British foreign and defense policy

Liehr, Marc Nikolas

British foreign and defense policy

How does the relationship with the United States and the Commonwealth affect its point of view towards an ever increasing importance of the EU?

von Marc Nikolas Liehr (Autor:in)

Politik - Internationale Politik - Thema: Internationale Beziehungen

Zusammenfassung

Inhaltsangabe:Abstract:
Is Great Britain really a desperate European? This was the question in mind whilst writing this essay. Would Britain go to war against Iraq with the United States of America, or would it search for a peaceful solution together with old Europe within the United Nations. The answer to this question is well known today. The UK decided to wage war on Iraq together with America. Once again Britain gave its continental European partners the feeling to be more the fifty-first state of America than a member of the European Union, trying to find a common European position in foreign and security policy.
Why does the UK behave the way it does? Is it really taking a reluctant position against an ever increasing importance of the EU in foreign and security affairs? What is it about its relationship to the US, and which role does the Commonwealth play in this area traditionally the domain of sovereign national politics? The essay examining these questions will come to an astonishing conclusion.
At the moment Britain is celebrating its 30th anniversary of EU membership. This should be an occasion to find out more about its foreign and defence policy.
At the time of writing, Britain was the only European power coupled with the US in preparing for a war against Iraq. The question has to be asked as to why Britain has adopted such a pro-American stance? Since Blair's election to power in 1997, time and time again he has emphasized that Britain's future is in Europe. However, certainly with regard to foreign and defence policy, such a statement appears hollow. What happened with those honourable aims of European integration like a Common Foreign and Security Policy, which was established as a 'pillar' of the EU by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Finding an agreed European Common and Foreign Policy certainly has not been obtained and could even be said to be in its worst state ever. Nothing illustrated this better than the diversity of opinion within the EU concerning the possible war with Iraq. Italy and Spain tended towards the position of the US and Britain. France wanted to formulate a new UN resolution before deciding the course of action they wish to take. Germany stood against the use of any force.
At present, it would seem that the CFSP remains an objective to be realised at a later date. Past and present, none of the other EU members act as closely with the US as Britain. Is Britain's policy influenced by American interests […]

Leseprobe

Inhaltsverzeichnis

ID 7755

Liehr, Marc Nikolas: British foreign and defense policy - How does the relationship with

the United States and the Commonwealth affect its point of view towards an ever

increasing importance of the EU?

Hamburg: Diplomica GmbH, 2004

Zugl.: Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Universität, Magisterarbeit, 2003

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Abbreviations

ANF

Atlantic Nuclear Force

ANZUS

Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States

BAOR

British Army of the Rhine

BOT

Board of Trade

CAB

Cabinet

Office

CENTO

Central Treaty Organisation

CFSP

Common Foreign and Security Policy

CJTF

Combined Joint Task Forces

CSCE

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

DBPO

Documents on British Policy Overseas

ECSC

European Coal and Steel Community

EDC

European Defence Community

EEC

European Economic Community

EMU

Economic and Monetary Union

EPC

European Political Cooperation

ESDI

European Security and Defence Identity

ESDP

European Security and Defense Policy

European

Union

FCO

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

FRUS

Foreign Relations of the United States

HMSO

Her/ His Majesty's Stationery Office

IGC

Inter-governmental

Conference

MLF

Multilateral Nuclear Force

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PRO

Public Record Office, Kew

RRF

Rapid Reaction Force

SACEUR

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

SDR

Strategic Defense Review

SEA

Single European Act

SEATO

Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation

Contents

Abbreviations

Introduction

Chapter 1

Britain's `Special Relationship' with the United States

Introduction

The historical development of Anglo-American relationship

The relationship is getting `special'

Differences over the Middle East

The Korean War

The Suez Crisis

East of Suez

First signs of getting `European'

The 1980s Moving towards the Falklands War

A new World order

Conclusion

nuclear

cooperation?

Introduction

The independent nuclear deterrent

The Sandys White Paper

The Bermuda Meeting and its consequences

The Nassau Meeting

The Multilateral Nuclear Force

The Atlantic Nuclear Force

The Strategic Defense Initiative

Conclusion

Chapter 2

Great Britain and the Commonwealth

Introduction

Britain, Western Europe and the Commonwealth as the `third power'

The maintenance of the worldwide commitments

The `Wind of Change'

Conclusion

Chapter 3

Great Britain and Europe

Introduction

A restrained approach towards Europe

The foundation of NATO

A rearmament of Germany?

Finding a solution

The European Defence Community

Britain and the demise of the EDC

The `birth' of the Western European Union

A defence organisation; a British mouthpiece to Europe?

The existence of a non-existing British-European/

common European foreign and defence policy

The search for an increased European defence identity

On the way to Maastricht

The Treaty of Maastricht

The Yugoslavia Crisis

Time for a change?

The Treaty of Amsterdam

Recent days...

Conclusion

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

At the moment Britain is celebrating its 30

anniversary of EU membership. This

should be an occasion to find out more about its foreign and defence policy.

At the time of writing, Britain was the only European power coupled with the US

in preparing for a war against Iraq. The question has to be asked as to why Britain

has adopted such a pro-American stance?

Since Blair's election to power in 1997,

time and time again he has emphasized that Britain's future is in Europe.

However, certainly with regard to foreign and defence policy, such a statement

appears hollow.

What happened with those honourable aims of European

integration like a Common Foreign and Security Policy, which was established as

a `pillar' of the EU by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Finding an agreed

European Common and Foreign Policy certainly has not been obtained and could

even be said to be in it's worst state ever. Nothing illustrated this better than the

diversity of opinion within the EU concerning the possible war with Iraq. Italy

and Spain tended towards the position of the US and Britain. France wanted to

formulate a new UN resolution before deciding the course of action they wish to

take. Germany stood against the use of any force.

At present, it would seem that the CFSP remains an objective to be realised at a

later date. Past and present, none of the other EU members act as closely with the

US as Britain. Is Britain's policy influenced by American interests rather than

finding a common ground within Europe?

The following chapter will discuss the connection between these two countries

As a starting point to understanding this unusual phenomenon, we shall examine

it from an historical perspective. Understanding a nations intention presupposes to

know its history out of which its sentiments arise. Therefore it shall be

concentrated in the following on important Anglo-American historical events.

Why, for example, had the UK such a strong interest in the Middle or Far East

instead of concentrating on Europe? Which effect did the `humiliating'

experience of the Suez crisis have on British thinking?

The historic development of the Anglo-American partnership has been closely

linked with that of the nuclear policy and as such shall be the second point of the

following discussion. Since existence of nuclear weapons it was a vital matter for

the UK having an independent nuclear deterrent. De facto the British independent

nuclear deterrent is dependent on partnership with the US. They provide Britain

with missiles systems, though not with nuclear warheads. The UK is the only

individual country to which the US supplies them.

How did this special atomic

relationship arise? It shall be surveyed if there really is an atomic partnership and

what intentions did the UK have entering into such a dependence.

Furthermore, the influence of this connection on a possible European nuclear

force shall be discussed. Therefore this part of the work concentrates on the

Nassau Meeting of 1962, and the following discussion to establish a Multilateral

Nuclear Force/ Atlantic Nuclear Force. Cooperation or coordination of the

European deterrent was never that close to its realisation.

The second chapter will discuss the relation between Great Britain and its

Commonwealth. Regarding former British greatness in its foreign and defense

policy is automatically linked to its Empire/ Commonwealth. But what happened

to this linkage which Margaret Thatcher described as ` the deceptive might of an

Empire which continued to expand until 1919 but which cost more to defend than

it contributed to national wealth'?

Today little remained of the Empire. It is

nearby to presume, that this transition could not develop without having any

impact on British policy towards Europe.

Lastly, the third chapter examines the interrelations between the United

Kingdom's relationship with the United States, the Commonwealth and Britain's

security policy in the post-war European order. The twentieth century has been a

highly militarised one for the UK. After two world wars in fifty years, the British

developed a cautious approach to dissolving their defence capability in Europe.

Moreover, Britain faced a new threat in the form of the Soviet Union and the

beginning of the cold war. How did this effect British foreign and defence policy

towards Europe? A key theme of this part will be the establishment of a western

European defense system, the search for an European defence identity, and the

British opinion towards the latter.

Gowing, Nuclear Weapons and the `Special Relationship', p. 117.

Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 5.

Martin/ Garnett, British Foreign Policy, p. 103.

Chapter 1

Britain's `Special Relationship' with the United States

Introduction

The first thing that must strike the objective reader when considering the Anglo-

American relationship is the contrast between its coolness for most of its duration

and its warmth in modern times. Only for a mere sixty years in total has it

amounted to what might be called an `alliance'.

Since the Second World War it appears that Britain's foreign and defence policy

has been heavily influenced and moulded by America and less so by the European

Union.

This could be explained by the so called `Special Relationship' between

the US and Britain. It is based upon the cooperation that had been established in

the Second World War.

Yet,

the policy of cooperation with the US was not

without problems. Britain sought an alliance with a more powerful nation than

herself. This, in the sprit of reciprocity, raises the question of what Britain could

offer in return for such an alliance.

David Watt claims: ` the special relationship,

fruitful and attractive as it has been, flourishes only in Atlantic water and

European soil'

. Britain found itself involved in issues that were peripheral to its

own interest, and decision-makers in Washington were often antagonistic towards

British policies.

Perhaps the `Special Relationship' is a one-sided relationship,

which was never decisive in American policy. Playing the part of a superpower is

a lonely business. In the words of May and Treverton, the `Special Relationship'

amounts to, `a sense of company in a confusing, unfriendly world'

. But is Britain

really just a companion?

Rees, Britain's contribution to global order, p. 36.

Watt, Introduction: The Anglo-American Relationship, pp. 4-7.

Ibid.

Rees, Britain's contribution to global order, p. 37.

May/ Treverton, Defence Relationships: American Perspectives, p. 181.

The historical development of Anglo-American relationship

It is somewhat surprising to note, that the history of the Anglo-American

relationship is one characterised as anything but `special.' For most of the

nineteenth century there was neither reason for hostility

nor partnership, between

the nations. It would take a common enemy to unite them. The entry of the US

into the First World War

cemented a genuine alliance. However, this warmth

was not to last. In 1919, the US Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles and

refused to join in the League of Nations, evidence that the US preferred

isolationism than collaboration. This was to leave, as David Watt comments,

`Anglo-American relations at the outbreak of World War II about as distant as it

is possible to imagine between `friendly' powers.'

It was the common peril of

the Second World War that breathed life back into the Anglo -American

relationship once more. The seeds that were to blossom into the `special'

relationship had been sown.

The relationship is getting `special'

With the end of the war, America showed every sign of reverting back to

unilateralism to pursue a latent rivalry with Britain and her Empire. Churchill and

other British politicians had different ideas. They were to recognise the

importance of continuing close ties with the US. Not even the American hostility

to the British Empire shook their belief that Britain would find her main security

in a transatlantic relationship.

It was Churchill himself who was to coined the phase `special relationship.' It

was brought into the public arena in his `Sinews of Peace'

speech, delivered at

Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946. Churchill advocated, `the fraternal

association of the English-speaking peoples,' which involved `a special

relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United

Especially not after the settlement of the Alabama claims in 1872.

Watt, ibid., p. 2.

Watt, ibid., p.3.

Reynolds, Eden the diplomatist, pp. 70-1.

Also known as `Iron Curtain' speech.

States.'

These words came at a time in which the Anglo-American relations

were undergoing a period of discord. With the two wartime leaders no longer

being in office, the warmth of the wartime closeness began to cool. Roosevelt

died in April 1945, and Churchill was replaced in July by his former deputy,

Clement Attlee. Roosevelt's successor, Harry Truman was no Anglophile. Also,

the Americans were suspicious of the new British socialist government, which, in

one Congressman's view was, `a very long step toward communism.'

Significant tensions between the nations were to arise, not only over different

standpoints in the economy

but also over foreign and security policy in the post

-war world. Britain's foreign and security policy struggled to find a new

orientation in the new world order. Despite this, the central facet of British

foreign policy remained steadfast; `to maintain our position as a great Power, and

this has, indeed, been our main purpose since 1900, when British power was at its

zenith...If we accepted a lesser role, it would be so modest as to be intolerable.'

To fulfil this objective, Britain faced three options. Firstly, it could develop the

Commonwealth as an alternative power bloc to become the `third power'

alongside the US and the USSR. Alternatively, it could revive the wartime Anglo-

American alliance to combat future threats. Lastly, Britain could concentrate on

building an European alliance. At the time, the latter, in terms of building rival

power bloc, was not considered to be viable. The first two options, however, were

not mutually exclusive, and Churchill spoke of them as being interlocking. As the

British remained sceptical of American reliability, the preferred option was to

strengthen the Commonwealth under British leadership. This line of thought was

prevalent in the Foreign Office certainly until 1948 and was nurtured by the

Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin.

He feared, Britain might be reduced to a

humble deputy under an American sheriff. Also, he did not want to act

prematurely to undermine the potential of the UN or to unnecessarily provoke the

Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance, pp. 222-6.

Jesse Wolcott, quoted in Justus D. Doenecke, Not to the Swift, p.61.

For example, the termination of Lend-Lease aid (September 1945), which required Britain to

seek a major loan from the American government, generated friction even as the two powers co-

operated in fiscal diplomacy designed to advance their mutual interests.

Public Record Office [henceforward PRO] FO371/ 124968/ 24, Makins's memorandum, `Some

notes on British foreign policy', 11 Aug. 1951.

John Kent, Bevin's Imperialism and the Idea Euro-Africa, 1945-49, pp. 70-1.

USSR.

However, at the same time, Bevin recognised the importance of good

relations with the US. In a letter written to Prime Minister Attlee in February

1946, Bevin said, `an entirely new approach is required, and that can only be

based upon a very close understanding between ourselves and the Americans. My

idea is that we should start with an integration of British and American

armaments and an agreement restricting undesirable competition between our

respective armament industries.'

However, the close understanding that Bevin so valued had to overcome the

countries' differences over the Middle East security issues.

Differences over the Middle East

The United Nations had a mandate to maintain peace in the Middle East.

However, it was becoming increasingly evident that this was a doomed

enterprise.

For Britain, the security of the Commonwealth directly correlated

with the security and prosperity of the UK. Until 1948, the Middle East was

considered to be Britain's first line of defence.

It was therefore vital that peace

in this region had to be maintained and consolidated. A chasm of opinion

between the US and the UK centred on Palestine. The Foreign Secretary, Ernest

Bevin wished to separate the Zionist and Arab states, and was opposed to the

mass immigration of Jews from Europe.

To do this, Britain had to negotiate

treaties with the new Arab states. This would be difficult to achieve if Britain

were to sponsor a Jewish state in Palestine. Therefore he tried to get the

Americans involved, Although infuriated by, what he saw as the lack of

consistency in a US Palestinian policy, Bevin wanted to involve the Americans to

secure a stable Middle East especially as he was increasingly concerned about

Soviet advances in the region. However, as Bartlett describes, President Truman,

for a variety of political, cultural and moral reasons

, `chose to depart from

There is a revealing Bevin memorandum of 8 November 1945 on post war power realities in

DBPO, edited by R. Bullen and M.E. Pelly, London, HMSO, 1986 ff, series I, iii. 310-13.

FO 800/ 451, fol. 44, Def/ 46/ 3, Bevin to Attlee, 13 February 1946.

Temperley, Britain and America, p. 168.

Edmonds, Setting the Mould, The United States and Britain, pp. 171-4.

Hahn, Discord or Accommodation, p. 282.

For example the approach of the 1948 election, in which the Jewish vote was influential.

professional, diplomatic and service advice at several critical junctures.'

Truman recognized the Jewish state in May 1948, resisting the Bernadotte Plan's

provisions for redrawing the borders of Israel. In desperation, the British dropped

the Palestinian mandate in May 1948, while trying to rescue what they could of

their relationship with the Arabs. In February 1949, Bevin denounced the US

policy as `let there be an Israel and to hell with the consequences'.

Despite, the

differences in opinion over the Middle East and the Palestine question, the overall

result was not to hamper the development of the `special' relationship.

Yet the trans-Atlantic partnership faced the further threat of alarming evidence of

Soviet intransigence. By the summer of 1947, the Truman Administration had

reduced its ground force in Europe from 3.5 million to a mere 200 000. Britain

feared that the US would cut loose from Europe.

As the Permanent Under-

Secretary of the Foreign Office expressed it early in 1947, `with Britain weak and

Russia threatening, too great independence of the United States would be a

dangerous luxury.'

The emergence of the Cold War marked a transitional period in relations between

Britain and the United States. The initial differences regarding the Soviet Union's

intentions began to merge by the beginning of 1946. The US replaced Britain as

world leader as the Pax Britannica transferred to the Pax Americana. This step,

was seen as necessary by the British to face the communist threat.

In 1949,

Western confidence was shaken by the creation of a communist China. Britain,

with regard to her economic interests, was soon to recognise China's new regime.

This was not to please the US.

The Korean War

When North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950, it was put beyond doubt

that the Cold War had spread beyond Europe. For Britain, the war constituted

both a consolidation of, and a threat to, the development of the Anglo-American

Bartlett, The Special Relationship, p. 29.

Louis, British Imperialism and the End on Palestine Mandate, p. 27.

Ovendale, ibid., p. 73.

The developments of British policy towards Europe shall be discussed later in this essay, pp.

41-82.

Sir Orme Sargent, quoted in Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, p. 270.

Ovendale, ibid., p. 78.

relationship. Truman's decision to act with the UN Security Council to condemn

North Korea's, attack was fully supported in London. But there was concern

about the American doctrine of globalized anti-communist containment. Malaya

and Hong Kong also had to be defended against possible North Korean/ Chinese

aggression.

The intervention of communist Chinese in the Korean War initiated a period in

which Britain, although still valuing their Atlantic alliance, saw her role to

restrain Washington. The original UN intention was simply to repel the invading

forces. However, from September 1950 Britain wished to establish a unified and

democratic Korea. The invasion was seen as evidence of Soviet adventurism,

and the Prime Minister felt the Chinese would welcome the removal of Soviet

influence from Korea. Yet he was to misjudge the situation and the Chinese

entered the war. Now, the prospect of uniting the two Korean states proved too

hard to resist. The following two months proved to be the most challenging and

strenuous stage of Anglo-American relations encountered during the Korean

conflict.

Truman's unguarded statement regarding the possible use of nuclear

weapons in Korea precipitated in Whitehall what Roy Jenkins describes as a

`mood of near panic.'

Attlee rushed to Washington to make sure, that this is not

the case. He was anxious to prevent any extension of the war beyond Korean

frontiers. Not only dangerous in itself, this might result in a weakened US

commitment in Europe. However, both Europe and the Commonwealth were far

too dependent upon the US to risk a separation of the alliance. The atmosphere at

the beginning of the Truman-Attlee talks was tense. Although the American

military did consider the use of atomic weapons in response to the Chinese

victories in Korea, Truman was as concerned as Attlee was to avoid all-out war

with China. Accordingly, the official statements were toned down.

Other issues,

however, came to the fore. Acheson reminded the British that America could not

deploy its resources against the Soviet threat in Europe, unless Britain gave full

support to the American policy in East Asia.

It was not only the American

Dumbrell, A Special Relationship, p. 45.

Temperley, ibid., p. 177.

Lowe, The Korean War in Anglo-US Relations, 1950-53, p. 128.

Jenkins, Truman, p. 178.

Temperley, ibid., p. 177.

Foreign Relations of the United States [henceforward FRUS], 1950, VII, pp. 1382-3,

memorandum by Mc Williams, 5 December 1950.

demands for more British support that strained their relationship. Fortunately, for

Britain, the US modified its policy making it easier for the British government to

support the US.

The Korean war demonstrated Britain's dependence upon the US. `While the US

viewed the Special Relationship as an instrument for American system-building,

Britain, belying the postwar realities, saw it as a pillar of her own, a diametrically

opposed design for reinstating herself as a major power.'

The war emphasised

the decline of British power. The lessons to be drawn from the Suez crisis in 1956

were foreshadowed in Korea.

The Suez Crisis

The following years of the Anglo-American relationship were governed by a

rivalry for control of Middle East oil. The leaderships in both countries had

changed hands. In Washington, the transition was from Democrat to Republican

with Eisenhower becoming the new President in 1953. In London, the transition

was from Labour to Conservatives governed by Churchill who returned to office

in 1951. The change of leadership did little to enhance Anglo-American relations,

despite both men experiencing the close alliance during the war period.

Eisenhower and its secretary of state John Foster Dulles tended to view the US

relationship with the UK as one among many, not one having a `special' status.

Eisenhower agreed with Acheson, that too much had happened for Churchill and

Eden to revive the personal ties which had existed with Roosevelt during the

Second World War this would be `a classical example of the wrong way to do

things.'

Having said that, while America was trying to establish a doctrine of

containment against communism in the Middle East, the then British Foreign

secretary, Anthony Eden aimed to co-opt American policy for British purposes,

motivated by anti-communist solidarity. `The British should not allow themselves

to be restricted by a reluctance to act without full American concurrence and

Perkins, Unequal Partners, p. 63.

Manderson-Jones, The Special Relationship, p. 20.

This was seen necessary by the Republican administration not only for their aim of the defence

burden sharing with its closes allies. They also proceeded, that the United States could not

function in the United Nations in the face of the emerging neutralist and anti-colonial bloc with

Britain at its side, see Ovendale, ibid., pp. 99-100.

Bartlett, ibid., p. 59.

support. We should frame our own policy in the light of our interests and get the

Americans to support it to the extent we could induce them to do so.'

The extent of the difference of opinion between the nations, became evident

during the `Suez Crisis' of 1956. The US refused to give financial aid to the

Aswan dam, As a result, the Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, announced his

intention to use canal tolls

to fund its construction. The nationalization of the

Suez Canal that followed on 26 July 1956 provoked a strong reaction from Eden.

Britain considered a military response more or less immediately without any real

consultation with her Baghdad Pact allies.

Britain also chose to act

independently of America, because it viewed the Anglo-American relations in the

Middle East as a `conditional alliance' of interests, and was persuaded, that US

support would be forthcoming on account of Nasser's connection with Moscow.

It was Eden, in particular, who considered, the Egyptian coup to be an

opportunity to humiliate or better still, to topple Nasser.

However, America

failed to recognise the symbolic importance of the canal to Britain.

Eisenhower's refusal to endorse military operations against Egypt forced Eden to

hatch a complicated conspiracy, in which Britain, France and Israel conducted

secret joint operations against Egypt. The beginning of hostilities confused

officials in Washington. Eisenhower presumed, that this, `worst kind of Victorian

colonialism', was an example of Western imperialism, which would undermine

Western security interests throughout the Third World.

However, the American

administration considered the best way to take a lead in the matter, was to take

action in the United Nations, calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and

the withdrawal of all invading forces. The US exerted intense financial pressure

on Britain. By November, 15 per cent of British gold and dollar reserves had

evaporated, while the oil shortfall further taxed the British economy. Under this

pressure, Britain was forced to accept a ceasefire and withdrew her troops.

Despite the British feeling of betrayal, especially at the very time when Britain

Kyle, Britain and the crisis, 1955-56, p. 103-4.

The Suez Canal was jointly owned by Britain and France.

The Pact involved a 1955 agreement between Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan.

Bartlett, ibid., p. 83.

Ibid.

Elliot, Defeat and Revival, p. 241.

Bartlett, ibid., pp. 85-7. Next to his concerns about the consequences opposite the Third World ,

domestic reasons with regard to the presidential elections played a crucial role in

Eisenhower's considerations, see Ovendale, ibid., pp. 111-19.

desperately needed US support,

policy-makers in both countries envisaged at no

point during the crisis, that relations between the UK and the US were irreparably

ruptured.

According to the Foreign Office, both Britain and the US had to

`conserve sufficient confidence and loyalty in the action of the other to prevent a

break-up of the alliance, when urgent events demand immediate action in a part of

the world where only one part is in a position to take it.'

The Foreign Office

came to this conclusion, because they reasoned that in the context of an ongoing

international cold war, and the consequent need to preserve the unity of the

western alliance, neither country could afford to let the rift be permanent. Harold

Macmillan

implemented the `cost-effectiveness' principal of Empire. The

British foreign and defence policy had to take account of the economic realties,

which meant, it should be assessed what value associated and dependent countries

were to Britain, and who would move in if Britain moved out.

Britain's

withdrawal from the middle East region, following the Suez crisis, created a

power vacuum. It was feared, on both sides of the Atlantic, that the Soviet Union

could move into this vacuum. To prevent this happening, the US proclaimed the

Eisenhower Doctrine on 5 January 1957, which pledged support to those states,

which felt threatened by communism.

The Suez crisis and the following decline of British influence in the Middle East

underlined that a closer military cooperation with the US was considered vital if

the UK was to remain an international power. An alternative was to build a closer

association with the Western Europeans. However, Macmillan decided to rebuilt

the `special' relationship with the US. He later wrote, `the most urgent, and ... the

most delicate task which confronted me upon becoming Prime Minister, was to

repair and eventually restore our old relationships with Washington.'

Bartlett, ibid.

The American embassy in London reported on 23 November 1956 that `anti-American feeling

is at a very high pitch', see Bartlett, The Special Relationship, pp. 88-9.

Lindop, Great Britain and the United States, p. 95.

PRO FO371/ 120342/ AU 1057/ 3, `Restoration of confidence in United States/ United

Kingdom relations', prepared by Hankey, 15 November 1956.

In January 1957, Macmillan was chosen as Prime Minister by Queen Elizabeth II, acting on

advice. Eden had to go. The reason given was his health.

Ovendale, ibid., p.124.

East of Suez

Throughout the 1960s, the relationship was to heal very quickly. The launch of

the Soviet rocket Sputnik 1 in October 1957, signalled that America's nuclear

superiority was being challenged. The result was a strengthening Anglo-American

nuclear partnership.

The countries even started to coordinate their diplomacy

over the Middle East, and combined military operations such as the intervention

in Lebanon and Jordan in 1958. Their intelligence services worked closely

together over the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Despite the edict that no

information was to be passed to anyone outside a small circle of Americans, it is

suggested by Ritchie Ovendale, `that Sir Kenneth Strong of British intelligence

was informed of the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, even before the much

recorded apparent deduction by him on 17 October based on beds being carried

into the Pentagon.'

Nevertheless, differences between the UK and the US were

still existed. With the resignation of Macmillan and the assassination of John F.

Kennedy in 1963, new complications within the `special relationship' arose. The

relationship was to cool especially over security differences in over the Vietnam

war in 1964. The US, under the President Lyndon B. Johnson, was aware of the

propaganda benefits of intervening in South-East Asia as part of an allied crusade

to prevent communist domination in the area. However, British officials and

Prime Minister Wilson, did not share Johnson's view over the essential role of

South Vietnam to Western interests.

It was to create a growing strain on the

Anglo-American relationship.

Yet, the most telling development during the 1960s for the Anglo-American

relationship, was the British retreat from East of Suez. This became a necessary

step due to the weakening British financial and economic situation.

The British

were well aware that the US viewed their relationship with the UK as essential to

fight the cold war.

As Secretary of State Dean Rusk told a UK delegation in

Hahn, ibid., p. 283.

The development of the nuclear cooperation shall be discussed in the next chapter.

Ovendale, ibid., p. 128.

Hahn, ibid., p. 285.

See Bartlett, ibid., pp. 107-15.

USNA 641.00/9-1057, American Embassy, London, to State Dept, 10 Sept. 1957, in which the

Embassy looked forward to Macmillan's government coming to terms with a reduced world role.

Yet, it noted, if this were to happen `Britain may appear somewhat less attractive an ally to a

1964, the United States valued its relationship with the UK because `Britain was

the senior member of the Commonwealth', and because `she had traditional ties

and major interests in many parts of the world.'

Wilson was aware of this

American point of view, and as late as July 1966, he was assuring Johnson that

`the UK will not shirk its East of Suez responsibilities.'

But British economy

continued to stagger from crisis to crisis, and by Autumn of 1967 the British

government itself could no longer avoid the issue of devaluation.

In January

1968, the decision was made to recall most of the British forces from East of Suez

by the end of 1971, with the exception of Hong Kong.

The American verdict on

the Wilson defence commitment was clear. US Defence Secretary Clark Clifford

announced at a 1968 National Security meeting that a new era in Anglo-American

relations had begun. It was one, in which Britain `cannot afford the cost of an

adequate defence effort.'

In US eyes, Britain had fallen from a great power

status which contributed to a waning of the `special' relationship in the early

1970s. In the words of John Dumbrell, `where post-1945 commentators had

echoed Winston Churchill speaking of Britain's three circles of influence, (the

Commonwealth, the US and Europe), it was now common to assert that the first

two of these three circles were closing'.

First signs of getting `European'

The Anglo-American relationship during the 1970s can be divided in two periods.

The first, from 1970-74, when the Conservatives under Prime Minister Edward

campaigned for membership of the EEC. Heath assured the French, that Britain

would not be a `Trojan horse', acting for the US in Europe. With this new found

`Europeanness' of Britain, Heath even stated in December 1971, that it his

priority was to formulate an agreed European position before trying to reconcile it

world power like the United States because Britain no longer to the same extent has interests

similar to ours around the world'.

PRO PREM 13/104, unsigned memorandum of meeting in the White House, 7 Dec. 1964.

National Security File: Country File: UK, box 216, Bator to Johnson, 29 July 1966.

In 1954 the British army was still the third largest in the world, a decade later, it was smaller

than West Germany's, and from 1953 to 1963, the British economy had fallen from third to fifth

most productive in the world.

Bartlett, ibid., pp. 115-18.

National Security Council Meetings File, box 2, Summary notes of 587

NSC Meeting, 5 June

1968, LBJ Library.

Dumbrell, ibid., p. 72.

with the interests of the US.

As a consequence, Nixon was determined to devise

a security policy without consulting Britain.

British and American interests

clashed during the Middle East Yom Kippur war of October 1973. London and

Paris agreed their policy of blaming the US and Israel for the threat to oil flows.

The US decided to airlift military hardware to Israel to turn the tide of battle

against Egypt and Syria. However, Britain denied the US permission to use

British air bases to shuttle the supplies to Israel. In the opinion of Alan P. Dobson,

Britain's role as leader of the world economy and defender of the west had began

to decline and consequently the foundation of the special relationship had began

to erode.

The second period of the 1970s was characterized by the attempt of both, Prime

Minister Harold Wilson (1974-6) and his successor James Callaghan (1976-9) to

contain the damage done to Anglo-American relations by their predecessor Heath.

In March 1974, Callaghan, speaking as the new foreign secretary under Wilson,

rejected `the view that Europe will emerge only out of a process of struggle

against America.' It would condemn any consultations within the Community

which had `an anti-American tinge.'

The period witnessed much cooperation

between the two countries; the Soviet threat, the problem of the illegal regime in

Rhodesia and providing support to Portugal on its way to democracy. Yet tension

was to arise when Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974. The American secretary of

state Kissinger, was anxious over the increased Soviet influence in this region,

Meanwhile, his British colleague Callaghan was more concerned over the

Commonwealth membership of Cyprus.

The 1980s Moving towards the Falklands War

Despite the cooperation of the 1970s, the `special' relationship was never to

achieve the warmth of earlier days. However, there was a revival of a certain

closeness following the 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This close

relationship was enhanced even further with the inauguration of Ronald Reagan

Bartlett, ibid., pp. 129-30.

Hahn, ibid., p. 286.

Dobson, Anglo-American relations in the twentieth century, pp. 140-2.

Bartlett, ibid., pp. 134-5.

This will be examined in detail later in this work.

as President in 1981. There was an alignment of policies between the two

countries as well as a good personal relationship between their two leaders. Both

were convinced of the need to reinvigorate containment of Soviet communism.

For both, a close Anglo-American partnership was an essential to such a policy.

The leaders were quick to reaffirm their nuclear cooperation and shared similar

views over the free market economy. Thatcher offered support to Reagan's SDI

proposal, which many European states were reluctant to approve.

One of the

most important tests of their partnership in this era was the 1982 Falklands War.

Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands created immediate and profound

dilemmas for the US. According to David Gompert, `Important American

interests were on a collision course with one another: on the one hand, the Anglo-

American special partnership and the principle of non-aggression, on the other,

Latin American relationships and the ability to maintain peace and tranquillity in

this hemisphere.'

The British, with the Suez Crisis in mind, were aware of the

Latin American dimension to American policy. They launched an intense

campaign to win US support. Once this was achieved, it was to bring about the

most striking demonstration of Anglo-American military cooperation since the

Korean War.

The Americans not only provided logistical and intelligence support but, vitally

for Britain, allowed of use the American facilities on Ascension Island.

Lord

Withelaw, a major figure in the British government, later remarked, `If we hadn't

had the use of that base, we would not have been able to send the Task Force.'

A year later, in October 1983, tensions between the nations arose over the US

invasion of Grenada, an independent member of the Commonwealth. However,

once troops were committed, battle tensions calmed down. By 1986 the US could

once again rely on full British support for the bombing of Libya.

Dumbrell, ibid., pp. 90-5.

He was a member of US Secretary of State Alexander Haig's Falklands mediation team.

Gompert, American Diplomacy and the Haig mission, p. 110.

Bartlett, ibid., p. 154.

Ascension Island was still some 4000 miles distant from the Falklands, but it was near enough

and just qualified as a half-way base.

Withelaw, The Observer, 3 April 1989.

A new World order

The 1990s witnessed the end of the Cold War which led to a radical change in

world politics. Events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse

of the Soviet Union in 1992, made Britain anxious over the future of its `special'

relationship with the US.

The common threat of the Soviet Union, created the

Anglo-American defence alliance, which was often was seen as the foundation of

the `special' relationship. The end of the bipolar world indeed not only

questioned the existence of NATO but also the `special' relationship itself. Since

George Bush became President (1989-93), the personal relations had once again

began to cool. As the Secretary of State James Baker commented, Washington

might favour a `special' relationship with the European Community as a whole

and Germany in particular.

However, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in the summer

of 1990, Thatcher's immediate reaction was to once again adopt of the role of

America's reliable friend. Germany, on the other hand, refused to send troops to

the region, using constitutional inability as the reason. Britain's military

commitment to the Gulf region has continued, through Major's administration

until the present day. From 1998 when the US and UK launched a four-day

bombing attack on strategic targets in Iraq

, to 2003 when allied forces invaded

Iraq to topple Saddam. Britain being the European country to play an active part

in combat. In recent days, it would appear that Britain is the most important ally

in Europe for the US once again. In a Press conference, given by the Prime

Minister Blair and President Bush on 17 July 2003 Bush stated, `The close

partnership between the United States and Great Britain has been, and remains

essential, to the peace and security of all nations... Acting together, The United

States, Great Britain and our coalition partners enforce the demands of the

world.'

World policy highly concentrated on Europe in the 1990s, and though it shall be discussed in

detail later in this work. Therefore shall the facts concerning Europe just serve for the historical

overview.

Ovendale, ibid., p. 153.

President Clinton sent military forces to the Gulf to force Saddam Hussein to comply with his

pledge to permit UN observers to inspect the sites of biological and chemical weapons. Saddam

ordered the UN observers expelled from his country, which caused this Anglo-American reaction.

`Speeches', www.number10.gov.uk.

Conclusion

In December 1962 former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson famously said:

`Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role...the attempt to play a

separate power role that is, a role apart from Europe, a role based on a `special

relationship' with the United States, a role based on being the head of the

`Commonwealth' which has no political structure, or unity, or strength..., this

role is about played out'.

Indeed, with regard to the history of British foreign

and defence policy, it would appear that the European nations have little influence

in British policy. After the Second World War, Britain still thought and acted like

a great power. However, the decline in its power, prestige and capabilities was

about to come. Although victorious, Britain's `invisible income,' earned from

shipping insurance and overseas investments, had been halved. Britain's

weakness lay in her dependence on overseas commodities and capital markets and

their need for them to be easily accessible. Whilst Britain remained a great power,

this was not threatened. However, in a changing post war world, Britain's ability

to police these commodities seriously eroded. However, military bases, political

influence and colonies around the globe, did still equate to Britain being

considered to be the third power next to the US and USSR. The growing

polarisation in world affairs, with the onset of cold war, generated a fear in

Western Europe. Britain's perception of the Soviet Union as a threat, was based

on the latter's powerful capabilities and aggressive intentions. Bereft of adequate

resources and the difficulties of defending her national interests, the UK viewed

the USSR as a threat, which had the potential to endanger Britain directly. With

Britain's impaired economic and defence capabilities, the US was the only

country with sufficient power and resources to meet the Soviet threat. It was thus

that an already close relationship was strengthened by wartime cooperation and

came to be regarded as the most vital strategic asset for the UK.

To secure an American commitment to European security was one of the main

aims of British policy. Freedman noted, `In two cases, both the stakes and the

British contribution were of a high order, Korea in 1950 and the Gulf. In both, the

tendency to gear forces and operations to gain an entry into American policy-

Quoted in Ovendale, ibid., p. 130.

making was evident,'

After the humiliation of the Suez crisis, British policy-

making again sought a close Anglo-American relationship to slow the decline of

Britain as a major power. The British strategy was, `to ensure that Britain remains

the US's most dependable ally, in the hope and expectation that the US will

remain Britain's.'

This however, was not always the case. The `special'

relationship, despite US support for European integration, deceived British policy

makers into believing that there was a `non-European home.' When the historical

dimension is borne in mind, it is easy to understand the reasons why Britain

seems to be a reluctant European. Britain's ascent to the status of a great power,

had been buttressed by an active external orientation, a scheme of affairs in which

Europe figured but a little. This leaves the impression, that strong considerations

of national interests precluded identification with the European movement,

especially in the foreign and defence policy, which is so important for the

sovereignty of a state. This first impression, with regard to a CFSP of the EU

further shall be examined later.

A nuclear cooperation?

Introduction

The nuclear cooperation between the UK and the US originated in the Second

World War. It was Britain who founded the Maud Committee, a research

programme for the development of atomic weapons. By the time President

Franklin Roosevelt offered Winston Churchill full atomic collaboration with the

US, the British were already far ahead. Churchill rejected the American proposal,

preferring collaboration through a mutual exchange of information. However,

with the US entry into the war, American research efforts were so immense, that

it was the US who produced the first bombs. From this point onwards, Britain's

dependence on the US programme was evident.

In 1942, the British sought

military nuclear cooperation with the US. This was finally gained in 1943. In

August of that year, the Quebec Agreement was signed, making the British junior

Freedman, The Politics of British Defence, p. 35.

The Independent, 27 August 1998.

See Melissen, The struggle for nuclear partnership, p. 1.

Details

Seiten
Erscheinungsform: Originalausgabe
Jahr: 2003
ISBN (eBook): 9783832477554
ISBN (Paperback): 9783838677552
Dateigröße: 793 KB
Sprache: Englisch
Institution / Hochschule: Georg-August-Universität Göttingen – Rechts-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften
Note: 1,0
Schlagworte: europe europa cooperation great britain

Autor

Marc Nikolas Liehr (Autor:in)