The WTO and other non-tax treaties

Schlatzer, Iris

The WTO and other non-tax treaties

BWL - Rechnungswesen, Bilanzierung, Steuern

Zusammenfassung

Inhaltsangabe:Abstract:
The creation of the World Trade Organization (hereafter WTO) in 1995 was a turning point in the history of international trade. For the first time, an international organization was given the acutely significant mission of enacting and supervising a code of conduct for international trade relations. If areas of misbehavior are identified, interventions can be initiated within the WTOs legal competence. A well-engineered dispute settlement mechanism provides the instrument for ensuring compliance with the standards imposed.
Tax-related distortions of international trade result from both tariff and non-tariff barriers. Taxation has the potential of having obstructive effects on trade a phenomenon which the WTO is very well aware of.
The principal objective of this thesis is to describe the WTOs impact on a countrys latitude to design its fiscal measures in light of the effect on foreign trade.
In this respect, the WTOs provisions that relate to taxation are of particular significance. First, after the relevant provisions have been identified, a test will be applied to show the resultant repercussions on taxation. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (hereafter GATT) and the subsequent General Agreement on Trade in Services (hereafter GATS) representing two core agreements of the WTO will be scrutinized in separate chapters. However, to avoid going beyond the scope of this paper, the agreements will only be dealt with in a limited way. Thus, any references to subsidizing will be disregarded. Although the author is very aware of the practical importance of subsidies within the WTO framework, limits had to be drawn.
Primarily, the thesis will give an introduction to the agreements legal status within the European Union and the single European Member States. Focus will be on the impact of the WTO in the respective legal orders. Moreover, the repercussions on individual parties will be addressed as well. Finally, the chapter closes with an analysis of the legal enforceability of the WTO code.
The next two chapters will be dedicated to the GATT and the GATS and their effect on taxation. Great emphasis will be attached to the two major principles embraced therein most-favored-nation treatment (hereafter MFN treatment) and national treatment.
Chapter 5 will shed light on the relationship between the WTO and bilateral double taxation conventions (hereafter DTCs). Focus will be on the possibility […]

Leseprobe

Inhaltsverzeichnis

ID 4475

Schlatzer, Iris: The WTO and other non-tax treaties

Hamburg: Diplomica GmbH, 2005

Zugl.: Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, Diplomarbeit, 2005

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Diplomica GmbH

http://www.diplom.de, Hamburg 2005

Printed in Germany

Iris SCHLATZER

Kontakt:

iris.schlatzer@chello.at

+43 (0) 664 112 84 44

PROFIL

Ambitionierte Studentin der Betriebswirtschaftslehre an der Wirtschaftsuniversität

Wien, überdurchschnittlich motiviert um Zielvorstellungen vor allem durch

Eigeninitiative zu erreichen. Überzeugt davon, durch Einsatz sozialer Sensibilität

einen wichtigen Beitrag leisten zu können, daher hohe Wertschätzung der

sukzessiven Verbesserung der eigenen sozialen Kompetenz.

Spezialisierungen auf dem Fachgebiet der Unternehmensbesteuerung und des

Personalmanagements Bestrebungen in Richtung einer Karriere in der

Steuerberatung/Unternehmensberatung.

Verfassen der Diplomarbeit in englischer Sprache mit dem Thema ,,The WTO and

other non-tax treaties" im Rahmen des EUCOTAX-Wintercourse Programms

2004/2005 mit anschließender Fachtagung in Tilburg (NL) von 1.-8. April 2005.

Interessen: Nationales und Internationales Steuerrecht, Englisches Kino, Digitale

Fotographie, Reisen, Tennis.

AB L E O F

O N T E N T S

G L O S S AR Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

1 .

PREFACE ... 5

2 .

LEGAL STATUS OF WTO AGREEMENTS ... 7

2.1

IVISION OF

OWER BETWEEN THE

EMBER

TATES AND THE

IN THE

WTO

ONTEXT

... 7

2.1.1

Introduction ... 7

2.1.2

Dual Membership... 7

2.1.3

Shared versus Exclusive Competence... 8

2.2

WTO

AW AND ITS

MPACT ON THE

EGAL

YSTEM

... 10

2.2.1

Introduction ... 10

2.2.2

The Allocation of Competencies and the Effect on the Right of Interpretation ... 11

2.3

WTO

AW AND ITS

MPACT ON

NDIVIDUALS

... 13

2.3.1

Introduction ... 13

2.3.2

Denial of Direct Effect of WTO Law in the EC Legal Order... 13

2.3.3

The Academic Discussion of WTO Law's Direct Effect... 16

2.3.4

The Backdoor for Direct Effect ... 17

3 .

MOST-FAVORED-NATION AND NATIONAL TREATMENT UNDER

T H E G AT T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0

3.1

NTRODUCTION

... 20

3.2

OST

-F

AVORED

-N

ATION

REATMENT

... 21

3.2.1

The External Dimension of Non-Discrimination... 21

3.2.2

Wording of the Law... 21

3.2.3

Taxes within the Purview of Article I GATT ... 22

3.2.4

Exceptions to MFN Treatment... 24

3.3

ATIONAL

REATMENT

... 28

3.3.1

The Internal Dimension of Non-Discrimination... 28

3.3.2

Wording of the Law... 29

3.3.3

Taxes within the Purview of Article III GATT ... 31

3.3.4

Deviation from National Treatment by virtue of Article XX GATT ... 32

3.4

ONCEPT OF

LIKE

RODUCT

... 33

3.4.1

Conceptual Delimitation from "directly competitive or substitutable" Product ... 33

3.4.2

Situational Meaning of "like" Product... 36

4 .

MOST-FAVORED-NATION AND NATIONAL TREATMENT UNDER

T H E G AT S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1

4.1

NTRODUCTION

... 41

4.2

GATS

COPE AND

EFINITION

... 42

4.3

OST

-F

AVORED

-N

ATION

REATMENT

... 44

4.3.1

Generally Binding Character ... 44

4.3.2

Wording of the Law... 45

4.3.3

Taxes within the Purview of Article II GATS... 46

4.3.4

Exceptions to MFN Treatment... 47

4.4

ATIONAL

REATMENT

... 54

4.4.1

Requirement of Specific Commitments ... 54

4.4.2

Wording of the Law... 55

4.4.3

Taxes within the Purview of Article XVII GATS ... 57

4.4.4

Exceptions: Limits of National Treatment... 58

4.4.5

The European Archetype: Free Capital Movement within the GATS... 65

4.5

ONCEPT OF

LIKE

ERVICES AND

ERVICE

UPPLIERS

... 70

5 .

DTCS AND THEIR INTERFERENCE WITH THE WTO CODE ... 73

5.1

EGIMES IN

ONTRAST TO

RADE

EGIMES

... 73

5.2

COPE OF

DISCRIMINATION IN

RTICLE

OECD

ODEL

ONVENTION

RTICLE

XVII

GATS

AND

RTICLE

III

GATT

OMPARISON

... 75

5.2.1

Article 24 OECD Model Tax Convention ... 76

5.2.2

Article XVII GATS ... 80

5.2.3

Article III GATT ... 83

5.2.4

Re-Evaluation of Non-Discrimination in the Different Legal Frameworks ... 87

5.3

OMPATIBILITY OF

DTC

S WITH THE

OST

-F

AVORED

-N

ATION

RINCIPLE

... 89

5.3.1

The Fundamental Problem ... 89

5.3.2

Arguments for the Exclusion of DTCs from MFN Treatment... 89

5.3.3

Arguments for the Inclusion of DTCs into MFN Treatment ... 91

6 .

OTHER NON-TAX TREATIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON

T AX AT I O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4

6.1

NTRODUCTION

... 94

6.2

REATIES OF

RIENDSHIP

OMMERCE AND

AVIGATION

... 95

6.3

NVESTMENT

REATIES

... 97

6.3.1

The WTO Provisions on Investment... 97

6.3.2

Bilateral Investment Treaties ... 99

6.3.3

The Multilateral Agreement on Investment... 101

7 .

CONCLUSION ... 105

B I B L I O G R AP H Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 7

L O S S AR Y

Appellate Body

ASCM

Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

BIT

Bilateral investment treaty

CFI

Court of First Instance

DSB

Dispute Settlement Body

DSU

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the

Settlement of Disputes

DTC

Double taxation convention

European Community

EC Treaty

Treaty establishing the European Community

ECJ

European Court of Justice

EJIL

European Journal of International Law

EuZW

Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (German

periodical)

EWS

Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht (German

periodical)

FCN treaty

Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation

FDI

Foreign direct investment

GATS

General Agreement on Trade in Services

GATT 1947

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947

GATT 1994

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994

GSP

General System of Preferences

IMF

International Monetary Fund

IStR

Internationales Steuerrecht (Austrian periodical)

JIEL

Journal of International Economic Law

MAI

Multilateral Agreement on Investment

MFN

Most-favored-nation

RIA

Regional integration agreement

RIW

Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (Austrian periodical)

TRIMs

Trade-Related Investment Measures

TRIPS

Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

VCLT

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

WTO

World Trade Organization

WTO Agreement

Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization

1. P

R E F AC E

The creation of the World Trade Organization (hereafter "WTO") in 1995 was a

turning point in the history of international trade. For the first time, an international

organization was given the acutely significant mission of enacting and supervising a

code of conduct for international trade relations. If areas of misbehavior are

identified, interventions can be initiated within the WTO's legal competence. A well-

engineered dispute settlement mechanism provides the instrument for ensuring

compliance with the standards imposed.

Tax-related distortions of international trade result from both tariff and non-tariff

barriers. Taxation has the potential of having obstructive effects on trade a

phenomenon which the WTO is very well aware of.

The principal objective of this thesis is to describe the WTO's impact on a

country's latitude to design its fiscal measures in light of the effect on foreign

trade.

In this respect, the WTO's provisions that relate to taxation are of particular

significance. First, after the relevant provisions have been identified, a test will be

applied to show the resultant repercussions on taxation. The General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade 1994 (hereafter "GATT") and the subsequent General Agreement

on Trade in Services (hereafter "GATS") representing two core agreements of the

WTO will be scrutinized in separate chapters. However, to avoid going beyond the

scope of this paper, the agreements will only be dealt with in a limited way. Thus, any

references to subsidizing will be disregarded. Although the author is very aware of

the practical importance of subsidies within the WTO framework, limits had to be

drawn.

Primarily, the thesis will give an introduction to the agreements' legal status within the

European Union and the single European Member States. Focus will be on the

impact of the WTO in the respective legal orders. Moreover, the repercussions on

individual parties will be addressed as well. Finally, the chapter closes with an

analysis of the legal enforceability of the WTO code.

The next two chapters will be dedicated to the GATT and the GATS and their effect

on taxation. Great emphasis will be attached to the two major principles embraced

therein most-favored-nation treatment (hereafter "MFN treatment") and national

treatment.

Chapter 5 will shed light on the relationship between the WTO and bilateral double

taxation conventions (hereafter "DTCs"). Focus will be on the possibility of conflict

and the possible prevalence of one agreement over the other.

Finally, chapter 6 addresses non-tax treaties other than the WTO. The purpose is to

show to what extent these treaties include provisions on taxation or "carve-out" the

issue. The chapter's structure reflects the classification of non-tax treaties into

general trade treaties and pure investment treaties.

Until now, research on this topic has not been carried out very extensively. Thus, it

has been a great challenge to gather and analyze data. Primarily, however, the

subject matter has proven to be very intriguing. The thesis at hand therefore intends

to provide an in-depth study of the current state of the relationship between the WTO

and tax matters. Sporadically, a cautious look and future expectations will be

provided. Unfortunately, no one is endowed with the ability to forecast future

developments in international trade relations. Only vague ideas about further trends

can be projected. Nevertheless, it looks as though the WTO's role in leading

international trade relations will become particularly interesting.

2. L

E G AL

T AT U S O F

WTO

G R E E M E N T S

2.1 T

IVISION OF

OWER BETWEEN THE

EMBER

TATES AND THE

THE

WTO

ONTEXT

2.1.1 Introduction

The WTO currently has 148 participants

; these include all 25 European Union

Member States (hereafter "the European Community" or "EC" in WTO matters).

These states are at the same time signatories to the WTO and Member States of the

EC, and are necessarily confronted with different legal consequences as to their

rights and obligations in view of the two "most significant institutional and normative

sites of governance in the world today"

. It is essential for the purpose of further

examination of the potential legal interactions between the WTO, on the one hand,

and the 25 Member States of the EC and the EC itself, on the other hand, to shed

light on the division of power between the Member States and the EC.

2.1.2 Dual Membership

Most noteworthy is what amounts to a dual membership of the Member States of the

EC. Beside each being a participant in the WTO, the EC has been a WTO Member in

its own right as well since January 1, 1995 accounting for 26 WTO Member States

in total as far as the EC is concerned. Therefore, for the better part of the issues

related to the WTO, the European Commission has the responsibility of representing

and speaking for the EC in a single voice and on behalf of the respective Member

States at almost all WTO meetings.

Not surprisingly, WTO matters mainly allude to

the EC instead of single Member States. However, for laws that do not qualify as

Community law and thus permit the Member States to some extent to pass

legislation autonomously, discrepancies in legislation among the Member States are

likely to emerge. In these cases references will be addressed to specific Member

For further details on the WTO Member States, see

http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (accessed on December 3, 2004).

Snyder, The gatekeepers: The European courts and WTO law, Common Market Law Review 2003, p. 313.

See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_union_or_communities_popup.htm (accessed

on September 19, 2004).

States concerning their laws, especially when it comes to disputes alleging measures

that presumably contravene a WTO provision.

2.1.3 Shared versus Exclusive Competence

Article 3(1)(b) and Article 133 of the Treaty establishing the European Community

(hereafter "EC Treaty") provide further clarification of the above-mentioned division of

responsibilities between the EC and the Member States.

In principle, there is a

distinction between areas of shared or non-exclusive competence as opposed to

those of exclusive competence of the EC representing pure Community law. The

underlying idea of conferring exclusiveness upon the EC in the exercise of its

competencies, as is the case for commercial policy matters, is that the EC Member

States no longer have the right to implement laws or to enter into treaties with third

parties independently

Importantly, if the Member States have competence in a field

of shared competence they still have to act in a Community sense. In the context of

the WTO, national competence entitles a Member State to engage in the processes

of negotiating and concluding of the WTO agreements.

Presumably relying on the relevant articles of the EC Treaty referred to above, the

European Commission negotiated the Uruguay Round which resulted in the

establishment of the multilateral WTO signed at the Marrakesh ministerial meeting in

April 1994 and did so in its capacity as an exclusive agent. The fact that the new

Agreement Establishing the WTO (hereafter "WTO Agreement") replaced the old

GATT 1947, updated it and expanded to the field of services and intellectual

property, simultaneously introducing the Understanding on Rules and Procedures

Governing the Settlement of Disputes (hereafter "DSU"), confronted the Member

States with a much broader coverage of WTO law. From the Member States' point of

view, the legal implications were unknown. This gave rise to the question posed by

the Member States whether Article 133 EC Treaty justified the EC's exclusive

See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_union_or_communities_popup.htm (accessed

on September 19, 2004).

For a more comprehensive examination of the allocation of competencies, see Mauderer, Der Wandel vom

GATT zur WTO und die Auswirkungen auf die Europäische Gemeinschaft unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der

unmittelbaren Anwendbarkeit des primären WTO-Rechts (2001), pp. 66 et seq.

Leal-Arcas, Exclusive or Shared Competence in the Common Commercial Policy: From Amsterdam to Nice,

Legal Issues of Economic Integration 2003, p. 5, http://ssrn.com/abstract=569084 (accessed on December 19,

2004).

Louis, Implementation of WTO Rules in the EC Legal Order, in Bronckers/Quick (eds) New directions in

international economic law Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson (2000), p. 498.

competence for concluding the WTO Agreement alone or if the EC shares

competence with the Member States in this matter. The WTO Agreement would then

be a mixed agreement.

In the end, after a legal dispute between the European

Commission and the Member States, the European Court of Justice (hereafter "ECJ")

was consulted and in its Opinion 1/94

decided this case in favor of the Member

States who sought to have their say vis-à-vis the EC in international trade

agreements. Although the EC could still enjoy exclusive competence in matters of

trade in goods

covered by the GATT, the ECJ denied the same exclusiveness for

trade in services and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual

Property Rights (hereafter "TRIPS Agreement"), since both are outside the scope of

exclusiveness conferred by Article 133 EC Treaty.

The dispute finally came to an

end with the joint ratification of the WTO Agreement by the EC and the parliaments of

all Member States, although an explicit allocation of obligations between the EC and

the Member States towards the other Contracting Parties was omitted.

In any

event, this allocation would only be important in respect of the internal relationship

between the EC and the Member States. With regard to third countries, the

Community and the Member States appear as a single Contracting Party responsible

for breaches of WTO law in equal measure.

The absence of such a concrete

allocation has shaped one of the arguments employed by the ECJ for its claim of

jurisdiction over interpretation of those parts of WTO law in which the Member States

are actually competent as well.

This will be dealt with in more detail in a later

chapter dedicated to the problem of the authority of interpretation.

Lavranos, Legal interaction between Decisions of International Organizations and European Law (2004), p. 27.

ECJ, 15 November 1994, Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR I-5267.

ECJ, 15 November 1994, Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR I-5267, para. 27.

See also Leal-Arcas, Legal Issues of Economic Integration 2003, p. 9.

Gasparon, The Transposition Of The Principle Of Member State Liability Into The Context Of External

Relations, EJIL 1999, pp. 605 et seq.

Louis, in Bronckers/Quick (eds) New directions in international economic law Essays in Honour of John H.

Jackson, p. 498.

ECJ, 16 June 1998, Case C-53/96, Hermès International (a partnership limited by shares) v. FHT Marketing

Choice BV [1998] ECR I-3603, paras. 24 and 29.

See chapter 2.2.2.

2.2 WTO

AW AND ITS

MPACT ON THE

EGAL

YSTEM

2.2.1 Introduction

Without any doubt the text of the old GATT 1947 and its successor, the WTO,

impinge upon the EC legal order. The need to take WTO law into consideration from

the EC perspective provides sufficient reason to address the question of the ways in

which the WTO code affects the EC constitutional order.

The relationship of international law with supra-national or national law is regulated

through the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereafter "VCLT"). It is

a codification of the principles of the law of treaties on international relations. Under

the principle of "pacta sunt servanda"

, international law takes primacy over national

law.

The ECJ conforms to this hierarchy of norms, since in the EC legal order the

GATT 1947 prevailed over EC secondary law. This superiority to EC secondary

legislation, as some cases have shown in the past

, was expanded to WTO law as

well.

Moreover, under Article 300(7) EC Treaty, international agreements

entered

into by the Community are not only binding on the international level but are

considered by the ECJ to "form an integral part of Community law"

, being quasi

embedded in the EC legal system.

Basically, the EC institutions experienced an expansion of their sphere of influence, a

tendency that holds true especially for the power of the courts. Above all, the ECJ's

jurisdiction concerning the matter of direct effect of WTO law in the EC legal order

has to be emphasized. Indeed, the ECJ has constantly denied that WTO law may be

directly invoked in the EC legal arena by either stating that the direct effect issue was

not relevant to the case or by explicitly denying such direct effect of WTO law.

See Article 26 VCLT.

Cottier/Schefer, The Relationship Between World Trade Organisation Law, National And Regional Law, JIEL

1998, pp. 83 et seq.

See ECJ, 8 February 2000, Case C-17/98, Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v. Aruba [2000] ECR I-675, and CFI,

20 June 2001, Case T-188/99, Euroalliages v. Commission of the European Communities [2001] ECR II-1757

concerning the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement; see ECJ, 13 December 2001, Case C-317/99, Kloosterboer

Rotterdam BV v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij [2001] ECR I-9863 concerning the WTO

Agreement on Agriculture.

Snyder, Common Market Law Review 2003, p. 315.

For further details on the status of the various international treaties within the EC, see Lavranos, Legal

interaction between Decisions of International Organizations and European Law (2004), pp. 23 et seq.

ECJ, 30 April 1974, Case 181-73, R. & V. Haegeman v. Belgian State [1974] ECR 449, at 472.

Behrens, Die private Durchsetzung von WTO-Recht, in Nowak/Cremer (eds) Individualrechtsschutz in der EG

und der WTO (2002), p. 205.

However, the European courts do employ WTO law as an aid for interpretation.

Moreover, the ECJ does not allow WTO law to be used to challenge the legality of

EC secondary legislation except for two specific situations in which certain

circumstances pertaining to the concrete implementation of or reference to WTO law

are met.

The following text describes WTO law and its influence on the

interpretation of EC law, while discussion of the direct effect issue will be postponed.

This will subsequently be dealt with in chapter 2.3, together with a discussion of the

impact of WTO law on individuals.

2.2.2 The Allocation of Competencies and the Effect on the Right of

Interpretation

In an attempt to survey the procedure of interpreting WTO law in respect of EC law

the difficulty discussed above that arises from the division of competence between

the EC and the respective Member States has to be acknowledged once again.

Actually, one would expect that the right to interpret WTO law depends on the

respective allocation of competencies between the EC and the Member States. As a

matter of fact, this is not always the case, since areas in which the EC and its

Member States are jointly responsible for complying with the WTO provisions

provoke more controversies concerning the right to interpret WTO law compared with

matters where the EC has exclusive responsibility.

Despite the existence of areas

of shared competence, the ECJ claims the right to exclusively construe WTO law in

any WTO matter.

The fact that the EC is authorized to exert exclusive competence pertaining to

matters associated with the GATT is beyond dispute. The ECJ's decision on the

competencies battle with respect to the conclusion of the WTO Agreement provides

the necessary evidence.

As a consequence, the ECJ is entitled to interpret the

provisions laid down in the GATT. In contrast, stretching this right to interpret to cover

the entire WTO Agreement as the ECJ claims is a much more difficult issue and is

worth a more detailed examination.

Snyder, Common Market Law Review 2003, pp. 326 et seq.

Eeckhout, Judicial Enforcement Of WTO Law In The European Union Some Further Reflections, JIEL 2002,

pp. 91 et seq.

Snyder, Common Market Law Review 2003, p. 317.

ECJ, 15 November 1994, Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR I-5267, para. 27.

As already outlined in a foregoing section

, matters where the applicable provisions

of the GATS or the TRIPS Agreement can be invoked fall within the shared

competence of the EC and the Member States. However, it is the ECJ's settled case

law that it has jurisdiction to interpret WTO law. WTO law contains many more

agreements than the GATT. The evidence for the ECJ's attitude in this respect is

provided by a glance at the relevant cases. These will be mentioned briefly in order

to give an idea of the justifications put forward by the ECJ. In Hermès

as well as in

Dior

the interpretation of Article 50 TRIPS was at stake and the ECJ claimed to

have the authority to construe it. The ECJ relied on the argument that the necessity

for a standardized interpretation for the sake of the Community is decisive by holding

that

where a provision can apply both to situations falling within the scope of national

law and to situations falling within the scope of Community law, it is clearly in the

Community interest that, in order to forestall future differences of interpretation,

that provision should be interpreted uniformly, whatever the circumstances in

which it is to apply.

The principle of consistent interpretation of international and domestic law may

support the ECJ's claim for its right to construe WTO law. In other words, in cases

where there is room for different possible approaches of interpretation, domestic

legislation is to be interpreted in line with international agreements.

Providing for a

uniform and consistent evaluation of the respective laws, which presumably could be

effectively fulfilled by the ECJ, would guarantee the required framework for the

compliance of domestic legislation with international obligations or at least reduce the

probability of a clash between the two legal systems. In addition, the non-existence of

the possibility for domestic courts to request a preliminary ruling on the contents of

WTO law comparable to the EC's preliminary rulings procedures

may also foster

independent and different ways of interpretation, again qualifying the ECJ as the

interpreter of WTO law.

See chapter 2.1.3.

ECJ, 16 June 1998, Case C-53/96, Hermès International (a partnership limited by shares) v. FHT Marketing

Choice BV [1998] ECR I-3603.

ECJ, 14 December 2000, Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98, Parfums Christian Dior SA v. TUK

Consultancy BV and Assco Gerüste GmbH and Rob van Dijk v. Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co. KG and Layher BV

[2000] ECR I-11307.

ECJ, 16 June 1998, Case C-53/96, Hermès International (a partnership limited by shares) v. FHT Marketing

Choice BV [1998] ECR I-3603, para. 32.

Cottier/Schefer, JIEL 1998, pp. 83 et seq.

Eeckhout, JIEL 2002, pp. 91 et seq.

2.3 WTO

AW AND ITS

MPACT ON

NDIVIDUALS

2.3.1 Introduction

WTO law's main function is to reduce barriers to trade in order to protect the

participants on the world market, more precisely businesses themselves. Although

WTO law only addresses the Member States, its real nature is to confer benefits to

the individual business entities by laying down the necessary code of conduct by

which the Member States have to abide.

In this manner, WTO law requires that

protective or discriminatory restrictions be removed in order to eliminate market

distortions and to foster a stable and predictable framework in which business can be

conducted smoothly.

The possibility of enforcing WTO law directly in the European courts therefore plays a

vital role, in particular for the beneficiaries of WTO law. They operate against a legal

background that is shaped by both EC and WTO law. The answer to the question of

the extent to which WTO law can be an instrument for challenging the legitimacy of

Community legislation depends on whether WTO law generates rights for the

individual. These rights would then have to be respected by the courts and public

authorities.

2.3.2 Denial of Direct Effect of WTO Law in the EC Legal Order

The ECJ's approach towards the highly controversial matter of whether WTO law has

direct effect in EC law and consequently can be relied on by individual litigants was

exemplified in the well-known banana-dispute

and the EC's adherence to the import

restriction of meat treated with growth hormones

, both of which are in contrast to

the WTO Appellate Bodies' (hereafter "AB") findings on these regulations. One may

infer from this settled case law of the ECJ that neither a Member State nor a natural

or legal person may invoke WTO law before the European courts.

Conversely, an

EC Member State can be held liable for breach of Community law; in other words,

Behrens, in Nowak/Cremer (eds) Individualrechtsschutz in der EG und der WTO, p. 202.

Behrens, in Nowak/Cremer (eds) Individualrechtsschutz in der EG und der WTO, p. 201 et seq.

ECJ, 5 October 1994, Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European Union [1994]

ECR I-4973.

CFI, 11 January 2002, Case T-174/00, Biret International SA v. Council of the European Union [2002] ECR II-

17.

Lavranos, Die EG darf WTO-Recht weiterhin ignorieren, EWS 2004, p. 293.

Community law produces direct effect in national legislation that private parties can

rely on immediately before the ECJ.

The ECJ's reluctant attitude towards the rather sensitive issue of the direct effect of

WTO law is reflected in the preamble of the Council decision concerning the

conclusion of the WTO Agreement on behalf of the EC, in which it says that

by its nature, the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization,

including the Annexes thereto, is not susceptible to being directly invoked in

Community or Member State courts.

Although only a unilateral declaration that cannot restrict the scope of a treaty, the

ECJ used, inter alia, this preamble to support its negative attitude towards granting

direct effect.

If we now turn to the WTO level, a Panel report, in the same manner,

states that

neither the GATT nor the WTO has so far been interpreted by GATT/WTO

institutions as a legal order producing direct effect. Following this approach, the

GATT/WTO did not create a new legal order the subjects of which comprise both

contracting parties or Members and their nationals

although the Panel qualifies this assertion in a footnote stating that

the fact that WTO institutions have not to date construed any obligations as

producing direct effect does not necessarily preclude that in the legal system of

any given Member, following internal constitutional principles, some obligations

will be found to give rights to individuals. Our statement of fact does not prejudge

any decisions by national courts on this issue.

Having now established that both on the EC and especially on the WTO level, there

is no requirement of direct effect of WTO provisions in the respective legal orders,

the ECJ's findings not to grant direct effect to WTO law seems justifiable. However,

the direct effect issue can be regarded from different angles. These are often of

purely political nature, producing conflicting arguments in favor of and against the

Gasparon, EJIL 1999, pp. 605 et seq.

Council Decision 94/800/EC, 22 December 1994, [1994] OJ L 336, 23/12/1994, p. 1.

Broek, JIEL 2001, pp. 411 et seq.

See WT/DS152/R, 22 December 1999 (adopted on January 27, 2000), United States Sections 301-310 of the

Trade Act of 1974 Report of the Panel.

See WT/DS152/R, 22 December 1999 (adopted on January 27, 2000), United States Sections 301-310 of the

Trade Act of 1974 Report of the Panel, fn. 661.

matter discussed. The ECJ's view reflects only one side of the coin. This has

inevitably triggered conflicts between critics and proponents of the ECJ's decisions.

For the sake of completeness, the legal ramifications of WTO dispute settlement

outcomes must not be ignored. After a case has gone all the way through WTO

dispute settlement proceedings

and the competent organs, such as a Panel or

ultimately the AB, have found a certain EC provision to be in conflict with WTO

principles, the unlawfulness of the legislative measure is then uncontested on the

WTO level.

Yet this does not automatically confer the right upon individuals to rely

on such a dispute settlement ruling before the European courts.

In brief, WTO Panel and AB reports do not have direct effect in the EC legal order.

This approach is not surprising, since it would not make sense for the ECJ to deny

the direct effect of WTO law while at the same time granting direct effect to Panel

and AB reports. This clearly would be tantamount to a loophole.

When taking a look at the DSU, however, this seems slightly paradoxical. According

to the provisions in the DSU, AB reports are legally binding and unconditional. They

represent the last stage of WTO dispute settlement and are virtually automatically

adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (hereafter "DSB") unless all WTO Member

States object to it by consensus. For this reason, the party concerned has to stick to

the AB report's findings and there is no option to comply with it by granting voluntary

compensation or withdrawal of commercial commitments.

These quite stringent

dispute settlement procedures are designed to ensure compliance by actually

obliging the parties to adhere to the settlement's outcome. In this respect, the

possibilities of compensation and suspension of obligations under Article 22(1) DSU

are supposed to be applied only temporarily until the defendant brings its laws at

issue in accordance with WTO law.

Nonetheless, the ECJ sees no reason for

granting direct effect; on the contrary, it held that the Community would be deprived

of the possibility for temporary negotiations on adequate compensation if the

contested EC measure has not been duly withdrawn within a reasonable period of

For further details on the DSU, see www.wto.org.

For further details on the implementation of dispute settlement findings, see Rosas, Implementation And

Enforcement Of WTO Dispute Settlement Findings: An EU Perspective, JIEL 2001, pp. 131 et seq.

Snyder, Common Market Law Review 2003, pp. 335 et seq.

Lavranos, EWS 2004, p. 295.

Broek, JIEL 2001, p. 411 et seq.

time.

The fact that compensation should only be resorted to as a temporary

measure when immediate and full compliance is not feasible makes it clear that

dispute settlement outcomes are in fact unconditionally binding on the parties

involved.

Still, the ECJ reserves its margin of discretion with respect to WTO

dispute settlement resolutions by not accepting that dispute settlement findings may

overrule EC law.

2.3.3 The Academic Discussion of WTO Law's Direct Effect

In the literature there are different views as to the correct legal resolution of the direct

effect issue. Some scholars support the ECJ's judgments denying direct effect in the

EC legal system, and put emphasis on the impact of a direct effect through a quasi-

pure monistic implementation of WTO law.

Possible repercussions may be a

diminished flexibility of the EC compared to important trading bodies like the U.S. and

Japan, which regard WTO law to be non-self-executing. This lack of reciprocity

, an

element that is inherent to an agreement such as the GATT which is based on

negotiations

, is one of the main arguments in favor of denial of direct effect.

Similarly, the ECJ holds that the WTO Agreement differs in this very respect from

other international treaties concluded by the Community that do have direct effect.

In addition, the European courts themselves would have to review and evaluate

cases brought before them by individuals, a function that should only be assigned to

the WTO organs in order to avoid differing interpretations of the issue at hand.

Generally speaking, the various areas of international law have too many differences

and result in unpredictable results when allowing for full direct effect in a legal

See Article 22(2) DSU.

Griller, Judicial Enforceability Of WTO Law In The European Union Annotation To Case C-149/96, Portugal V.

Council, JIEL 2000, pp. 441 et seq.

See CFI, 19 September 2000, Case T-252/97, Anton Durbeck GmbH v. Commission of the European

Communities [2000] ECR II-3031 concerning the denial of direct effect of adopted panel reports; see CFI, 28

September 1999, Case T-254/97, Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH Chemnitz v. Commission of the European

Communities [1999] ECR II-2743 concerning the denial of direct effect of AB reports.

Eeckhout, JIEL 2002, pp. 91 et seq.

For a detailed definition of reciprocity, see Mauderer, Der Wandel vom GATT zur WTO und die Auswirkungen

auf die Europäische Gemeinschaft unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der unmittelbaren Anwendbarkeit des

primären WTO-Rechts, pp. 165 et seq.

See the preamble of the GATT, which states that the WTO signatories ought to contribute to the WTO's

designated aims "by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements".

Bogdandy, Rechtsgleichheit, Rechtssicherheit und Subsidiarität im transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht, EuZW

2001, p. 361.

See ECJ, 23 November 1999, Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council of the European Union [1999]

ECR I-8395, paras. 42 and 45.

order.

Self-executing WTO provisions would in any event give the courts with the

power to set aside domestic legislation , the administrative organs which could

directly rely on WTO law and, above all, private parties who would be able to

contest the validity of the domestic statutory framework more importance.

Acceptance of the direct effect of WTO law in the EC legal order relies on the ECJ's

jurisprudence that secondary EC law is to be interpreted "so far as is possible, in a

manner that is consistent with those [international] agreements"

and that the full

effectiveness of EC law would be impaired if there were no way to sue the

Community for damages for allegedly illegal EC provisions.

In addition, the ECJ's

quite intransparent line of argumentation when denying direct effect has caused

sharp criticism. The argument of reciprocity does not seem very striking either, since

some international agreements concluded by the Community are given direct effect

although other parties to the agreement are not prepared to do so.

In addition, the

nature of the dispute settlement mechanism resembles a "judicial procedure".

Hence, the ECJ's preference for the option to negotiate instead of full implementation

is contradictory to it.

Finally, notice should be taken of the arguments that are in between the two

extremes. In this respect, the WTO dispute settlement procedure is of note, because

if a case has been before the dispute settlement organs and a violation has been

discerned, direct effect should to be granted in this specific case as opposed to

situations in which no such a breach has been established yet.

2.3.4 The Backdoor for Direct Effect

Without claiming a full-scale direct effect of WTO law in the EC legal order, litigants

have used another argument that gives a partial direct effect to WTO law. They have

frequently tried to use WTO law as a criterion to assess the legality of EC legislation.

Eeckhout, JIEL 2002, pp. 91 et seq.

Cottier/Schefer, JIEL 1998, pp. 83 et seq.

ECJ, 10 September 1996, Case C-61/94, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of

Germany [1996] ECR I-3989, para. 52.

Lavranos, EWS 2004, p. 297.

Louis, in Bronckers/Quick (eds) New directions in international economic law Essays in Honour of John H.

Jackson, p. 502.

Louis, in Bronckers/Quick (eds) New directions in international economic law Essays in Honour of John H.

Jackson, p. 501.

Griller, JIEL 2000, p. 441 et seq.

Cottier/Schefer, JIEL 1998, pp. 83 et seq.

This means of challenging EC law is in fact directly linked to the direct effect debate,

since the ECJ employs the same arguments to justify the rejection of WTO law for

the above-mentioned purpose of exerting legitimacy-control over potentially

conflicting EC provisions.

The present legal situation on the direct effect of WTO

law in matters that are attributable to Community law can be regarded as settled. The

ECJ definitely does not allow WTO law to have a direct effect that would entitle EC

Member States or private parties to directly rely on it.

However there is an exception, or more precisely, there are two exceptions to the

general rule. Through its case law the ECJ has created the possibility that WTO law

can be directly enforceable.

Admittedly, the field of applicability is a very narrow

one since the conditions that need to be satisfied are very strict. But the ECJ's

approach can be regarded as an attempt to ensure that room be left for private

interests to act as a counterweight to the Community's sovereignty concerning

international relations.

In addition, the creation of exceptions allows the ECJ to act

as a "gatekeeper" and keep the impact of WTO law under its control.

In Fédiol

and Nakajima

the ECJ departed from its denial of direct effect. By way of exception,

it held that WTO law qualifies as a criterion to control the legitimacy of EC legislation.

Basically, in cases where a Community legislative act relates directly to a WTO

provision, the ECJ is willing to construe and apply it for the purpose of assessment of

EC legislation's legality. Moreover, if the concrete implementation of a WTO provision

under a Community law is at stake that aims at ensuring compliance with this

international obligation, the respective WTO provision may be invoked and may

serve as a criterion to assess the legality of the specific EC measure.

Apart from this, there is also a theoretical possibility for WTO law to become directly

effective in the domestic law system of certain Member States, provided the legal

Snyder, Common Market Law Review 2003, p. 328.

See ECJ, 22 June 1989, Case 70/87, Federation de l'industrie de l'huilerie de la CEE (Fediol) v. Commission of

the European Communities [1989] ECR 1781, and ECJ, 7 May 1991, Case C-69/89, Nakajima All Precision Co.

Ltd v. Council of the European Communities [1991] ECR I-2069.

Broek, JIEL 2001, pp. 411 et seq.

Snyder, Common Market Law Review 2003, p. 333.

ECJ, 22 June 1989, Case 70/87, Federation de l'industrie de l'huilerie de la CEE (Fediol) v. Commission of the

European Communities [1989] ECR 1781.

ECJ, 7 May 1991, Case C-69/89, Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v. Council of the European Communities

[1991] ECR I-2069.

Griller, JIEL 2000, pp. 441 et seq.

order allows self-executing provisions. The ECJ created a backdoor for direct effect

by establishing in Dior that

in a field in respect of which the Community has not yet legislated and which

consequently falls within the competence of the Member States ... Community

law neither requires nor forbids that the legal order of a Member State should

accord to individuals the right to rely directly on the rule laid down by Article

50(6) of TRIPs or that it should oblige the courts to apply that rule of their own

motion.

The absence of Community legislation is the crucial condition that has to be met

the Community may not yet have enacted legislation applying to this specific case. In

particular, mixed agreements where the EC shares competence with the Member

States such as the TRIPS Agreement and the GATS are likely not to be ruled on by

the EC. Accordingly, the Member States are solely competent. Whether the national

courts granting direct effect can justify their deviation from the ECJ's standpoint in

terms of their close bond to the EC is still an open question. It is debatable whether a

potential way for invoking WTO law directly before the courts has been created in

spite of the responsibility to harmonize with regard to external relations.

ECJ, 14 December 2000, Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98, Parfums Christian Dior SA v. TUK

Consultancy BV and Assco Gerüste GmbH and Rob van Dijk v. Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co. KG and Layher BV

[2000] ECR I-11307, para. 48.

Broek, JIEL 2001, pp. 411 et seq.

3. M

O S T

-F

AV O R E D

-N

AT I O N AN D

AT I O N AL

R E AT M E N T

U N D E R T H E

GATT

3.1 I

NTRODUCTION

For the purpose of the examination of the two most fundamental principles embraced

by the WTO agreements, most-favored nation and national treatment, only the text of

the GATT will be drawn on for now. The subject matter of the subsequent chapter of

this study will be an in-depth elaboration on the equivalent provisions laid down in the

GATS. In this manner, a comprehensive analysis can be provided and will contribute

to a better understanding of the WTO's most cherished concepts. The main focus of

this thesis will be pursued by consistently keeping in mind the general interrelations

of WTO provisions with tax issues.

Before the WTO came into being the international framework for trading activities

was not very extensive and principles on this matter were not properly developed.

Originally, only the issue of trade in goods was addressed through the creation of the

GATT in 1947. This agreement did not equal the status of an intergovernmental

organization as its successor, the WTO, did. Moreover, in the course of the Uruguay

Round and the establishment of the WTO, the original GATT 1947 was not only

updated to the GATT 1994, it became one component of a set of new agreements

that not only directly refer to the trade in goods, but also embrace other areas like

services and intellectual property rights. In fact, with regard to trade in goods, the

GATT evolved to an umbrella agreement being supplemented by various other

agreements. All together they are the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods

These other agreements typically relate to specific sectors or issues and therefore

take prevalence over the GATT if there is a conflict.

However, the provisions which

will be of interest in the following are to be found in the GATT text itself.

Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement.

For the general interpretative note to Annex 1A, see http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/05-

anx1a_e.htm (accessed on October 20, 2004).

3.2 M

OST

-F

AVORED

-N

ATION

REATMENT

3.2.1 The External Dimension of Non-Discrimination

Basically, a MFN clause can manifest itself in a variety of forms of appearance.

These forms consist in the unilateral or reciprocal, conditional or unconditional and

limited or unlimited grant.

As a matter of principle, a Contracting Party is required to

treat other Parties to the Contract in respect of its legislative and administrative

measures no less favorably than any other party that has been granted certain

benefits.

More precisely, if bound to a MFN clause the most advantageous

treatment that a Contracting Party accords to another Contracting Party or third party

is automatically expanded to the rest of the Parties to the Contract, assuming that

like circumstances prevail. Both the obligation to provide for equal treatment and the

prohibition of any discriminatory behavior characterize the MFN clause.

In addition, the principle of MFN treatment only concerns external relations of a

Member State. It imposes the obligation to contribute to a level playing field by

sticking to non-discriminatory treatment in respect of the international economic

dimension.

3.2.2 Wording of the Law

Article I(1) GATT covers the general MFN treatment.

Generally speaking, it can be

paraphrased as equal treatment among the WTO Member States on a contractual

basis.

With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in

connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international

transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of

levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in

connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters

referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III,* any advantage, favour, privilege

or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or

destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally

Brößkamp, Meistbegünstigung und Gegenseitigkeit im GATT (1990), pp. 26 et seq.

Kramer, Die Meistbegünstigung, RIW 1989, p. 473.

Kramer, RIW 1989, pp. 473 et seq.

In fact, the GATT contains several MFN clauses in its text, however, Article I can be regarded as the most

important one and therefore only it will be dealt with.

to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other

contracting parties.

A Member State is, of course, not obliged to accord MFN treatment to third states.

Conversely, if benefits are granted to third states the MFN treatment provision forces

it to allow the same benefits for all Member States.

Although the scope of MFN treatment suggests that it is very broad, some criteria

nevertheless have to be met in order to render it applicable. Article I(1) GATT

requires immediate and unconditional application of MFN treatment. A Member State

must not subject its grant of MFN treatment to the fulfillment of certain concessions

by the beneficiary as a "quid pro quo". Moreover, the GATT's MFN treatment can be

regarded in a twofold way. Whereas it is in fact restricted to tariffs, charges of any

kind and tax measures in connection with both import and export activity, it enjoys

unlimited applicability within this range.

Since MFN treatment is within the

framework of the GATT, which covers only the trade in goods, the scope of MFN

treatment is considerably restricted. Its application is confined to products, both in

respect of importation and exportation. In addition, in order to qualify for MFN

treatment the condition of "likeness" of the products originating in or destined for all

Member States must be established. As the term "like" product appears several times

in different articles of the GATT and no specific definition is provided in the text, it has

been a matter of numerous dispute settlement procedures.

This gives cause to

scrutinize its meaning. A separate chapter will be devoted to this controversial

issue.

"Likeness" will be analyzed from the different perspectives found in the

articles dealing with MFN treatment and national treatment.

3.2.3 Taxes within the Purview of Article I GATT

Article I(1) GATT specifies the different kinds of benefits falling within the scope of

MFN treatment. Any "advantage, favour, privilege or immunity" granted to any

product qualifies for MFN treatment. In this respect, the article mentions customs

duties and charges of any kind due in the process of importation or exportation,

charges on the transfer of payments, the administrative procedures of levying such

Lal Das, The World Trade Organisation A Guide to the Framework of International Trade (1999), p. 15.

Brößkamp, Meistbegünstigung und Gegenseitigkeit im GATT, p. 26.

Lal Das, The World Trade Organisation A Guide to the Framework of International Trade, p. 19.

See chapter 3.4.

charges, the applicable rules and formalities in connection with import or export and

finally reference is made to Article III(2) and (4) GATT. The term "charges of any kind

on or in connection with importation or exportation" can also be identified as "quasi-

tariffs".

They do not include real internal taxes to which domestic as well as foreign

products are subject. Article I GATT covers these internal taxes by expressly relating

to Article III GATT dealing with the provisions of national treatment on internal

taxation and regulation.

By taking a glance at the designated article it becomes

clear that MFN treatment also covers internal taxes, other internal charges and the

respective laws, regulations and requirements affecting internal sale, offering for

sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.

If MFN treatment is approached from a tax perspective a multitude of issues are

covered. In principle, a tariff can be described as a tax that is imposed in the event of

a product passing across a country's border.

Moreover, these taxes are not

prohibited under the GATT, although they do in fact protect the domestic market to a

certain extent. However, their application must be non-discriminatory, as provided by

the MFN standard.

Neither a reduced tariff level constituting an advantage, an

exemption from a tax amounting to a privilege, nor taxes imposed on the transfer of

payments, export taxes, excise duties, sales taxes and value-added taxes are

permitted to be applied in a discriminatory manner among the Member States.

Finally, a breach of MFN treatment occurs if differing methods of levying taxes result

in less favorable treatment of foreign products. This applies irrespective of the fact

that a tax law per se does not treat these products less favorably in the Member

States.

However, it is essential to remember that Article I GATT only covers products. It

implicitly encompasses indirect taxes as they are apparently reflected in the products'

prices.

These taxes are directly attributable to the product and therefore enjoy MFN

Prieß/Berrisch, WTO-Handbuch World Trade Organisation (2003), p. 99.

Zinser, Das GATT und die Meistbegünstigung (1962), p. 47.

Hoekman/Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System The WTO and Beyond (2001), p. 25

Hoekman/Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System The WTO and Beyond, pp. 25 et

seq.

The enumeration provided does not make the claim to be exhaustive, Lal Das, The World Trade Organisation 

A Guide to the Framework of International Trade, pp. 16 et seq.

Bartholet, WTO und Steuern Interdependenzen von WTO-Grundprinzipien und nationalem Steuer- und

Abgaberecht, Archiv für Schweizerisches Abgaberecht 2003, p. 351.

Qureshi, Trade-Related Aspects of International Taxation A New WTO Code of Conduct?, Journal of World

Trade 1996, p. 167.

Details

Seiten
Erscheinungsform: Originalausgabe
Jahr: 2005
ISBN (eBook): 9783832444754
ISBN (Paperback): 9783838644752
DOI: 10.3239/9783832444754
Dateigröße: 985 KB
Sprache: Englisch
Institution / Hochschule: Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien – unbekannt, österreichisches und internationales Steuerrecht
Erscheinungsdatum: 2005 (April)
Note: 1,0
Schlagworte: direct taxation most-favored-nation treatment nation double convention gats

Autor

Iris Schlatzer (Autor:in)

The WTO and other non-tax treaties

Zusammenfassung

Leseprobe

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Details

Autor

Iris Schlatzer (Autor:in)