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Peacemaker USA?

The Role of the United States in the Arab-Israeli Conflict in the 1990s

©2004 Diplomarbeit 107 Seiten

Zusammenfassung

Inhaltsangabe:Abstract:
When Eretz Israel was founded under David Ben-Gurion in 1948, its existence was immediately recognized by President Truman and the United States of America. Following this historic date, a strong and profound relationship developed between the two states, deepening over the years. With the inauguration of President Bill Clinton in 1993, a new era began: in the following years, Clinton made the peace process in the Middle East one of his top priorities in foreign policy. The United States became the trusted mediator between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, two parties that had refused to negotiate for years.
Numerous critics and especially the Arab nations hold the Jewish lobby in Washington responsible for the exceptional American engagement in the Middle East, while others assume that this engagement is mainly due to U.S. strategic interests and the growing importance of Arab oil. Throughout the years, the United States have constantly tried to accomplish a balance between their commitment to the state of Israel while keeping their strategic interest in the Arab world in mind. Owing to the hostilities and the continuing violence in the Middle Eastern region, the Americans were of the opinion that merely a lasting peace settlement between Arabs and Israelis could secure their interests.
The following thesis focuses on the role of U.S. Middle East policy during the Clinton administration, centering on the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis. It will question whether the United States, and particularly Bill Clinton, functioned as a peacemaker between the hostile parties and achieved significant progress in the peace process. Beginning with an illustration of the historical facts, we will take a closer look at the origins of biblical Israel, the emergence of the name Palestine, and the role of Palestine in World War I. Furthermore, the work deals with the establishment of the Jewish state and the subsequent wars with surrounding Arab nations.
The third chapter attends to the Palestinians and their national movement which was dominantly influenced by the appearance of Yasser Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization. It will also investigate the question of whether the Palestinians can be viewed as a lever of the Arab states and to which extent the Arab nations play a role in the conflict. Subsequently, the focus will be on the United States and its traditional close relationship with Israel, in […]

Leseprobe

Inhaltsverzeichnis


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"Restoring the Jews to their homeland is a noble dream shared by many Americans."
Abraham Lincoln in 1836

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I.
Introduction
1
II.
Israel, the Promised Land?
3
II.1 Palestine, "Land of the Philistine"
4
II.2 Palestine, Plaything of the Great Powers
5
II.3 The Origins of the State of Israel
7
II.4 Fighting for the Holy Land ­ The Arab-Israeli Wars
10
III.
On Palestine and Its People
11
III.1 The Palestinian National Movement
11
III.2 Yasser Arafat and the PLO
12
III.3 The Palestinian Refugees ­ Lever of the Arab States?
14
III.4 The Role of the Arab States
15
IV.
The United States and Its Special Bond with Israel
17
VI.1 American Presidents of the Twentieth Century
and their Relation to Israel
17
V.
The United States Middle East Policy of the Clinton Administration 31
V.1 The First Term of Office: From the Oslo Accords
to the Takeover of the Likud
31
V.1.1 The Oslo Accords
34
V.1.2 The Gaza-Jericho Agreement
38
V.1.3 The Peace Treaty Between Israel and Jordan
40

V.1.4 Oslo II ­ The Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
43
V.1.5 The Likud Bloc Comes Into Power
47
V.2 The Second Term of Office: From the Hebron Protocol
to the Year 2000
50
V.2.1 The Hebron Protocol
50
V.2.2 U.S. Cabinet Reshuffle and Policy Change
52
V.2.3 The Wye River Memorandum
56
V.2.4 The Way to Camp David 2000
60
V.2.5 Camp David II
62
VI.
Other Factors Influencing U.S. Foreign Policy
64
VI.1 Clinton's Staff
64
VI.2 The U.S. Congress
67
VI.3 The Influence of the Lobbies
72
VI.4 Public Opinion
77
VI.5 The United Nations
80
VII. Conclusion
83
Appendix
85
Bibliography
95

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When Eretz Israel
1
was founded under David Ben-Gurion in 1948, its existence was
immediately recognized by President Truman and the United States of America. Following
this historic date, a strong and profound relationship developed between the two states,
deepening over the years. With the inauguration of President Bill Clinton in 1993, a new era
began: in the following years, Clinton made the peace process in the Middle East one of his
top priorities in foreign policy. The United States became the trusted mediator between Israel
and the Palestinian Authority, two parties that had refused to negotiate for years.
Numerous critics and especially the Arab nations hold the Jewish lobby in Washing-
ton responsible for the exceptional American engagement in the Middle East, while others
assume that this engagement is mainly due to U.S. strategic interests and the growing impor-
tance of Arab oil. Throughout the years, the United States have constantly tried to accom-
plish a balance between their commitment to the state of Israel while keeping their strategic
interest in the Arab world in mind. Owing to the hostilities and the continuing violence in the
Middle Eastern region, the Americans were of the opinion that merely a lasting peace settle-
ment between Arabs and Israelis could secure their interests.
The following thesis focuses on the role of U.S. Middle East policy during the Clinton
administration, centering on the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis. It will
question whether the United States, and particularly Bill Clinton, functioned as a peacemaker
between the hostile parties and achieved significant progress in the peace process. Beginning
with an illustration of the historical facts, we will take a closer look at the origins of biblical
Israel, the emergence of the name Palestine, and the role of Palestine in World War I. Fur-
thermore, the work deals with the establishment of the Jewish state and the subsequent wars
with surrounding Arab nations. The third chapter attends to the Palestinians and their na-
tional movement which was dominantly influenced by the appearance of Yasser Arafat and
the Palestine Liberation Organization. It will also investigate the question of whether the Pales-
tinians can be viewed as a lever of the Arab states and to which extent the Arab nations play a
role in the conflict. Subsequently, the focus will be on the United States and its traditional
close relationship with Israel, in order to concentrate afterwards on the central question ­ the
various steps of the peace process during Clinton administration and its achievements in the
1990s. Finally, the thesis will discuss additional factors influencing U.S. foreign policymaking
and conclude with a summary of the results coming from this work.
1
Eretz Israel signifies "the Land of Israel".

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From the CIA ­ The World Factbook, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/is.html>.

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Thus says the Lord GOD: I will gather you from the peoples, and assemble you out of the
countries where you have been scattered, and I will give you Eretz-Israel. They shall come
there, and they shall take away all the detestable things of it and all its abominations from
there. (Ezek. 11: 17-18)
3
These biblical words play a central role in the bitter fight for a tiny country, "slightly
smaller than New Jersey,"
4
called Israel, Palestine, or even designated the `Holy Land.' For
more than fifty years two peoples, Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews, are battling for a piece
of land that covers 20,991 square kilometers and constitutes "only 1/6 of one percent of
what [is] known as `the Arab world.'"
5
Each party claims it to be its land, basing their right
upon history and their religious beliefs.
6
"Both Arabs and the Jews see themselves as descen-
dants of Abraham ­ the Arabs through Ishmael and the Jews through Isaac ­ and conse-
quently rightful inheritors to the `Promised Land.'"
7
But who is right? And who has a right to
the `Holy Land'?
After all, it is not my task to pass judgment, but to investigate a problem that has been
occupying the people's mind for decades: the continuous Arab-Israeli conflict.
Israel is located in the Middle East, bordering on Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.
It is the only democracy in the midst of twenty-one Arab nations and is surrounded by nu-
merous Muslim countries. At present the State of Israel has approximately 6.2 million inhabi-
tants of which eighty percent are Jewish, fifteen percent are Muslims, while the remaining five
percent are made up of Christians and other religious groups.
8
3
Ezek. 11: 17-18, <http://ebible.org/bible/hnv/Ezekiel.htm>.
4
CIA ­ The World Factbook, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/is.html>.
5
Bill Bennett, Jack Kemp, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Twenty Facts about Israel and the Middle East ­ Open Memo-
randum, April 24, 2002, on: <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/673392/posts>.
6
Because Palestine and Jerusalem were already conquered in the beginning of the Islamic campaigns
and were from then on ­with the exception of the years during the crusades ­ under Islamic-Arabic
rule, the Muslims regard them as Waqf. The expression Waqf signifies that Palestine is regarded as a re-
ligious fief from Allah that has to remain under Islamic dominion. Since it is now under the dominion
of non-Muslims it has to be recaptured by means of Jihad, cf. Ernst Hunziker, Zwischen Allah und
Arafat: Palästinenser und die Versöhnung
, Zürich: Edition Interfrom, 1996, 66-67.
7
Vaughn P. Shannon, Balancing Act: US Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Hampshire/Burlington
(VT): Ashgate Publishing, 2003, 15.
8
CIA ­ The World Factbook, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/is.html>.

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"
"
According to the Bible, the Kingdom of Israel was founded around 1021 BC. Ninety-
nine years later, after the death of King Solomon (ca. 926 BC),
9
it disintegrated into the
Northern Kingdom, Israel
10
and the Southern Kingdom, Judah.
11
Yet, if the name Israel has
existed even before the Christian era, where do the people and the name of Palestine come
from? In order to understand these contexts, we need to take a brief look at history.
The Jews of biblical Judea, were expelled after the destruction of the First Temple of King
Solomon in 586 B.C.E. This and the subsequent expulsion of the Jews by the Romans in
the first century C.E. (the diaspora) has been the basis for Zionist claims of return; that
this land, charged to the Jews by God, belonged to them still.
12
In 63 BC, the Romans conquered the Kingdom of Israel which remained the follow-
ing 700 years under its occupation.
13
More than a hundred years later, in 66 AD, the Jewish
population revolted against the Roman occupants,
14
thus the rebellion was not crowned with
success ­ only four years afterwards the Roman Empire recaptured Jerusalem and destroyed
the Second Jewish Temple and sent the Jews into exile.
15
The people of Israel rose once more
against their suppressors in 123 AD, but "the second major Jewish revolt against Rome,"
16
was put down in 135 AD. Yet not only was the victory the Romans': to further humiliate and
punish their opponents, "the Emperor Hadrian wanted to blot out the name of the Roman
`Provincia Judaea' and so renamed it `Provincia Syria Palaestina,' the Latin version of the
Greek name" Philistea, after one of the greatest enemies in Jewish history ­ the Philistines.
17
9
The dates for King Solomon's death differ from the year 922 to the year 928 BC.
10
The Northern Kingdom Israel existed from 926-722 BC and then became an Assyrian province after it
was conquered in 722 BC by Sargon II, the King of Assyria. Cf. Hermann Kinder, Werner Hilgemann,
dtv-Atlas zur Weltgeschichte: Karten und chronologischer Abriss
, I: Von den Anfängen bis zur Französischen Revolu-
tion
, München: Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag,
26
1992, 37.
11
The Southern Kingdom Judea existed from 925-587 BC (note that Judea came one year earlier into
being than Israel, although it is stated that the Kingdom was divided in 926 BC), and was then con-
quered by the Babylonians under the lead of King Nebuchadnezzar, cf. Kinder, Hilgemann, dtv-Atlas,
I, 37. Jerusalem and the First Temple were destroyed and the people of Judea were exiled to Babylon
but returned later.
12
Shannon, Balancing Act, 15.
13
700 years later, the Arabs conquered the region.
14
The reason for the revolt was the erection of an imperial place of worship in Jerusalem and the Roman
demand that the Jews worshipped the emperor, cf. Kinder, Hilgemann, dtv-Atlas, I, 39.
15
After the revolt was put down, 960 Zealots (a religious Jewish grouping) fled to the fortress of Masada
and there resisted the Roman occupation for three years. When the Romans had almost succeeded in
entering the fortress, the leaders of the Zealots decided that they would not live as servants or under
the occupation of the Romans and subsequently committed mass suicide. Today Israeli soldiers still
"take an oath there: `Masada shall not fall again,'" cf. for further information: Masada,
<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/masada.html>.
16
The Bar Kochba revolt, cf. Where did the name Palestine come from?, found on: <http://www.palestine-
facts.org/pf_early_palestine_name_origin.php>.
17
Cf. Emanuel Nassauer, Zur Geschichte Israels, ed. by AStA der Geschwister- Scholl- Universität Mün-
chen, München: Selbstverlag, 2001, on:

5
Throughout the years "[t]he name `Provincia Syria Palaestina' was later shortened to Palaes-
tina, from which the modern, anglicized `Palestine' is derived"
18
­ the name that is still
claimed by the Arabs to be the real name of the Promised Land.
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In the second half of the nineteenth century when again anti-Semitism in Europe be-
gan to grow, the voices calling for a Jewish national home became audible. Due to the rising
persecution of Jews in Russia and Romania,
19
the Zionist
20
conception found more and more
support among the Diaspora. However, until the end of the nineteenth century there was no
considerable political organization whose aim consisted in restoring the Jews to their home-
land. Not before the publication of Theodor Herzl's "Der Judenstaat" (1896) did Zionism
become a political agenda and with the foundation of the World Zionist Organization (WZO)
21
a
collective voice. In those days, though, Herzl's and the WZO's efforts remained fruitless: the
territories corresponding with present Israel were under the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II
who refused the Jewish request to return to their country of origin. At that time, Palestine
was inhabited by approximately 450,000 predominately Muslim Arabs
22
and 24,000 Jews.
23
From 1881-1903, the first aliyah, or wave of Jewish immigration, descended upon Pales-
tine. A second wave followed with some 85,000 Jews, mostly from the Russian pogroms.
By 1922, the Jewish population would approximate eleven per cent of the estimated
750,000 people in Palestine.
24
The situation for the Jewish people changed when the Ottoman Empire joined World
War I side by side with Germany and Austria-Hungary, consequently leading to its collapse in
1918.
25
Two years previously, in 1916, however, the British and the French had already
<http://www.stuve.uni-muenchen.de/publikationen/israel.htm>.
18
See Where did the name Palestine come from?, <http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_early_palestine_name_
origin.php>.
19
Cf. e.g. Shannon, Balancing Act, 15; Hermann Kinder, Werner Hilgemann, dtv-Atlas zur Weltgeschichte:
Karten und chronologischer Abriss
, II: Von der Französischen Revolution bis zur Gegenwart, München: Deutscher
Taschenbuchverlag,
27
1993, 341.
20
The term "Zionism" was coined by the Jewish journalist Nathan Birnbaum in 1890 and is attributed to
a hill in Jerusalem called Zion which became the synonym for the Temple Mount and later the State of
Israel.
21
Theodor Herzl founded the World Zionist Organization in 1897 in Basle.
22
Predominately Muslims, but also Arabs of Christian belief.
23
Cf. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (bpb), ed., Informationen zur Politischen Bildung: Israel,
278/2003, 7; The Jews "were given second-class status in the Muslim Ottoman state, subject to special
taxes and persecution," see Shannon, Balancing Act, 16.
24
Ibid.; cf. also bpb, Israel, 278/2003, 8.
25
Great Britain's goal was the ending of the 400-years lasting Ottoman dominion over the Middle East
and the expansion of the British Empire, which was finally reached in 1918 when the British troops
conquered the territories of today's Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq.

6
agreed in the Sykes-Picot-Agreement on the partition of the Asian part of Turkey. According
to the map,
26
the two parties intended to establish an international zone in the region be-
tween Haifa in the north, the Egyptian border in the southwest, and Jerusalem in the east,
while the "`B Zone' ­ which included Jordan and the Negev of modern Israel ­ was desig-
nated for British rule and administration."
27
Concurrently, the British government made vague promises to Hussein Ibn Ali, the
Sherif of Mecca, concerning the establishment of an Arab Empire in recognition of his mili-
tary help,
28
while only one year later the foreign minister made a third contradictory declara-
tion to the Zionists of Great Britain, guaranteeing them a home in Palestine.
29
26
The Sykes-Picot-Agreement
, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/sykesmap1.html>.
27
Shannon, Balancing Act, 17; cf. also Kinder, Hilgemann, dtv-Atlas, II, 446, 536.
28
For further information see the Hussein-MacMahon Letters from 1915/16; the British High Commis-
sioner in Egypt, Sir Henry MacMahon, acted on behalf of the British government and implied in his

7
The Balfour Declaration was proclaimed to win worldwide Jewish backing for the war ef-
fort at a time when Great Britain urgently needed every possible source of support. [...]
Many influential American Jewish leaders were also pro-Zionist, and their backing was an
important asset. [...] Later, in 1936, wartime Prime Minister David Lloyd George revealed
that the Zionists had promised to rally Jewish pro-Allied sentiment if they received a
commitment for establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine.
30
"Whatever the legal and semantic discussions conclude about what the British prom-
ised each, the point is that each side perceived these statements to imply statehood for their
respective camps."
31
But despite the implied promises of the Hussein-MacMahon Corre-
spondence and the Balfour Declaration, which formed part of the peace treaty between the
Allies and Turkey, Palestine was declared British mandate on April 25, 1920.
32
Two years later
on July 24, 1922, the mandate, containing the basic sentences of the Balfour Declaration, was
ratified by the League of Nations.
33
Great Britain, however, pursued other interests and the
Arabs as well as the Jews were just a means to an end.
34
"In fact, the Balfour Declaration was
a masterpiece of doubletalk in the sense that British promises to both the Zionists and the
Palestinian Arabs were couched in ambiguous terms."
35
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Between World War I and the end of World War II, approximately 400,000 Jews
36
from Russia, Germany, Poland, and other Eastern bloc states came to Palestine. They bought
up land from the Arabic great landowners and built cities where they could finally live to-
gether peacefully after 2000 years of Diaspora.
37
The Palestinians, on the other hand, felt be-
trayed by the English and watched the growing Jewish population with suspicion. Numerous
uprisings were the result, escalating later in a civil war.
38
Meanwhile the situation for the Jews
letters that the British would grant independence to the Arabs in exchange for military help against the
Ottomans.
29
Cf. appendix "Balfour Declaration," a public letter from the British Foreign Minister Alfred Balfour to
the prominent Jewish leader Lord Rothschild.
30
Don Peretz, The Middle East Today, New York/Westport (CT)/London: Praeger,
5
1988, 99.
31
Shannon, Balancing Act, 16.
32
Cf. Kinder, Hilgemann, dtv-Atlas, II, 446.
33
The League of Nations was the predecessor of the United Nations.
34
British interests were: a link to the British colony India, the strategic important Suez Canal, and the
Arabic oil resources.
35
Jamal R. Nasser, The Palestine Liberation Organization. From Armed Struggle to the Declaration of Independence,
New York: Praeger, 1991, 8.
36
Cf. table "Jüdische Einwanderung nach Palästina," in: bpb, Israel, 278/2003, 8.
37
See Friedrich Schreiber, Michael Wolffsohn, Nahost: Geschichte und Struktur des Konflikts, Opladen: Leske
und Budrich, 1987, 53.
38
Arabs assaulted the Jewish population and even murdered their own people for working or `collaborat-
ing' with the Zionist enemy. Although the Jewish leadership strictly opposed the violence, Jewish ter-
rorists answered the Arab attacks with retaliatory measures, cf. Martin Gilbert, Das Jüdische Jahrhundert,
München: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 2001, 182-183, 189-193.

8
in Europe (and especially in Germany) deteriorated and tens of thousands tried to find refuge
in Palestine. Despite the dramatic state of affairs, the leaders of the Palestinian Arabs, as well
as the surrounding Arab governments, were unwilling to help the persecuted Jews and de-
manded a stricter immigration policy from the Mandatory Power. The British Prime Minister
Neville Chamberlain was well aware that it was of strategic importance to have the Muslim
world on Great Britain's side and therefore was of the opinion that if they had to offend one
of the parties, they would rather offend the Jews than the Arabs.
39
To discuss the growing
violence in Palestine and Great Britain's plans to limit Jewish immigration, leaders from both
population groups were invited to London. But while the Jews still tried to convince the Brit-
ish that the admittance of the refugees was of highest priority, the British government under-
took the first steps to stop illegal immigration.
40
Although the British administration was (at
least partly) conscious that their action was neither correct nor just,
41
they considered the
alliance with the Arabs more important. For this reason and out of fear that the situation in
Palestine would deteriorate, the British government, even though being aware of the pogroms
in Germany, limited Jewish immigration in 1939 to a minimum. The motives for this decision
and the figures for the immigration restrictions were recorded in the British White Papers,
42
"that [furthermore] declared the British would be rid of Palestine in ten years and declared
the Balfour Declaration to be null and void. [...] The British seemed to be trying to strike a
balance between the Arab and Zionist pressures, pleasing none in the end."
43
The Jews were understandably desperate and therefore tried to channel the illegal
refugees into the country, nevertheless they decided on fighting alongside Great Britain and
the Allies against the Hitler regime, hoping for a policy change. Yet, the British remained pro-
Arab and refused to admit even Holocaust survivors.
44
39
Cf. ibid., 190-191. The British calculated that the Jews would never take sides with Hitler and Ger-
many, consequently they had to offer something to the Arabs so that they would not come to an
agreement with Hitler.
40
Cf. ibid., 189.
41
Winston Churchill, for example, was scandalized at the British policy, cf. ibid., 191.
42
White Papers, official reports by a British Government commission, were statements of proposed
government policy on a particular area of concern. For more details, cf. Gilbert, Das Jüdische Jahrhun-
dert
, 189-193 and bpb, Israel, 278/2003, 9. In the White Papers, Great Britain promised the Arab popu-
lation an independent state within ten years, limited the Jewish immigration to 75,000 between 1939-
1945, and prohibited the selling of Arab land to Jews (known as the British "White Paper Policy"), cf.
Schreiber, Wolffsohn, Nahost, 110-113; Kinder, Hilgemann, dtv-Atlas, II, 537.
43
Shannon, Balancing Act, 34; for more information on this issue please see Gilbert, Das Jüdische Jahrhun-
dert
, chapter 4, 147-195.
44
Although many Jews wanted to emigrate to Palestine, only 13,000 received permission from the British
government, cf. Gilbert, Das Jüdische Jahrhundert, 243. One of the most well-known accounts is the
tragedy of the Exodus, a ship full of survivors from concentration camps who were refused the entry to
"the Land of Promise," cf. ibid. 250.

9
Despite the strict White Paper policy, the illegal immigration increased and the Arab-
Jewish civil war became more and more critical so that England saw no other possibility than
to withdraw from the Middle Eastern region after World War II:
45
The first area abandoned was Palestine. Intensified hatred between the Palestinian Arabs,
the Jews, and the British after the war made the latter's position untenable. After an un-
successful attempt by the 1946 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to find a compro-
mise, Great Britain handed over the dilemma to the United Nations.
46
In 1947, the United Nations General Assembly set up a Special Committee on Pales-
tine (UNSCOP)
47
"to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Pales-
tine."
48
On August 31 of the same year, the UNSCOP recommended the partition of the ter-
ritory into an Arab and a Jewish state, in the course of which Jerusalem should be set up as a
zone under international administration.
49
Thirty-three nations voted in favor of the partition,
thirteen against it, and ten abstained from voting
50
­ the United States, Russia, and the Jewish
Agency were in favor of the partition of Palestine, while the Arab League
51
rose in protest,
strictly rejecting the plan. The population in Palestine was divided and
[f]ervently enthusiastic celebrations by one side in the midst of bitter protest by the other
made violence inevitable. Where Jews and Arabs lived side by side, as in Jerusalem, Arab
demonstrators attacked Jewish shops and counterretaliations soon followed. [...] It was to
be a fight for complete Arab or Jewish victory.
52
In May 1948, the British mandatory power withdrew from Palestine and shortly after,
on May 14, the Jewish National Council under the chairmanship of David Ben-Gurion
53
pro-
claimed the establishment of the Jewish state, officially named the `State of Israel.' A few
minutes after the new state had come into being, the White House announced its de facto
recognition by the United States. "The US, filling the British vacuum in tending Middle East
affairs, quickly became the most important outside actor to influence the direction of what
would come to be the Arab-Israeli conflict."
54
45
Not only the continuing conflict made it difficult for the British, also the financial burden of the man-
date and the increasing attacks of Jewish and Arab terrorists on the British military, cf. ibid., 252.
46
Peretz, The Middle East Today, 117.
47
UNSCOP: United Nations Special Committee on Palestine.
48
Cf. appendix, United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 181 (II), Future government of Palestine.
49
Cf. ibid.
50
See Schreiber, Wolffsohn, Nahost, 128.
51
The Arab League was established in 1945 and has 22 members: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti,
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi A-
rabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
52
Peretz, The Middle East Today, 300; Gilbert, Das Jüdische Jahrhundert, 253-264.
53
David Ben Gurion, a Polish immigrant, was a pioneer of Zionism and became not only the founder of
the State of Israel, but moreover the first Israeli Prime Minister and Defense Minister.
54
Shannon, Balancing Act, 18.

10
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H
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a
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W
a
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s
s
Merely one day after the Declaration of Independence, five Arab nations,
55
­ Egypt,
Trans-Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq ­ invaded the new Israeli state to "help" the Palestin-
ian Arabs and their cause; for the Israeli people the war undeniably became a fight for their
existence.
56
Fortunately for them, the Arab armies did not agree on a joint warfare but each
party pursued its own interests.
57
As a result, the Israelis "[b]y successful military operations,
[...] had gained nearly a third more territory than the amount allocated to it by the U.N. parti-
tion resolution."
58
In January 1949, the "Independence War" ended with an Israeli victory
that led to the signing of armistice treaties with the involved parties in the following months
(except for Iraq and Saudi-Arabia which withdrew without any agreement). The Palestinians,
however, who the war was actually fought for, continued to be the losers. Called upon by the
Arab leaders and driven away by Jewish military units, the Palestinians left their homes and
belongings and fled to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank. Soon after, the Gaza
Strip was assigned to Egyptian administration, the West Bank and East Jerusalem were an-
nexed by Trans-Jordan,
59
and Israeli forces occupied the remaining territories designated for a
Palestinian state.
60
The Independence War was not to be the last; four additional armed conflicts with the
surrounding Arab nations followed.
61
Interestingly, none of them resulted in the establish-
ment of a Palestinian state but instead only in the extension of Israeli territory.
62
55
Saudi-Arabia joined the war later.
56
The intentions of the Arab nations were stated by Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab
League: "This will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like
the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades," cf. Schreiber, Wolffsohn, Nahost, 146, and see also
<http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_independence_war_start.php>.
57
Indeed the Arab nations were not fighting for the Palestinian cause: Trans-Jordan, for example, aimed
at the foundation of a Great Syrian Empire and intended to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian
state by all means, since Jordan is historically a part of Palestine; Saudi-Arabia and Egypt joined the
war among other things to avoid the Jordanian aspiration to become a great power, while Syria and
Lebanon were afraid of losing their independence by becoming part of the Syrian Empire. For further
information, please see Schreiber, Wolffsohn, Nahost, 135-138, 147-148.
58
Peretz, The Middle East Today, 303.
59
After the annexation the whole region, including Trans-Jordan, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem,
was then named Jordan.
60
Cf. bpb, Israel, 11.
61
Suez Crisis 1956; Six-Days War, June 5-10, 1967; October War or Jom-Kippur War, October 6-24,
1973; Lebanon invasion, 1982.
62
During the Six-Days War (an Israeli preventive war against Egypt) the Israeli forces occupied the Sinai
Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Israel withdrew from the Sinai Pen-
insula after Egypt fully recognized the state of Israel and signed a peace treaty in 1979.

11
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1
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M
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t
t
The development of a Palestinian national identity began relatively late and was for
the most part a response to Zionism and later the establishment of the Jewish state.
63
During
the period of the Ottoman Empire, a political entity or a national consciousness was virtually
non-existent and also in 1914 "[t]he Arabs had not as yet developed a strong nationalist feel-
ing. Their loyalty was to Islam, or to some Christian millet,
64
not to the state."
65
In former
times the majority of the Palestine Arabs felt ­ in geographical terms ­ just belonging to the
towns they lived in, while later they thought of themselves as related to Syria or Lebanon.
66
Palestinian identity began to crystallize during the British mandate when for instance
the "[v]iolence [...] during April 1920 [was] making it clear that Palestine nationalists would
not passively accept British or Jewish control."
67
Thereupon several underground organiza-
tions emerged that aimed at liberating the region in question from British and Jewish pres-
ence. In the following years, "Palestinian nationalism would accelerate [...] as the Zionist
project increased the Jewish population and landownership in the area."
68
The movement
culminated in the Arab revolt of 1936, a riot in the course of which several Jews were killed
while the British Mandatory Power did nothing to set an end to the battles. When the rioters,
however, began to attack the British Army as well, they started to hit back on the Arab ex-
tremists and ended the rebellion. Just one year later, the second Palestinian revolt broke out ­
answered with massive counter terror by the Jewish radical underground organizations Stern
Group and Irgun Zeva'i Le'ummi
69
­ but was again defeated by British troops, particularly
because the different leaders of the rioters were not able to come to an agreement concerning
the designation of a commander-in-chief.
70
From this information one can draw the conclu-
sion that a real Palestinian identity did not yet exist ­ every clan was still pursuing its own
interests.
71
63
"Partly in reaction to Jewish nationalism and the increasing presence of the Jews in Palestine at the
turn of the century, there was also at this time a rise in Arab nationalism there and throughout the
Middle East," Shannon, Balancing Act, 16.
64
About ninety percent of Palestine's Arabs were Muslims, the remaining ten percent of Christian belief.
65
Peretz, The Middle East Today, 277.
66
Cf. ibid., 284.
67
Ibid., 281.
68
Shannon, Balancing Act, 16.
69
Irgun Zeva'i Le'ummi, also abbreviated called Irgun or Etzel, was a national military extremist organi-
zation, which attacked the Arab population and later on fought the British Authorities. For some years
the later Prime Minister Menachem Begin headed Etzel. Cf. Gilbert, Das Jüdische Jarhundert, 168, 230.
70
Cf. ibid., 253-256.
71
One Palestinian Arab group was even fighting against the rebellion with financial and logistical help by
the British and the Jewish, cf. Schreiber, Wolffsohn, Nahost, 102.

12
After the declaration of the UN partition plan in 1947, nationalistic aspirations among
the Palestinians grew stronger but were destroyed by the decision of the Arab League to re-
ject the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state. Throughout the following years, na-
tional identity was literally created by the fact that the Palestinian people became inhabitants
of different Arab states,
72
nonetheless were never accepted as full citizens. They were forced
to stay in refugee camps and neither had the chance to become accustomed to the new soci-
ety, nor to become members of it. Nowhere welcomed, the Palestinians recalled their national
identity and began the battle for their own state, a battle that especially heated up with the
appearance of Yasser Arafat and the foundation of the PLO ­ the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion
.
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2
2
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Y
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O
In the 1950s the situation deteriorated visibly: the State of Israel was constantly at-
tacked by guerrilla troops from the West Bank, later also from Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria.
Israel, in turn, responded with military retaliation against Arab villages that offered hiding-
places to terrorists. Around the same time, the name of Yasser Arafat came into the picture ­
the man who would become Chairman of the Palestinian Authority after its establishment in
1994. In 1957, he and three other officials founded the secret organization Al-Fatah
73
in Ku-
wait and shortly afterwards started their terrorist attacks against the Jewish nation.
74
Several years later, on June 1, 1964, another Palestinian Arab organization was for-
mally proclaimed ­ the official Palestine Liberation Organization:
75
The PLO was born in Jerusalem, but the seed that germinated it, was planted in Cairo.
[...] it was President Nasser of Egypt, who first advocated the formation of a `Palestinian
entity' and who pushed for the creation of the PLO. [...] Nasser began to fear that he
would lose the support of the Palestinians, and other Arab leaders wanted to maintain
control over them.
76
Astonishingly, the organization for the liberation of Palestine was thus nowise created
by the Palestinian resistance itself, but was established by the Arab League that was alarmed
72
Cf. chapter III.3 The Refugees ­ Lever of the Arab States?
73
Fatah: Acronym for Harakat al-Tahrir al-Falistiniya, the Palestinian Liberation Movement, with the
first letters in reverse order giving FATAH which means conquest (whereas the word derived from the
normal abbreviation Hataf means "death"), definition from the Palestinian National Authority Official
Website, <http://www.pna.gov.ps/Government/gov/fateh.asp>.
74
Cf. Schreiber, Wolffsohn, Nahost, 187.
75
The PLO was of course not the only group fighting for the liberation of Palestine, numerous factions
existed and still exist today, e.g. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine ­ PFLP, Al-Aqsa
Martyrs Brigade (affiliated to Fatah), Abu Nidal Organization ­ ANO, Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad,
to just name some.
76
Nasser, The Palestine Liberation Organization, 123.

13
at the increasing unrest in the refugee camps. Yet, what surprises even more are the "PLO
and PA
77
assertions to Western audiences that the root of the conflict is Israel's occupation
of the West Bank and Gaza" although "the Palestine Liberation Organization [...] was
founded in 1964 -- three years before Israel controlled the West Bank and Gaza."
78
In 1969 then, Yasser Arafat was appointed Chairman of the Executive Committee of
the PLO and made, equally to the Fatah,
79
armed struggle a doctrine:
Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not
merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination
and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular
revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it.
80
The PLO soon developed its own dynamism and became a synonym for the Palestin-
ian revolution and guerilla warfare tactics. The Arab League, on the contrary, more than once
might have wished for the impossible ­ that they had never created it. That is to say, the at-
tacks of the Palestine Liberation Organization were not just confined to Israel, but the or-
ganization also showed aggression towards their host countries.
81
The disruptions that result [from the PLO and the refugee camps] become a problem for
host states, as Egypt found out in 1956, Jordan in 1970, and Lebanon in 1982. For Jordan,
the PLO in their country were not merely an indirect nuisance vis-à-vis their activities to-
ward Israel; they also conspired against the Jordanian regime, leading the latter to expel
the PLO in a bloody campaign known as `Black September' in 1970.
82
This might have been the reason why the Arab nations decided at the Summit Con-
ference in 1974 on the recognition of the PLO as the only representative of the Palestinian
people.
83
The PLO regarded this as a concession from their Arab allies, though eventually it
meant nothing else than the Palestinians were on their own and could no longer count on
political help.
77
Abbreviation for the Palestinian Authority.
78
Bennett, Kemp, Kirkpatrick, Twenty Facts, <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/673392/
posts>. Note that Fatah was even established much earlier by Arafat and therefore not intended to
fight the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
79
As the PLO Charter, the constitution of Fatah calls for armed struggle as an inevitable measure for the
liberation of Palestine, cf. Constitution Fatah: <http://www.fateh.net/e_public/constitution.htm>.
80
Article 9 of the PLO Charter, <http://www.pna.gov.ps/Government/gov/plo_Charter.asp>.
81
Especially Jordan had massive problems with the PLO and al-Fatah in the 1970s: Based in the refugee
camps, the guerillas had practically created a state within a state, operating from Jordanian territory to
attack Israel. Moreover, the fighters assaulted the sovereignty of King Hussein of Jordan who in return
intended to disarm the fedayeen (Arab guerrillas who operate mainly against Israel). Fierce battles be-
tween the Jordanian army and PLO's military force (and numerous casualties) followed, finally result-
ing in the expulsion of the terrorist organizations which found their next refuge in Lebanon, cf. also
Schreiber, Wolffsohn, Nahost, 222-223; 240-243; 309.
82
Shannon, Balancing Act, 27; cf. also footnote 81.
83
Since 1988 the PLO is recognized by 124 states as the State of Palestine, cf. Victor Kocher, Der Neue
Nahe Osten. Die arabische Welt im Friedensprozess
, Zürich: Verlag Neue Züricher Zeitung, 1996, 24-25.

14
Ten years after the foundation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Arafat was
invited by the United Nations to hold a speech before the General Assembly in 1974 and the
PLO was soon after granted the status of a permanent representative in the Assembly ­ a
special arrangement for the PLO which could not at all be considered as a nation. His speech
was widely celebrated by the members of the UN General Assembly, just the United States,
Israel and a few other countries remained more than skeptical, in particular after hearing
Yasser Arafat's concluding words, which sounded more like a threat than an offer of peace:
"Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter's gun. Do not let
the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat: do not let the olive branch fall from my hand."
84
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­
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o
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a
a
b
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S
S
t
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t
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e
s
s
?
?
During the Independence War about 900,000 Palestinian Arabs
85
left Israel for vari-
ous reasons: numerous civilians simply fled out of fear of the war and in the view of massa-
cres,
86
others followed the calls of Arab leaders to leave their homes or were driven away by
the Israeli army.
87
Approximately 160,000 Palestinians (usually the ones that were too poor or
physically not in a position to flee) stayed in Israel and became citizens after the Declaration
of Independence. A major part of the refugees was seeking shelter in the neighboring coun-
tries: 506,200 went to Jordan,
88
127,600 to Lebanon, 82,194 to the Syrian Arab Republic, and
198,277 to the Gaza Strip.
89
The Palestinians were not the only ones leaving their property behind, the Jewish in-
habitants of Middle Eastern Arab countries ­ about 600,000 ­ were also expelled violently. In
contrast to the Palestine Arabs, though, the Jewish immigrants were integrated into Israel as
full citizens while their counterparts were forced to stay in refugee camps, where they are still
living at present.
90
None of the Arab countries, except for Jordan, ever made the attempt to
84
Speech by Yasser Arafat, United Nations General Assembly, New York, November 13, 1974, found
on: <http://www.weltpolitik.net/texte/policy/israel/Speecharafat_1974.pdf>.
85
According to information from the Arabs the number of refugees amounted to 800,000-1,000.000,
according to the UNRWA there were about 900,000 and Israeli officials state a number of 600,000-
700,000 refugees.
86
The probably most known is the "Dir Yassin massacre" where more than 250 persons were killed by
the Jewish forces. The account of the occurrence and the number of casualties, however, is ques-
tioned. Cf. e.g. Gilbert, Das Jüdische Jahrhundert, 256, who claims more than a hundred Arab victims,
and see furthermore Gad Nahshon, "Dr. Uri Milstein: `Dir Yassin Massacre' was a hoax!", in: Jewish
Post
<http://www.jewishpost.com/jp0710/jpn0710i.htm>.
87
Cf. Gilbert, Das Jüdische Jahrhundert, 257. The Jews intimidated the Arab population to such an extent
that they fled out of fear.
88
The West Bank was at that time part of Jordan and because of that there are no specific numbers.
89
Cf. appendix, UNRWA table: Number of registered refugees.
90
In 2003 the number of refugees rose to over four million: ten official refugee camps are to located in
Jordan, twelve in Lebanon, ten in Syria, nineteen in the West Bank and eight in the Gaza Strip. Source:

15
incorporate its Muslim brothers, but moreover denied them political, economic, and social
rights:
Jordan was the only Arab country to welcome the Palestinians and grant them citizenship
(to this day Jordan is the only Arab country where Palestinians as a group can become
citizens). [...] Little has changed in succeeding years. Arab governments have frequently
offered jobs, housing, land and other benefits to Arabs and non-Arabs, excluding Pales-
tinians.
91
It is also important to note that neither Egypt nor Jordan strove for the foundation of
a Palestinian state while the Gaza Strip and the West Bank was under their rule from 1948 to
1967. Although vigorously assuring that they are fighting for the rights of the Palestinians, the
Arab objectives remain questionable and the observer is compelled to ask himself if this
statement from Radio Cairo might not be true: `The refugees are the keystones of the Arab
fight against Israel. The refugees are the weapons of the Arabs and Arab nationalism.'
92
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.
4
4
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a
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a
a
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e
s
s
The significance of the Arab nations in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has always been
fundamental. Already in 1947 the Arab League rejected the UN partition plan as unacceptable
and demanded an undivided Arabian state without letting the people concerned, the Pales-
tinians, speak for themselves. After the loss of the first Arab-Israeli War in 1949, the Arab
world not only refused to recognize the Jewish state but also to negotiate with the Israelis.
93
The establishment of a Palestinian state was strictly repudiated as well, since this would have
meant the recognition of the State of Israel by the Arab nations. Besides, the Arabs were
careful to keep control of the Palestinian people and to prevent the establishment of an inde-
pendent Palestinian state. They feared that a radicalization of the Palestinian movement
might have unpleasant consequences on the remaining population who in turn might endan-
ger the entire Arab world.
94
This leads to the conclusion that the surrounding nations have
constantly pursued their individual objectives (mainly enlarging territory and extending their
UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East),
<http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/camp-profiles.html>.
91
Mitchell G. Bard, Myth and Fact: Arab States and the Palestinians, on:
<http://www.ujc.org/content_display.html?ArticleID=85320>; see also Hunziker, Zwischen Allah und
Arafat
, 123, 133.
92
Own translation from Schreiber, Wolffsohn, Nahost, 161: "Die Flüchtlinge sind der Schlüsselstein des
arabischen Kampfes gegen Israel. Die Flüchtlinge sind die Waffen der Araber und des arabischen Na-
tionalismus." Radio Cairo, July 19, 1957.
93
The infamous "three nos," "no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel,"
were coined after the Six-Days war at the Arab summit meeting in Khartoum in September 1967.
94
Cf. Amer Hozayel, Die Friedensdiplomatie in der US-Strategie im islamisch-arabischen Raum zwischen Sechstage-
krieg und Carter-Administration
, (Diss. Philips-Universität Marburg, 1992), 95.

16
predominance) while absolutely none of these goals seems to include the future of the Pales-
tinian Arabs as a sovereign nation. Without a doubt, the fate of the Palestinian people is
bound up with the goodwill of the Arab governments but "[a]s a result of bitter experiences
with the Arab regimes, the Palestinians have come to learn that [the] Arab regimes have gen-
erally and understandably placed the interests of their regimes above those of the Palestini-
ans." However,
[r]egardless of perceptions to the contrary, the Palestine problem has been a major unify-
ing factor among Arabs, perhaps the only real one. [...] Israel provides those regimes with
the foreign enemy needed for the purpose of political socialization in authoritarian socie-
ties. Thus, while Arab leaders would like to solve the Palestinian problem, the absence of a
solution does serve their purpose as well.
95
The only thing consequently uniting the Arab nations is not the frequently cited "Pal-
estinian cause" but rather their hostility against the Jewish state and the "humiliation" they
suffered with each defeat in all of the five wars:
The defeat of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the 1967 war with Israel, while a stunning blow
to Arab pride, awakened widespread national consciousness, especially among the Pales-
tinians. The anti-Israeli virus spread from the Arab East across all North Africa and ardent
Arab nationalists throughout the Middle East and North Africa joined in support of the
Palestinian guerilla movements.
96
The support, nonetheless, is largely restricted to the financing of radical groupings and
the provision of training sides. Most Arab countries even fear that a radicalization of the
movement would cause instability in the Middle Eastern region which in turn would threaten
their own regimes,
97
therefore they refrain from offering a political platform to the Palestin-
ian refugees.
95
Nasser, The Palestine Liberation Organization, 116.
96
Peretz, The Middle East Today, 146.
97
The best example is the Palestinian uprising in Jordan in 1970-71, for further information see Nasser,
The Palestine Liberation Organization
, 124-134.

17
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At all times there has been an exceptional relationship between the United States of
America and the State of Israel. In general, the U.S. government and American presidents
have been well disposed towards the small Middle Eastern country since its foundation. Nev-
ertheless, "the US view is also divided along patterned groupings that can be summarized as
the Congressional view (pro-Israel), the State Department view (more sensitive to the Arab
perspective), and the presidential (the `balanced') view."
98
Looking at the history of the twen-
tieth century it becomes apparent that American presidents have constantly been trying to
protect the newly established Jewish state while maintaining a balance in the Mideast region.
Moreover, it becomes evident that Bill Clinton was not the only American president who
tried to reach an agreement between the hostile parties, Israel and Palestinian Authority.
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Until 1914, Zionism was almost of no meaning in the United States,
99
but when
World War I broke out, the Zionists were able to convince Louis D. Brandeis to join the Zi-
onist movement and support their cause. Brandeis, a known Jewish lawyer and furthermore
friend of President Wilson,
100
was able to make the Zionistic concept more popular in Amer-
ica and got the Zionists more prestige.
101
In 1918, the United States was one of the first na-
tions that advocated the Balfour Declaration
102
and the establishment of a national home for
98
Shannon, Balancing Act, 28.
99
In the late nineteenth century, Zionism did gain some support, particularly through the work of Theo-
dor Herzl. This led in 1897 to the foundation of the American Zionist Federation, cf. Steven L. Spiegel,
"Israel and Beyond: American Jews and U.S. Foreign Policy, in: L. Sandy Maisel, Ira Forman, eds., Jews
in American Politics
, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, 251-269, 255.
100
President Wilson appointed Louis D. Brandeis as Associate Justice to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1916.
He was the first Jewish member of the Supreme Court and active supporter of Zionism. His goal,
though, was not the establishment of a Jewish state; Brandeis was merely devoted to helping other
Jews. When Chaim Weizmann, the leader of British Zionism (and supporter of the establishment of a
Jewish national home), defeated him at a meeting of the Zionist Organization of America, Brandeis re-
tired from active involvement and accordingly the influence of the American Zionist movement sub-
sided, cf. ibid., 255-256.
101
Cf. Arthur Hertzberg, Shalom, Amerika! Die Geschichte der Juden in der Neuen Welt, New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1989, 171, 177. One representative of Indiana, William E. Cox, explained his support (and
probably that of numerous others) that way: ,,Just as Moses has led the Israelites out of bondage , so
the Allies are now redeeming Judaea from the land of the unspeakable Turk, as a fitting finale to this
World war. Judaea should be established as an independent nation, an independent sovereign, with
power to govern itself and to forward and complete its ideals of life. I feel that I am expressing the
thoughts of the American people, and certainly of those with whom I have discussed this question,
that the Government of the United States should use its proper influences in seeing that this Jewish
state be created, wherefrom will emanate the teachings and the principles of old Judaea," in: Regina S.
Sharif, Non-Jewish Zionism: Its Roots in Western History, London: Zed Press, 1983, 107-108.
102
The American Jewish Committee voted for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine and
presented a memorandum to President Wilson in which they asked him to support their concern, cf.
Hertzberg, Shalom, Amerika!, 195.

18
the Jewish people in Palestine.
103
It is unclear to which extent Jewry's, especially Brandeis and
Stephen S. Wise, involvement
104
influenced Wilson's decision; yet, what is known is that, for
example, his presidential campaign in 1912 was financially aided by the Jewish millionaire
Bernard Baruch. (Nonetheless, it has to be added that Baruch was hostile toward Zionism
and its aims ­ he promoted the settlement of the Jews in Uganda.)
105
What has to be taken
into account, though, is the fact, that "[t]hen as now, Jewish voters in the US sided more
heavily with Democrats than Republicans, and Wilson weighed the benefits of support
against the relatively costless act of rhetorical support."
106
He decided to offer private support
for the Jewish claim and consequently satisfied the American Jewish population, who was
grateful for the assistance. That way he was "scoring domestic points and balancing the stra-
tegic consequences as much as possible."
107
Several years later, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was little concerned with Pal-
estine and the increasing conflict between Jews and Arabs. He was generally loved by the
American Jewish population
108
and the American interests in the Middle East were confined
to Arab oil and the foundation of a Jewish home. This interest was mainly enforced by the
untiring efforts of the American Jewish community which aimed at the settlement of its peo-
ple in Palestine. President Roosevelt, who did not want to alienate the Jewish population,
assured them of his help and even rejected the partition plan for Palestine from the League of
Nations, but was blocked by the British. Still, for the Jews, Roosevelt became a kind of guard-
ian angel although his efforts to save European Jews from the Holocaust seemed rather half-
hearted.
109
More than 200,000 refugees
110
had come to the United States between Hitler's
103
"Woodrow Wilson, American President in 1917, endorsed the Balfour Declaration, and in 1922 Con-
gress passed a resolution supporting the contents of the Declaration, affirming the support for `the es-
tablishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,'" in: Shannon, Balancing Act, 33. Yet,
already in 1906, a Zionist organization had asked sixty-nine senators and 231 representatives if they
would support the Balfour Declaration and all of the interviewees approved of it, although there was
no indication that the Jewish vote or electorate had influenced them. Consequently, there must have
been a pro-Israeli attitude in American policy even before the lobbies emerged, cf. Sharif, Non-Jewish
Zionism
, 107.
104
Stephen S. Wise was a very prominent Jewish American Reform rabbi and also strongly supported
Zionism.
105
Cf. Gilbert, Das Jüdische Jahrhundert, 79. In the beginning of the 20
th
century, the British government
had offered the Jews to settle in Uganda.
106
Shannon, Balancing Act, 33.
107
Ibid.
108
In the first presidential elections in 1932, Roosevelt had received eighty-two percent of the Jewish
vote, in 1936 eighty-five and in 1940 he even obtained ninety percent of the Jewish vote, cf. Ira N.
Forman, "The Politics of Minority Consciousness: The Historical Voting Behavior of American Jews,"
in: L. Sandy Maisel, Ira Forman, eds., Jews in American Politics, 141-160, 153.
109
The most known incident is that of the St. Louis that had to return to Hamburg with 900 refugees on
board in May 1939, cf. Hertzberg, Shalom, Amerika!, 277.
110
Among them numerous intellectuals and artists like, for example, Albert Einstein and Marc Chagall.

Details

Seiten
Erscheinungsform
Originalausgabe
Jahr
2004
ISBN (eBook)
9783832489830
ISBN (Paperback)
9783838689838
Dateigröße
1.1 MB
Sprache
Englisch
Institution / Hochschule
Universität Kassel – 08 Anglistik/Romanistik
Note
1,0
Schlagworte
nahost außenpolitik israel palästina clinton
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Titel: Peacemaker USA?
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