Public Private Partnerships for Development

Table of Contents

1. Introduction and Methodology

2. Water supply shortage and the consequences for development

3. Theoretical background to water supply management
3.1 Water as a public and economic good
3.2 Water as a natural monopoly
3.2.1 Economies of scale
3.2.2 Economies of scope
3.3 Regulation
3.3.1 Reasons to regulate
3.3.2 Difficulties with regulation
3.4 The privatization-nationalization wheel

4. The concept ‘public-private partnership’
4.1 Definition
4.2 Historic developments
4.3 Partnership options
4.3.1 Service contract
4.3.2 Management contract
4.3.3 Lease
4.3.4 Concession
4.3.5 Build-operate-transfer (BOT)
4.3.6 Divestiture
4.4 Incentives and risks
4.4.1 Advantages for the public sector
4.4.2 Advantages for the private sector
4.4.3 Risk associated with partnerships
4.4.4 Summary

5. Analysis of public-private partnerships
5.1 Case study descriptions
5.1.1 Buenos Aires, Argentina
5.1.2 Tucuman Province, Argentina
5.1.3 La Paz-El Alto Metro, Bolivia
5.1.4 Manila, Philippines
5.2 Outcome influencing factors
5.2.1 The bidding process and initial request
5.2.2 The partnership contract
5.2.3 The regulatory environment
5.2.4 The general political circumstances and corruption

6. Lessons from the analysis

7. Conclusion

Appendix 1: Improved water and sanitation technologies

Appendix 2: Weighted Risk Matrix

References

1. Introduction and Methodology

Infrastructure development, specifically the provision of water and sanitation is a very important issue when it comes to the economic development of countries. Reducing the proportion of people without access to water and sanitation and the involvement of the private sector in economic development are two of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals^[1]. One way to involve the private sector is through public-private partnerships, meaning the combination of forces of a government and one or more companies in providing a service.

Public-private partnerships are increasingly promoted by the World Bank and other development agencies as the tool for successful development^[2]. Most partnership projects that have been implemented so far are long-term projects^[3] with contract lengths of 20 to 30 years.

In January 2003, after only five years, the French utility multinational Suez terminated its 25-year-contract with the city of Manila^[4]. Partnerships in Tucuman and Cochabamba (Argentina) have failed after only three years^[5]. Other partnerships are experiencing increasing problems. It seems like public-private partnerships are not the ‘wonder weapon’ development agencies would like them to be.

It is the aim of this paper to critically analyze the concept of public-private partnerships and its applicability to water and sanitation provision in developing countries. It intends to show the need for private sector involvement but at the same time questions whether development agencies are should vigorously promote the implementation of public-private partnerships in water and sanitation. Indeed, it might be better to reduce the speed of implementation in developing countries because the failure risk of a partnership is considerable and sustainable success cannot be achieved as easily as it might seem.

It is relatively difficult to find neutral sources on the topic of public-private partnerships in developing countries. Literature from development agencies is to a great extend promotional in nature. Critical voices from anti-globalization groups and other opponents of every issue connected to privatization are biased as well. This paper will try to analyze the topic from a perspective that is as impartial as possible using sources from development agencies, critics, and theoretical background in order to develop an opinion that is based on sound analysis instead of only biased information.

The paper is divided into five major parts. Each chapter is designed to answer a set of questions. These questions need to be answered in order to comprehend the whole dimension of the topic.

- Chapter 2: Using statistical data and briefly analyzing the connection between water supply shortage and the development of a country the following question will be answered: Why is water supply shortage such an important topic and what does it have to do with development?
- Chapter 3: The introduction of the theory that water is an economic good and piped water provision a natural monopoly and needs to be regulated create the basis for answering the questions: What is the problem with piped water provision? Why is it so complicated to manage water supply?
- Chapter 4: An overview of concept definitions, options and possibilities of public-private partnerships are used to give a reply to the questions: What are public-private partnerships? What are the options? What are the advantages and disadvantages for the public and private sector?
- Chapter 5: An analysis of four major public-private partnerships in water and sanitation will give answers to the following questions: How has the concept of public-private partnerships been applied in practice? Have partnerships been successful? What are the important factors that influence the outcome of a partnership?
- Chapter 6: The case analysis lessons will be used to develop answers to: What can be learned from the projects and what are the consequences for development policy makers?

2. Water supply shortage and the consequences for development

According to the United Nations Human Development Report 2002, practically 100% of the population in developed nations is using adequate sanitation facilities and improved water sources. Developing countries have an average of 78% of the population using improved water sources and only 52% using adequate sanitation. These numbers are even lower if one is to look only at least developed countries (63% and 45% respectively) or Sub-Saharan Africa (54% and 55% respectively)^[6].

Much has been done during the last decade. According to the United Nations Development Programme about 1 billion people gained access to clean water and sanitation in the 1990s. Nevertheless, more than 1 billion still do not have access to safe water and yet more have no access to sanitation. Even if the “Millennium Goals”^[7] are met, by 2020 there could be 76 million deaths of preventable water-related diseases^[8].

These deaths and even more the non-deadly cases of water-related diseases put a heavy burden on a household, a community and an economy.

If the member of a household is sick he or she cannot go to work and thus misses out on income. Additionally if the sick person is an adult it is very likely that one or more children have to stay at home to take care of the sick family member, missing a chance to be educated. Fewer days at work and higher health care costs leave the household with less disposable income. This is especially tragic because on average at least 25% of the population in developing countries live below the poverty line already; that is on less that US$ 1 per day.^[9]

Businesses can face problems as well. A company that constantly misses a part of its workforce is much less productive than a company that has a healthy compliment of workers most of the time. Having educated workers might be an important competitive advantage for a company. If people are not able to attend school or training sessions because of sickness this will also lower the productivity. Less productivity means higher costs which in turn lead not only to lower profits but also to reduced competitive strength.

Turning the focus to an economy as a whole one realizes that companies that are not competitive cannot be the basis of a healthy and growing and therefore developing economy. Health care costs place a high burden on a household, but government spending will also be affected. Governments of countries with adequate water and sanitation facilities will have to spend less on health care than governments of countries with a high proportion of inadequate facilities. The money saved could be used for other projects such as transportation or telecommunication networks. Ironically, most countries without adequate supply are the least developed anyway, and those are the countries that badly need money to finance the most basic infrastructure in their country such as schools, roads or hospitals.

Figure 1 analyzes the relation between inadequate water and sanitation supply and two important development indicators: GDP per capita and life expectancy at birth. It shows that in regions where people have inadequate access to clean water and appropriate sanitation facilities the GDP per capita and life expectancy are lower than in regions where virtually all people have access to clean water and sanitation facilities.

Figure 1: Connection between the lack of water and sanitation and development

illustration not visible in this excerpt

Source: Own analysis with data from UN Human Development Report, 2002 ( ^[10] )

It has been noted that the main goals for development are poverty reduction and the raising of living standards, and that one of the most important factors that influence these goals are health policies that include access to clean water and sanitation^[11].

Unfortunately developing country governments have not been very successful in providing adequate water supply and sanitation services. As can be seen in figure 1, as many as 55% of the population does not have access to water and sanitation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Asia offers approximately 80% of its population access to improved water sources but only 65% have access to proper sanitation facilities. In South America, Central America and the Arab countries around 15 to 20% of the population lack access to adequate water and sanitation. In Europe and North America on the other hand water and sanitation accessibility is 95%^[12].

More than once it has been emphasized that water is “a key driver of growth and poverty reduction”^[13]. It is therefore crucial that developing country governments find a way that will help them to provide clean drinking water and proper sanitation services for their population. The difficulties with the effective provision of infrastructure services and water and sanitation in particular will be addressed in the following section.

3. Theoretical background to water supply management

3.1 Water as a public and economic good

Water has long been seen only as a public good, a good that is available to everyone and that everyone has access to. Consequently there would be no incentive to sell water because the cost for selling it could not be recovered^[14]. In reality however, water can be sold. This is because some water is more an economic good rather than a public good. Water that is in the ocean or river, for example, is a public good because theoretically it is accessible by everyone and the decision to consume more is costless to the individual user^[15]. Clean water that is fit for human consumption however is an economic good; a good that is of limited supply and automatically becomes subject to the forces of demand and supply and an equilibrium price. In addition, clean drinking water is usually piped and metered and the decision to consume more results in higher cost.

Winpenny (1994) suggests that “mankind […] gets its water too cheaply”^[16], meaning that the price for piped water does not reflect the cost of providing it. One of the reasons for that is that water has generally not been treated as a commodity but rather as a basic right^[17] in the past and that as a result it has been supplied for low cost or sometimes even no cost at all. One of the co-called Dublin Principles^[18] states that water is indeed an economic as well as a public good and should be treated accordingly. A preparatory report for the 2002 Johannesburg Summit mentions that “fair access to affordable water for all does not imply that it has to be free”^[19]. One of the reasons for the difficulties with fair pricing of water supply is that water is a natural monopoly.

3.2 Water as a natural monopoly

A natural monopoly exists when “the costs of production are such that it is less expensive for market demand to be met with one firm than with more than one”^[20] Two main economic concepts are the sources for a natural monopoly – economies of scale and economies of scope^[21].

3.2.1 Economies of scale

Economies of scale usually occur in industries that incur large fixed costs, such as piped water provision. Building the pipe network is considered to be fixed cost and it is also by far the largest cost for a water distributor^[22]. Economies of scale can turn into diseconomies of scale when the cost increase for output expansion is greater that the actual output expansion. A natural monopoly can exist when the range of economies of scale is large compared to total market demand for a particular product^[23]. Consider the following graphs.

Figure 2 shows a natural monopoly. Average costs (AC) decline even after demand is met. This means that the one single company can produce enough to satisfy market demand at any price. Even if it increased output (Q) it would still see its average costs decline.

Figure 2: Natural monopoly

illustration not visible in this excerpt

Source: Train, 1991

Figure 3 illustrates a competitive market. The range when economies of scale exist has become so small compared to output that it is possible to produce at minimum cost even if many firms are in the market. It would not make sense for a single company to produce all the output because it would have extremely high average costs. On the contrary, it would be beneficial for each company to produce only Qn because this output can be produced at minimum average cost.

Figure 3: Competitive market

illustration not visible in this excerpt

Source: Train, 1991

3.2.2 Economies of scope

Economies of scope are only relevant for the existence of a natural monopoly when more than one good is produced^[24]. They exist if the production of a certain quantity of two or more products by one single company is less costly than if these products were produced by separate firms.

In the case of water provision alone it is clear that economies of scope do not play a role since only one good or service is delivered. Klein (1996) argues that “sewerage systems are in a sense complementary monopolies to water supply systems”^[25]. He continues with saying that people might be less disciplined with bill payment for sewerage collection because it is very unlikely that the company would disconnect them from the service. For this reason it is common that water supply, where bill payment discipline is higher because disconnection in the case of non-payment is more likely, and sewerage collection are carried out by one company^[26]. Consequently, even though water supply and sewerage collection are two goods, they can be thought of as one combined good because they usually go together. In this case the existence of economies of scope is not important.

A natural monopoly only exists when the total cost function shows subadditivity; that is when “no combination of two or more firms can produce the desired output at the lowest cost than one firm by splitting that output in any way between themselves”^[27]. According to Demsetz (1968) only one firm will continue to exist if it is indeed less costly for one company to produce a good than it is for two or more companies. This means that even if there is competition in the beginning or if competition is introduced the market will always result in a monopoly^[28]. Monopolistic industries often call for some kind of government intervention, mostly in the form of regulation^[29]

3.3 Regulation

The regulation of natural monopolies is a very important topic and closely related to one of the main goals of economics – to maximize social welfare. One of the most important tools for welfare maximization is competition.

“Competition, in theory if not always in practice, is nothing short of a miracle. Each firm tries to make as much profit as possible without regard (at least directly) for social welfare. Each consumer maximizes its own utility, ignoring others. Yet the result of all this selfishness is that social welfare, in the Pareto sense, becomes as great as possible. This consistency of private goals with social goals – the existence of this ‘invisible hand’ that molds privately motivated actions into socially desirable outcomes – serves as the basis for much of economics as a field of thought and, to a great extend, provides the rationale for ‘free’ markets.”^[30]

The following sections explain the need to regulate and highlight some of the difficulties with regulation.

3.3.1 Reasons to regulate

The existence of a natural monopoly allows firms to dictate the quality and price of a product. Companies strive to maximize profits and with a monopoly they would have the possibility to earn supernormal profits. In a competitive market the market forces of demand and supply regulate companies and force companies to adjust prices to a level that is acceptable for both the companies and the customers creating an equilibrium price where everyone is satisfied. In a monopoly this equilibrium cannot be achieved because customers do not have a choice and the company that is the monopolist could theoretically demand unlimited prices and thus earn supernormal profits.^[31]

Adam Smith’s theory of the invisible hand that combines social goals with company goals is the underlying principle for free markets and maximization of welfare. The ‘invisible hand’ is competition because, according to basic economic theory, a competitive market maximizes social welfare. As mentioned above, piped water provision is a local natural monopoly. The fact that the optimum cost of production exists only if one firm is in the market conflicts with a prerequisite for competition, that is that many firms are in the market. Regulation therefore “replaces the invisible hand of competition with direct intervention – a visible hand”^[32].

The regulator is usually some kind of government agency. It must try to emulate the effects of competition in order to achieve maximum welfare. Important social goals, or motives for regulation, are price control in order to make the service affordable, the protection of public health and safety, and environmental concerns^[33]. It is not suitable to introduce competition per se in the case of piped water provision because of the natural monopoly characteristics of the industry, making effective regulation even more important. The difficulties with creating effective regulation are described in the next section.

3.3.2 Difficulties with regulation

Good and effective regulation “establishes a situation in which the outcome that is socially optimal also generates the most profit for the firm, such that the firm chooses it voluntarily.”^[34] If the regulator had the same amount of information about the firm’s cost function as the company it would be able to determine the optimum output that both maximized profits for the firm and maximized social goals such as low water tariffs^[35]. This is not the case, however. The regulator thus has to find ways how it could encourage the firm to achieve socially optimal outcomes without sacrificing its profit maximization goals.

Creating these incentives is not easy. First the regulator would have to define what the optimal outcome is^[36]. For example, according to microeconomic theory, the optimal output level exists when price equals marginal cost. However, because piped water providers incur high fixed costs it could be possible that the firm loses money even though it uses marginal cost pricing and produces the optimal output level. In this case the theoretically optimal output level and pricing is not so optimal anymore. If a firm loses money it will sooner or later go out of business. After the optimal outcome has been defined, the regulator would have to come up with regulatory methods that force the company to produce exactly the optimal outcome. There are many proposed methods and optimal regulation practices have been and still are a much discussed topic^[37]. Train (1991) mentions some of the most important methods:

- Rate-of-return regulation: The firm is not allowed to earn more than a certain ‘fair’ rate of return. Avery and Johnson found rate-of return regulation to be costly to consumers because it does not encourage the firm to choose the socially optimal outcome. It encourages a firm to use inputs inefficiently; that is a firm is not encouraged to reduce costs because it will not be able to reap the benefits of higher returns.
- Subsidies: Studies suggest that subsidies can be very difficult to maintain especially in developing countries^[38] because of high costs to the government.
- The Vogelsang and Finsinger method: Creates an equilibrium under which a non-subsidized firm will produce efficiently and charge ‘Ramsey prices’^[39]. The regulator would use the firm’s last period cost to set maximum pricing possibilities for the next period. Over time this would cause prices to shift to ‘Ramsey prices’. The problem with this method is that firms might be induced to artificially inflate or misreport costs at the end of a period in order to manipulate the pricing allowance of the regulator.
- Different tariff structures: Examples are time-of use pricing with different prices for water at different times of the day or multipart tariffs with a flat fee component. Many firms use a combination of tariff structures and let the customer choose which one he prefers. Under certain circumstances most tariff structures are said to have the ability to increase social welfare.

Infrastructure services such as piped water provision are generally considered public services and for the last 50 years most water supply systems have been in state hands. The next section shows why the nationalization of infrastructure provision is not necessarily the best solution.

3.4 The privatization-nationalization wheel

At the beginning of industrialization infrastructure provision has been in private sector hands. Railways, power, gas and water networks were privately owned companies in many countries in the 19th century^[40]. In Great Britain, for example, water supply, gas, telegraph and railway companies were almost exclusively under private ownership during the first half of the 19th century^[41]. Competition fostered amalgamation into local monopolies. The monopolistic character of the industry motivated governments to regulate companies. In Great Britain the government started to regulate network industries such as gas, railway and water supply in the 1860s but with limited success^[42]. In the 1940s and 1950s many formerly privately owned infrastructure companies had become nationalized, not only in Great Britain. The degree of nationalization and regulation varied across countries and sectors but the motives for nationalization or heavy regulation were mostly the same^[43]. As mentioned above, these motives included the protection of public health and safety, environmental concerns, price control in order to make the service affordable and others.

Unfortunately many nationalized infrastructure providers did not do well. Income declined due to high subsidies while operating cost increased due to high maintenance cost resulting in increasing financial losses for many nationalized infrastructure providers^[44]. Lack of operating capital led to a general service and performance decline and caused dissatisfaction with the public^[45]. Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1993) have developed a “privatization-nationalization wheel” (Figure 4) that depicts the “vicious circle” that can occur with the provision of infrastructure services such as gas, power and water and sanitation.

Figure 4: The privatization-nationalization wheel

illustration not visible in this excerpt

Source: Adapted from Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 1993

Even though this model was developed for urban bus services^[46], it can be applied to any infrastructure provider starting out with privately owned companies (Entrepreneurship) such as the water providers in the 19th century. When the companies get more powerful through consolidation into one monopolistic company the government decides to regulate water tariffs (Regulation of fees). This leads to a decline in profitability and consequently the company would stop operation. Now the public sector takes over the water pipe network and starts to operate the water provision service. The government subsidizes water tariffs in order to be able to provide water to all households the lowest price possible. Sooner or later the income does not cover the operating costs anymore. Subsequent cutting of subsidies, tariff increases or even service blackouts cause public discontent. The government would see privatization as the solution to the problem and the circle would start again.

Klein and Roger (1996) argue that while there is a need to regulate infrastructure providers there is no need to fully nationalize them because all social objectives of a government could also be achieved with private sector operation and/or ownership. The different forms of private participation in infrastructure provision can be summarized under the concept of public-private partnerships.

4. The concept ‘public-private partnership’

4.1 Definition

Definitions of public-private partnerships (PPP) vary greatly. Manning and Mitchell-Weaver (1992) define public-private partnerships as “a set of institutional relationships between the government and various actors in the private sector and civil society”^[47] and that “several parties have combined forces to define and/or accomplish an objective”^[48]. This is a very broad definition of public-private partnerships. It does not mention any industry or sector and basically just says that a public-private partnership exists when the government and the private sector work together in one way or another.

Savas (2000) treats public-private partnerships as “any arrangement between a government and the private sector in which partially or traditionally public activities are performed by the private sector”^[49]. In his definition Savas (2000) specifically states that PPPs deal with ‘public activities’. Public activities could be for example education, health services, or infrastructure. Savas (2000) actually sets the terms ‘privatization’ and ‘public-private partnership’ on the same level by saying that ‘public-private partnerships’ are just “a less contentious term”^[50] than ‘privatization’. This is in extreme contrast to Manning and Mitchell-Weaver’s definition because they explicitly state that privatization and public-private partnerships are not the same: “Privatization is privatization and subsidies are subsidies; public-private partnerships they are not”^[51].

The most suitable definition of public-private partnerships for this paper is probably the one provided by Bennett, Grohmann and Gentry (1999). It stresses that public-private partnerships are a form of cooperation between the public and private sectors in which the advantages of both sectors can be used to provide infrastructure^[52] (Bennett et al, 1999) and will be used throughout the paper.

è Public-private partnerships are “a spectrum of possible relationships between public and private actors for the cooperative provision of infrastructure services”^[53].

Following Manning and Mitchell-Weaver’s definition the terms ‘public-private partnership’ and ‘privatization’ will not be used interchangeably in this paper because they represent two different concepts.

4.2 Historic developments

Public-private partnerships are not a completely new concept. Early forms of public-private partnerships for the provision of water have already been used extensively in France for over a century^[54]. The modern forms of public-private partnership originated in the 1970s mostly in the US and Britain in order to reduce government spending and to revive the economy^[55]. While public-private partnerships were originally mostly used in the provision of infrastructure such as roads, telecommunication, electricity, gas and water, they are now increasingly utilized in public service projects such as hospitals or schools. When developing countries started to face severe debt problems during the 1980s, development agencies began to apply the concept of public-private partnerships to developing countries for the same reasons that it was used it Britain and the US – to reduce government spending and to stimulate the economy^[56].

During the 1990s the concept of public-private partnerships has gained importance, especially in developing countries. It has been heavily promoted by the World Bank and other development agencies and has been praised as a great new development tool. Figure 5 shows the development of investment in infrastructure with private sector participation in developing countries.

Figure 5: Investment in infrastructure projects with private sector participation in developing countries

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Source: Adapted from Izaguirre, 2002

Many developed countries, especially the ones that have had extensive experience with public-private partnerships in their country (UK and US), support the use of public-private partnerships for water and sanitation provision in developing countries.

The US Agency for International Development endorses public-private partnerships as “the key to achieving higher rates of economic growth”^[57]. The German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development lists public-private partnerships as one of the topics in development and has recently allocated extra funding for grants to companies which want to participate in a public-private partnership in a developing country^[58]. The governments of the United Kingdom and Japan have founded the Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility in order to advise governments in developing countries on the use of public-private partnerships^[59]. The United Nations’ Public Private Partnership for the Urban Environment program, for example, offers grants for certain partnership projects^[60] and it is just one of the many promotional programs that the UN offers^[61]. The World Bank, probably the greatest advocate for public-private partnerships, has funded various projects and has just recently repeated its commitment to the promotion of public-private partnerships, especially in the water sector^[62].

4.3 Partnership options

Public-private partnerships are a variety of cooperation agreements. The most important ones are shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Forms of private participation in infrastructure

illustration not visible in this excerpt

Source: Brook Cowen, 1997

4.3.1 Service contract

A service contract is a form of partnership where private sector involvement is very limited. Usually a service contract means that the public sector has outsourced a part of the water supply service operation such as meter reading or the billing process. Operational responsibility is divided between public and private sector. A service contract is relatively short term, usually not longer than 1 to 2 years. All commercial risk and financing responsibility is assumed by the public partner. The private partner receives compensation that can be based on cost-plus, fixed fee or lump-sum^[63]. In Peru, Chile and Guatemala governments entered into a service contract with firms that would handle such aspects of water supply as meter reading, billing and water purification^[64].

[...]

^[1] United Nations, 2000

^[2] The World Bank, 2003

^[3] Sylva, Tynan and Yilmaz, 1998

^[4] Suez, 2003a

^[5] Esquivel et al, 2002 and Lobina, 2000

^[6] United Nations, 2002. For a definition of “adequate sanitation facilities” and “improved water sources” see Appendix 1.

^[7] One of the UN Millenium Development Goals is “by 2015, reduce by half the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water”. Source: United Nations, 2000

^[8] Gleick, 2002

^[9] The official income poverty line (less than 1$ per day PPP US$) is defined by the UN. In the Human Development Report 2002 the percentage of population living below the poverty line varied from 2% in Chile or Uruguay to 70% in Nigeria.

^[10] Note: Data on GDP per capita index, life expectancy index, people without water and sanitation are all taken from the Human Development Report 2002. Countries were then grouped according to regions and all data was averaged and transferred to a web graph to compare the performance of the different regions in the chosen categories.

^[11] Hughes, 1994

^[12] It would be 100% if the formerly communist Eastern European countries were excluded from the average.

^[13] World Bank, 2003

^[14] Since everyone has access to water nobody would be willing to pay for it if it was sold.

^[15] Winpenny, 1994

^[16] Winpenny, 1994, p. 11

^[17] Winpenny, 1994

^[18] Four widely accepted principles that were agreed upon in 1992 in Dublin by a preparatory conference for the 1998 Rio Earth Conference. (1) Freshwater is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development and the environment; (2) water development and management should be participatory, involving users, planners and policy makers at all levels; (3) women are central to providing, managing and safeguarding water; and (4) water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good. Source: World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2002

^[19] World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2002, p. 8

^[20] Train, 1991, p. 1

^[21] Train, 1991

^[22] Klein, 1996

^[23] Train, 1991

^[24] Train, 1991

^[25] Klein, 1996, p. 6

^[26] Klein, 1996

^[27] Spulber and Sabbaghi, 1998, p. 297

^[28] Demsetz, 1986

^[29] Spulber and Sabbaghi, 1998

^[30] Train, 1991, p. 1

^[31] Train, 1991

^[32] Train, 1991, p.2

^[33] Klein and Roger

^[34] Train, 1991, p.3

^[35] Train, 1991

^[36] Train, 1991

^[37] Train, 1991

^[38] Irwin, 1997

^[39] The term ‘Ramsey prices’, named after their creator F. Ramsey, represents optimality for non-subsidized natural monopolies. Source: Train, 1991

^[40] Klein and Roger, 1996

^[41] Foreman-Peck and Millward, 1994

^[42] Foreman-Peck and Millward, 1994

^[43] Klein and Roger, 1996

^[44] Foreman-Peck and Millward, 1994

^[45] Foreman-Peck and Millward, 1994

^[46] Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 1993

^[47] Manning and Mitchell-Weaver, 1992, p. 48

^[48] Manning and Mitchell-Weaver, 1992, p. 48

^[49] Savas, 2000, p. 4

^[50] Savas, 2000, p. 3

^[51] Manning and Mitchell-Weaver, 1992, p. 49

^[52] Bennett, Grohmann and Gentry, 1999

^[53] Bennett, Grohmann and Gentry, 1999, p. 4

^[54] The Economist, 1996

^[55] Manning and Mitchell-Weaver, 1992

^[56] Manning and Mitchell-Weaver, 1992

^[57] Manning and Mitchell-Weaver, 1992, p. 47

^[58] Bundesministerium fuer wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, 2003a

^[59] United Kingdom Department for International Development, 2001

^[60] www.pppue.org

^[61] www.undp.org

^[62] The World Bank, 2003

^[63] Savas, 2000

^[64] Rondinelli, 2002