international frameworks. Cf. Stern, The economics of climate change: the Stern review, p. xviii.

^[51] Cf. Godard, Time discounting and long-run issues: the controversy raised by the Stern Review of the economics of climate change, p. 4.

^[52] In comparison to this number the latest IPCC report estimates the cost of keeping CO2 equivalent concentrations below about 450 ppm as less than 3% of world GDP by 2030 and less than 5.5% by 2050. Cf. Heal, The economics of climate change: a post-stern perspective, p. 292.

^[53] Cf. Quiggin, Stern and his critics on discounting and climate change: an editorial essay, p.195.

^[54] Cf. Hulme, Why we disagree about climate change: understanding controversy, inaction and opportunity, p. 121.

^[55] Heal, The economics of climate change: a post-stern perspective, p.277.

^[56] Stern chose the parametric value of 0.1% to represent the pure rate of time discount as just a device to take account of possibilities that would render all calculations irrelevant, like e. g. a nuclear catastrophe. Due to the fact, that the probability of such an event is very unlikely the parametric value is almost zero. Cf. Quiggin, Stern and his critics on discounting and climate change: an editorial essay, p.203.

^[57] The Stern Review commissions the ethics of climate change from Broome, who claimed that economics are not ethics-free and that economics based on individuals assumed to be entirely self interested can have severe negative consequences. By arguing that those who cause climate change should cease to do or compensate those who suffer, Broome positions justice centre stage in considering the ethics of climate change. The utilitarian view further argues, that lives should not be valued by the method of willingness-to-pay and that future lives should not be discounted in value to present ones. Economists, who e.g. discount damages resulting from global warming at 1.5% pa or even higher value next generation’s lives and health implicitly as a fraction of their own. Cf. Barker, The economics of avoiding dangerous climate change. An editorial essay on The Stern Review, pp. 184-186. In addition to this such a discounting would be, like Caney argues, problematic in regards to the protection of human rights, since persons possess a human right not to suffer from the ill-effects of climate change. These ill-effects include an undermining of a person’s human right to a decent standard of health, economic necessities, and subsistence. The moral importance of these rights does not diminish over time and therefore they should not be discounted. Cf. Caney, Human rights, climate change, and discounting, p. 551.

^[58] Cf. Quggin, Stern and his critics on discounting and climate change: an editorial essay, p.203. Neoclassical economists like Nordhaus apply a discount rate which purely relies on the market and preferences rather than on ethics and moral philosophy. Nordhaus takes into consideration that humans prefer consumption today over deferred benefits tomorrow and that future generations are expected to be wealthier than the current generation and thus will have greater spending power to cope with the consequences of climate change. Cf. Hulme, Why we disagree about climate change: understanding controversy, inaction and opportunity, p. 122. Not surprisingly Nordhaus came to the conclusion that the Stern Review was unscientific. Cf. Barker, The economics of avoiding dangerous climate change. An editorial essay on The Stern Review, p. 184.

^[59] Godard, Time discounting and long-run issues: the controversy raised by the Stern Review of the economics of climate change, p.17.

^[60] Cf. Quiggin, Stern and his critics on discounting and climate change: an editorial essay, p. 203.

^[61] Cf. Van den Bergh, climate policy is affordable-12 reasons, p. 341.

^[62] The traditional approach cost-benefit approach thererfore simplifies or just ignores such deep uncertainties of long-term climate projections. Traditional economics have further persistently ignored the conclusions and insights of other disciplines, what lead to the neglect of the impact of climate change on amongst others security, which might be endangered as a result of human conflict due to mass migrations, large-scale biodiversity loss, economic development, and human population/demography. An extensive critique of the cost-benefit analysis, can be seen in Van den Bergh, climate policy is affordable-12 reasons, p.341-347.

^[63] Cf. Barker, The economics of avoiding dangerous climate change. An editorial essay on The Stern Review, p. 173.

^[64] This kind of risk analysis was also evident in the Third Assessment Report of the IPPC. If the risks of climate change are seen as very large and if future generations are not believed to being able to handle them, the results of cost-benefit analysis become obsolete through the application of the precautionary principle, which Hulme summarises in the aphorism “it is better to be safe than sorry”. The application of the precautionary principle shifts the burden of proof in the absence of scientifc consensus to those, who resist efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Cf. Hulme, Why we disagree about climate change: understanding controversy, inaction and opportunity, pp. 123-124.

^[65] Like in the IPCC reports the Stern Review also took intrinsic values on e. g. human suffering, damages to nature, and risks and uncertainties as criteria for social choice into account. Cf. Barker, The economics of avoiding dangerous climate change. An editorial essay on The Stern Review, p. 180.

^[66] Cf. Barker ,The economics of avoiding dangerous climate change. An editorial essay on The Stern Review, pp. 174-175.

^[67] Cf. Heal, The economics of climate change: a post-stern perspective, p. 295.

^[68] Arrow, The Case Cutting Emissions, The Economist: http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2007/12/kenneth-arrow-t.html (Accessed: 30.03.2011).

^[69] Cf. Sprinz, Internationale Regime und Institutionen, p. 251.

^[70] Neorealism concludes in the theory of hegemonic stability, which says that stable international cooperation is only possible when a hegemonic power agrees to enforce it over other states. Cf. Zangl, Regimetheorie, p. 117.

^[71] So the regime theory could also be regarded as a response to the limitations of neorealism to explain the fact, that despite the declining power of the US the mentioned institutions kept existing and global economical interdepencies even increased. Being an approach, which stresses the role of institutions in the international relations the regime theory has to be assigned to the so called neoinstitutionalism. Cf. Zangl, Regimetheorie, p. 118.

^[72] A social institution signifies durable, solidified behavior patterns in assignable, recurring situations, which base on specific norms and rules. Social institutions make actors meet role-expectations in recurring situations. Thereby they contribute to the equalisation of alternating behavior expectations and increase the reliability of expectations between two or more interacting parties. This in turn makes a cooperative handling of problems or conflicts more likely. Cf. Rittberger/ Kruck/ Romund, Grundzüge der Weltpolitik: Theorie und Empirie des Weltregierens, p. 201.

^[73] Cf. Oberthür, Umweltschutz durch internationale Regime: Interessen, Verhandlungsprozesse, Wirkungen, p. 40.

^[74] Cf. Rittberger/ Kruck/ Romund, Grundzüge der Weltpolitik: Theorie und Empirie des Weltregierens, p. 202.

^[75] Cf. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 28.

^[76] In order of clearly profiling own positions the other two schools, namely the realism and cognitivsm, refer to its arguments. Cf. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 23.

^[77] Cf. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, pp. 2-3.

^[78] Cf. Rowlands, Classical Theories of International Relations, p. 43.

^[79] Indeed increasing common rules and institutions exist in whose framework public action is generated, but in principle the states are admittedly sovereign and not subordinated to an authorative instance within the international system. Cf. Oberthür, Umweltschutz durch internationale Regime: Interessen, Verhandlungsprozesse, Wirkungen, p. 26.

^[80] According to Keohane rationality means that states have consistent, ordered preferences, and that they in order to maximize their utility in view of those preferences calculate costs and benefits of alternative courses of action. Egoism in turns implies that the utility functions of each state are independent from each other, so that a state’s utility is not affected by gains or losses of others. Cf. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 29. Oberthür, however, points to the fact that the rationality of states is bounded since they neither possess complete information nor would they be able to completely process it. Cf. Oberthür, Umweltschutz durch internationale Regime : Interessen, Verhandlungsprozesse, Wirkungen, p. 27.

^[81] Cf. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger 1996, Justice, Equality, And The Robustness Of International Regimes, p. 9.

^[82] Cf. Zangl, Regimetheorie, p. 117.

^[83] Global collective goods are a subset of international common goods, due to going beyond all national borders. No individual state possesses an exclusive right of utilisation, because - as with a public good - nobody can be excluded from its usage. At the same time a short supply causes the existence of a usage rivalry for common goods. This shortage of supply does not have an effect as long as the common good is available abundantly and becomes apparent not before the consumption exceeds a certain treshold. In the case of the atmosphere for example the resources associated with this “common” are exhaustible as, if CO2-equivalent gases are too numerous in the atmosphere, the normal functioning of the climate system is perturbed. Considering the free access to international common goods, profit maximizing states try to generate the highest possible utility out of their usage . On the other hand the damage caused on the goods is passed out to the community of users. Although nobody has an incentive to do so this behavior results in an overuse and possibly to the destruction of the goods, due to the fact that first and foremost the other states would benefit from own constraints. Cf. Oberthür, Umweltschutz durch internationale Regime: Interessen, Verhandlungsprozesse, Wirkungen, pp. 35-37.

^[84] Cl. Underdal, Arild, Complexity and challenges of long-term environmental governance, p. 388.

^[85] Exemplary for the case of climate change those side-effects could be the co-benefits of mitigation policies mentioned in the Reports of the IPCC, including lower levels of air pollution and associated health benefits as well as higher levels of energy security, employment and agricultural production. Side-effects could significantly minimise the costs for contributing to the collective good.

^[86] Cl. Underdal, Arild, Complexity and challenges of long-term environmental governance, p. 389.

^[87] Cl. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 31.

^[88] The Prisoner’s Dilemma got its name from a situation where two criminals are held in custody being charged with two offences - of which one is less serious than the other - they are suspected of having commited together. Each suspect is separately offered a deal. By confessing that the more severe crime has been committed together, he will go free while his accompliance - assumed that he continues to deny his participation - has to go to jail for both offences. In the case that both decide to confess only the punishment for the minor crime will be remitted to them. The dilemma emerges since each prisoner has a strong incentive to accept the prosecution’s offer being the best choice regardless of the decision of the former partner. The mutual confession, however, leads to a stricter punishment compared to the one which would have occurred by not confessing. Cl. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 31.

^[89] Cf. Own editing.

^[90] Young, Global Governance: Toward a Theory of Decentralized World Order, p. 276.

^[91] Due to the fact that an analytical deduction of actors’ interests can solely be situational, the actions of a state do not provide reliable information about their goals and interests. Cl. Oberthür, Umweltschutz durch internationale Regime: Interessen, Verhandlungsprozesse, Wirkungen, p. 28.

^[92] Tit for tat means that states will just cooperate when their partners cooperate as well. To explain the ‘tit for tat’ strategy Axelrod cites an example of the warfare in WWI, where self-interested behaviour led to a recognisable pattern of cooperation between the fighting forces. As long as their behaviour was reciprocated by the other side both forces avoided firing at breakfast and other inconvenient times. Through the means of sustained interaction and learning this pattern of institutionalised behaviour could develop even under the most unpromising circumstances. Cf. Vogler, The institutionalisation of trust in the international climate regime, p. 2684.

^[93] Cf. Vogler, The institutionalisation of trust in the international climate regime, p. 2684.

^[94] Krasner specifies this definition by describing principles as beliefs of facts, causation and rectitude; norms as standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights, obligations; and rules as specific prescriptions or proscriptions for actions and decision-making procedures as prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 9.

^[95] Cf. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 34.

^[96] Economically spoken the metaphor of the ‘shadow of the future’ stands for the discount rate. If actors are acting under a short shadow of the future, due to being preoccupied with short-term advantages, they heavily devalue future gains relative to present ones. This means in the context of international regimes, that strategies induced to further cooperation might fail. Since the willingness of actors to choose a cooperation strategy in any given round will be greater, the higher their conviction is, that the game will continue beyond all forseeable future, expectations regarding the length of game have an analoguous effect. Axelrod therefore came to the conclusion, that cooperation among non-altruistic states depends largely on the existence of a sufficiently long shadow of the future. Cf. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger 1996, Justice, Equality, And The Robustness Of International Regimes, p. 7.

^[97] Cf. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 34. If a state chooses a defection strategy regarding an agreement, this decision might also have consequences beyond this particular issue by affecting the possibility of achieving goals in other issue areas. An example is the cooperation within the bounds of the WTO, where trade partners have agreements on a huge diversity of products. If a state chooses to cheat this can have an effect beyond this specific cooperation agreement on the cooperation within the whole issue area. E.g. if a state is apt to step out of line regarding agricultural cooperation, this state will not do so if this would imply consequences for his automobil trade. Consequently not only the incentive to step out of line decreases but the fear that others do so diminishes as well. Cf. Zangl, Regimetheorie, p. 126.

^[98] Trainsaction costs are e.g. the costs associated with the negotiations, monitoring, and enforcement of agreements.

^[99] Cf. Oberthür, Umweltschutz durch internationale Regime: Interessen, Verhandlungsprozesse, Wirkungen, p. 61.

^[100] Cf. Zangl, Regimetheorie, pp. 126-127.

^[101] So the offences can be punished with the collapse of the regime, loss of reputation or sanctions, although Oberthür points out that the relevance of sanctions should not be overrated. Cf. Oberthür, Umweltschutz durch internationale Regime: Interessen, Verhandlungsprozesse, Wirkungen, p. 62.

^[102] Cf. Oberthür, Umweltschutz durch internationale Regime: Interessen, Verhandlungsprozesse, Wirkungen, pp. 62-63.

^[103] Cf. Zangl, Politik auf zwei Ebenen, p. 279.

^[104] Moravcsik, Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining, p. 15.

^[105] Cf. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, S. 436.

^[106] Cf. Sprinz/Weiß, Domestic Politics and Global Climate Policy, p. 67.

^[107] Cf. Zangl, Politik auf zwei Ebenen, pp. 296-297.

^[108] Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, S. 436.

^[109] Cf. Moravcsik, Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining, p. 15.

^[110] Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, pp. 436-437.

^[111] Cf. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, S. 437. Amongst others one of those opportunities is the exploitation of the control over information, resources, and agenda-setting with respect to the own domestic polity. By these means statesmen can get a bargaining advantage. Conversely international strategies can be emploid to change the character of domestic constraints. Cf. Moravcsik, Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining, p. 15.

^[112] Realist theories arose as a reaction to the perceived failure of the politics of appeasement and idealism prior to WWII.

^[113] Cf. Rowlands, Classical Theories of International Relations, p. 43.

^[114] Cf. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 115.

^[115] Cf. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger 1996, Justice, Equality, And The Robustness Of International Regimes, p. 10.

^[116] Concerns regarding relative gains do not only arouse when the state’s survival is acutely endangered, because the uncertainty in the anarchic international system combined with the state’s low risk-tolerance in matters of security makes these concerns omnipresent when governments are faced with cooperation decisions. Cf. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 120.

^[117] Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 115.

^[118] Cf. Sprinz, Internationale Regime und Institutionen, p. 255.

^[119] Since in coordination games there is only one Paretto-efficient Nash Equilibria, where every state gains the same.

^[120] The initial situation in this game is, that a couple, which wants to spend an evening together has - unlike in pure coordination games - different preferences about where to go. A cooperation strategy would imply that the actor allows his partner to choose the venue. Defection on the other hand means that the actors chose the preferred venue regardless of the preference of the partner. In a situation where both would opt for their first choices, each one would end up going out alone, what in turn would lead to a worse payoff. If one person, however, chooses to make the ‘heroic’ sacrifice of going to the disliked entertainment, the payoffs are better for both of them. Since coordination further leads to the existence of two Pareto-efficient Nash Equilibria (C,D) and (D,C) - which are preferred by both actors to a situation of non-cooperation - it is assumed to be stable. Cf. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, pp. 49-50.

^[121] Cf. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger 1996, Justice, Equality, And The Robustness Of International Regimes, p. 10.

^[122] Cf. Own editing.

^[123] Cf. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 105.

^[124] Cf. Sprinz, Internationale Regime und Institutionen, p. 255.

^[125] Cf. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 120.

^[126] The theory of hegemonic stability has also played a catalyic role in the articulation of the neoliberal approach since, as it can be seen in Keohane’s work ‘After Hegemony’, the interest-based approach of regimes has to some extent emerged from critically analysing it.

^[127] Cf. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 84.

^[128] Cf. Rowlands, Classical Theories of International Relations, p. 44.

^[129] In such a case the burdens of providing the good would have to be distributed proportional to the gains of all involved states. Cf. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 91.

^[130] Cf. Sprinz, Internationale Regime und Institutionen, p. 255. Being complementary weak cognitivism is still comfortable with the conzeptualization of states as rational utility-maximizers. Cf. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 137.

^[131] Cf. Rowlands, Classical Theories of International Relations, p. 60.

^[132] Blackboxing this process leads, according to cognitivists, to essentially incomplete explanations of international regimes. Cf. Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 136.

^[133] Cf. Oberthür, Umweltschutz durch internationale Regime: Interessen, Verhandlungsprozesse, Wirkungen, pp. 27+31.

^[134] Strong cognitivists make the case for an alternative rather than a complementation of the regime theory. Since this thesis will apply the regime theory on the issue area of climate change the branch of strong cognitivism can be neglected.

^[135] Cf. Sprinz, Internationale Regime und Institutionen, p. 256.

^[136] Oberthür, Umweltschutz durch internationale Regime : Interessen, Verhandlungsprozesse, Wirkungen, p. 53.